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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate acquiSitiOns, particularly leveraged cost basis acquisitions by an 
acquiring or purchasing corporation (P), of assets or stock of a target corporation 
(T), have been a popular topic in recent years. • A key element in determining 
the tax consequences of such acquisitions with respect to T, its shareholders, 
and P, is the sales price of T's assets or stock. However, the tax consequences 
remain uncertain in the following situations: (1) when part of the purchase price 
I. See, e.g., Final Days of Free Lunch; Congress Tries to Plug a Treasury Leak, NEWSWEEK, 
Feb. 3, 1986, at 44; The Heart of the Matter, FoRBES, June 17, 1985, at 136; The Tax Muddle 
That Could Spur More Takeovers, Bus. WK., May 14, 1984, at 166; Closed Loopholes That Open 
Merger Problems, Bus. WK., Oct. 18, 1982, at 173. For a more scholarly look at the tax impact 
on mergers and acquisitions, see STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
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consists of contingent payments by P; or (2) when T's assets include a contingent 
claim that T either sells to P, retains in a T stock acquisition by P, or distributes 
to its shareholders in connection with the sale of assets or stock. 
The continuing uncertainty in an area rife with case-law doctrine and ever-
increasing technical attempts at legislative reform primarily is attributable to a 
frequent, fundamental failure of such endeavors to utilize deep structure analysis. 2 
The courts have failed to provide a functional rationale for attributing income 
to a corporation and thereby overriding the General Utilities & Operating Co. 
v. Helvering3 shield of sections 336, 337, and 338 regarding: (1) the corporation's 
liquidating distribution (section 336); (2) its sale of assets pursuant to liquidation 
(section 337); and (3) the sale of stock by shareholders that is treated as a sale 
of the corporation's assets (section 338). This failure is compounded by a dearth 
of analysis that discusses why a complete liquidation should be held "open" in 
certain circumstances thus deferring income outside of the installment reporting 
provisions of section 453 at the T shareholder level. 
First, this Article discusses the Internal Revenue Code context in a trans-
actional framework. 4 Second, the conventional case-law doctrines that apply to 
contingent items in a cost basis acquisition of T at the T shareholder and T 
corporate levels are analyzed.' This section of the Article asserts that such 
doctrines handle contingent items inadequately due to a confusion of the deep 
structure policy of clear reflection of income with traditional tax accounting 
rules. Third, the Article develops a correlative year 2 adjustment model that 
achieves a clearer reflection of income than the conventional doctrine's treatment 
of T's and T shareholder's income in cost-basis acquisitions that involve con-
tingent items and create an effect in more than one tax year. 6 This model is 
based on the conceptual premises underlying various year I and year 2 case-
law exceptions to the annual accounting principle under which year I stands on 
its own with a final accounting based on events completed in that year and is 
not readjusted by events completed in subsequent years. Fourth, the Article 
compares the application of the conventional doctrine and the correlative ad-
justment model with the following contingent items: (I) P's contingent purchase 
price for T's stock or assets; (2) contingent items sold by T to P; and (3) 
contingent items distributed by T to its shareholders. 7 This section suggests 
reformulation of the proposed and temporary section 338 regulations as well as 
the section 337 regulations. Fifth, this Article analyzes the effect of recent 
ASPECTS OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND OTHER CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS {AND S. 420, 
S. 476 AND S. 632), 99th Cong., lst Sess. 2 (1985); STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. {1985); Forman, Using 
the Tax Code to Fend Off Corporate Takeover 'Sharks', 26 TAX NoTES 1162 (1985). For a summary 
of the hearings before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on oversight and select revenue 
measures concerning mergers and acquisitions, see Forman, Ways and Means Examines Tax Aspects 
of Mergers, 27 TAX NOTES 121 (1985). 
2. Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J. 861, 861 
(1976) ("(D)ifficulty in understanding tax law most frequently arises from failure by those who use 
basic concepts to grasp their meaning, rather than from any excessive attempt at statutory precision."). 
3. 296 u.s. 200 (1935). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 11-223. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 224-436. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 437-559. 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 560-673. 
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legislative enactments. 8 This section concludes that the legislative enactments still 
fail to address the contingent income problem and suggests several alternative 
legislative resolutions. Sixth, the Article evaluates the performance of the courts 
and Congress in this area to date. 9 The Article concludes that the judiciary is 
in the best position to achieve a deep structure analysis, but with clear thinking, 
either the courts, the drafters of regulations, or Congress could adopt an analytical 
framework that achieves a clearer reflection of income. 
11. STATUTORY REGIMES 
A. Introduction 
In order to determine the tax consequences of a P cost-basis acquisition of 
T's assets several major statutory regimes must be applied. If the acquisition 
is direct-pursuant to T's complete liquidation-section 337 applies. 10 If the 
acquisition is a stock purchase and is deemed a liquidation, section 338 applies. 11 
These sections apply to all parties to the transaction if: (l) P's purchase price 
of T's stock or assets is partially contingent; (2) T's assets include a contingent 
claim that is purchased by P in a section 337 transaction, or is deemed purchased 
by T as a new corporation (Neo-n under a section 338 election by P; or (3) 
T distributes a contingent claim to its shareholders pursuant to its complete 
liquidation and sale of its assets or the sale of its stock to P. 12 
/. Paradigm Asset Acquisition (Section 337) 
If P acquires some ofT's assets pursuant to T's complete liquidation, section 
337 11 applies at the T level to shield T from recognition of gain or loss on the 
sale of the "property." 14 This shield applies during the twelve-month period 
commencing on the date of the adoption of T's plan of complete liquidation. 1' 
This shield is lifted in certain instances even if the item in question qualifies 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 674-88. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 689-96. 
10. I.R.C. § 337 (West Supp. 1986). 
II. /d. § 338. 
12. /d. §§ 337-38. 
13. /d. § 337(a). Section 337(a) provides that no gain or loss is recognized to a distributing 
corporation from the sale or exchange of property within the 12-month period beginning from the 
date on which the corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation, provided that the corporation 
distributes all of its assets other than those retained to meet claims within such period. Section 337 
also shields the liquidating corporation from recognition of gain attributed to it from sales ostensibly 
made at the distributee shareholder level within such period. /d. 
14. Section 337(b) defines property as excluding: (I) stock in trade and inventory; and (2) 
installment obligations generated by sales of such inventory. /d. § 337(b)(l ). However, a "bulk 
sale," to one person in one transaction, of all of the inventory amibutable to the trade or business 
of the liquidating corporation is included in the term "property" together with any installment 
obligations generated by such a bulk sale. /d. § 337(b)(2). These definitional rules and counter rules 
are intended to effectuate the statutory goal of denying § 337's shield to "sales in the ordinary 
course of business !which) shall result in ordinary gain to the corporation as if the corporation 
were not in the process of liquidating." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1954). See 
generally Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494, 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 u.s. 848 (1970). 
15. I.R.C. § 337(a) (West Supp. 1986). 
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as "property." In particular, the "assignment of income" 16 and "tax benefit" 17 
case-law doctrines, the statutory depreciation recapture provisions of sections 
1245 1" and 1250, 19 and the clear reflection of income requirement of sections 
446(b)ll' and 48221 override the section 337 exemption. 22 If T distributes a con-
tingent income item or any other property in complete liquidation while selling 
its other assets to P (a "bootstrap acquisition"), 2·1 section 336 applies to shield 
16. The "assignment of income" doctrine, which prevents taxpayers from avoiding taxation 
by shifting income from the person or entity that earns it to another person, applies to § 337. See 
Stewart's Trust v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 682, 692-93 (1975); Rev. Rul. 77-190, 1977-1 C.B. 88; 
see also infra text accompanying notes 331-36. 
17. The classic tax benefit situation consists of a deduction in year I followed by an inconsistent 
event in a subsequent year (year 2). See infra text accompanying notes 391-93. A sale under § 337 
historically has been treated as an event that is inconsistent with a prior deduction so that courts 
apply the rule to § 337 sales. See infra text accompanying notes 406-12. 
18. I. R.C. § 1245(a) (West Supp. 1986). The personal property depreciation recapture provision 
was enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1962. Section 1245 converts what otherwise would be 
capital gain into ordinary income by requiring inclusion of any gain attributable to depreciation 
and deductions previously claimed by the taxpayer on § 1245 property. Income must be included 
to the extent that the depreciation allowed or allowable exceeds the property's actual decline in 
value. Section 1245 is applicable primarily to depreciable personal property and certain real property 
to which maximum accelerated depreciation and ACRS (Accelerated Cost Recovery System) life has 
been applied. /d. §§ 1245(a){3), 1245(a)(5). Justice O'Connor describes §§ 1245 and 1250 as partial 
statutory codifications of the tax benefit doctrine. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 
370, 386 n.20 (1983). In short, the recapture provisions serve to correct the conceptual error that 
was contained in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I (1947), under which ordinary depreciation 
deductions can give rise to capital gains because such deductions reduce the basis arising from 
indebtedness. /d. at 15-16; see infra text accompanying notes 496-503. The Revenue Act of 1962 
also enacted investment tax credit recapture provisions that apply to premature dispositions of 
property. I.R.C. § 47 (West Supp. 1986). 
19. I.R.C. § 1250(a) (West Supp. 1986). Congress applied a more limited depreciation recapture 
rule to certain real estate. Gain on disposition of residential real property held for more than one 
year is recaptured as ordinary income to the extent that prior depreciation deductions exceed 
depreciation computed on the straightline method. /d. § 1250(a)(I)(B). Gain on the disposition of 
nonresidential real property held for more than one year, however, generally is subject to recapture 
of all depreciation unless a straight line method has been elected, notwithstanding use of ACRS's 
substantially shorter Jives. /d. § 1245(a)(5). See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 
TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: CoRPORATE TAXATION, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1985) (hereinafter TAX REFORM 
PROPOSALS). For a list of other potential recapture provisions see id. at 41; Ferguson & Stiver, 
Taxable Corporate Acquisitions After TEFRA, 42 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 12.05, at 12-30 n.76 
(1984). 
20. I.R.C. § 446(b) (West Supp 1986). Section 446(b) provides that if no method of tax 
accounting has been used regularly by the taxpayer, or if the method does not reflect income clearly, 
the Treasury can recompute taxable income under a method that reflects income clearly. This 
provision often has been the basis for a judicially fashioned quasi-common-law clear reflection of 
income requirement, but at other times it has been limited to accepted accounting methods. See 
infra text accompanying notes 373, 383 & 385-89. The clear reflection of income requirement, 
however, overrides § 337. See Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202, 204~ (9th Cir. 1962). 
21. I.R.C. § 482 (West Supp. 1986). Section 482 provides that the Treasury may distribute, 
apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among two or 
more businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interest, if the Treasury 
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent 
evasion of taxes or to reflect income clearly. /d. On occasion, this provision has formed the basis 
for a common-law clear reflection of income doctrine. See infra note 374. 
22. See generally TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 40. 
23. A "bootstrap" acquisition involves the transfer of control of a target corporation (T) 
under which a substantial part of the stock owned by the existing T shareholders is redeemed so 
that the purchasing corporation (P) pays only for the balance of the former T shareholders' stock. 
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T from recognition of gain or loss on the assets distributed. Essentially, section 
336 is subject to the same case-law and statutory exceptions2• that apply to 
section 337. However, in a bootstrap acquisition the assignment of income and 
clear reflection of income doctrines generally have been held not to apply to 
T's distribution of "inchoate" or contingent income items. 2 ~ These holdings are 
the result of an erroneous limitation of the two doctrines to income "accrued" 
under traditional tax accounting methods. 
At the T shareholder level, liquidating distributions are treated as "con-
structive" sales or exchanges under section 331, thereby qualifying for capital 
gains treatment. 26 1 f P purchases the assets ofT pursuant to a complete liquidation 
ofT to which section 337 applies, T's shareholders may report principal payments 
received under any notes of P on the installment basis, 27 thereby applying a 
portion of their basis in the T stock against each paymentY If P's purchase 
price is partially contingent because it is based in part on events that will be 
completed in a future tax year (year 2), each former T shareholder may opt 
out of section 453 and hold the transaction "open" in the year ofT's liquidation 
(year 1). 29 Such an election has the effect of deferring the recognition of any 
gain until payments in excess of basis actually are received.-'" All gains retain 
the same character as if they were received at the time of the initial liquidation, 
but are subject to the time value of money rules.-' 1 Alternatively, if T distributes 
a contingent income item in liquidation, the T shareholders may report the entire 
transaction in installments under section 453.n However, a T shareholder cannot 
8. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, fEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS , 9.25, at 9-
35 (4th ed. 1979). In the basic stock acquisition, transaction some stock is redeemed by T while 
other stock is sold to P. In an asset sale, however, T more commonly sells part of its assets to 
P and distributes the proceeds of this sale and the remainder of its assets to its shareholders in 
complete liquidation of their stock. Under the current law, the same consequences occur at the 
shareholder level with respect to liquidating distribution for the shareholder's stock in a §§ 331-
337 asset sale or a redemption of part of the shareholder's stock and a sale of the remainder to 
P in a § 338 stock acquisition-bootstrap distribution. In the asset sale, § 336 would apply to the 
asset distribution at the T level. A special provision under § 338 produces the same result in a 
qualified stock sale. See infra note 38. 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61. 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 383 & 385-86. 
26. I.R.C. § 331(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 331(a) provides that amounts received by a 
shareholder in a distribution in complete liquidation are treated as full payment in exchange for 
the stock of the liquidated corporation. Under current law, capital gains and basis recovery result 
from such a constructive sale or exchange. See id. §§ 1001, 1202, 1221. 
27. /d. § 453(h)( I). Section 453(h)( I) is drawn narrowly in order to permit a shareholder 
who receives an installment obligation acquired in respect of a § 337 sale or exchange from a § 
331 liquidation to which § 337 applies to be treated as receiving payment for the liquidated stock 
only upon receipt of payments from the purchaser. See infra text accompanying notes 146-47. 
28. The former T shareholders apply the rules of § 453 to the installment reported P payments. 
These rules generally provide for recognition of income in each tax year in proportion to the 
payments received in that year. See infra text accompanying note 120. 
29. I.R.C. § 453(d) (West Supp. 1986). 
30. See infra note 122. If basis recovery (i.e., "open transaction") reporting is available, the 
taxpayer may defer recognition of gain until payments in excess of basis are received. See infra 
text accompanying notes 237-56. 
31. The linkage of timing and character in the open transaction doctrine is discussed infra 
in text accompanying note 242. The time value of money rules apply to the classic open transaction. 
See infra text accompanying notes 151-82 & 203. 
32. I.R.C. § 4530)(2) (West Supp. 1986). Section 4530)(2) provides for legislative regulations 
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both opt out of section 453 and report any of P's notes distributed in T's 
liquidation. Thus, if a substantial portion of P's noncontingent payments will 
be made in the future, election out of section 453 is impractical. 
P's basis in assets purchased pursuant to a complete liquidation of T is 
equal to its costs in such assets. In addition, the basis includes any of T's 
liabilities assumed as well as any of P's purchase liabilities,'-' unless these liabilities 
are "contingent" or exceed the fair market value of the assets acquired.q 
2. Paradigm Stock Acquisition (Section 338) 
As an alternative to the paradigm asset acquisition discussed above, P instead 
may acquire T's stock and make a timely election under section 338.'; Section 
338 provides in part that (Old) T is deemed to have sold all of its assets in a 
single sale to which section 337 applies as of the date that P acquired control 
of the T stock.'" The statutory goal of this hypothetical bulk sale is recognition 
of income or loss by Old T to the same extent as if T actually had sold its 
assets pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation. n If Old T distributes items-
including contingent items-in connection with a sale of its stock without actually 
permiting installment reponing when the selling price is not readily ascertainable. Temporary reg-
ulations issued under this provision are discussed infra in notes 117-30. 
33. See l.R.C. § 1012 (West Supp. 1986); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I (1947); Bolger 
v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973); Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. Rev. 
Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59; Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773 (1957). 
34. For a substantial period, courts have denied an initial inclusion of contingent liabilities 
in the basis. CRC Corp. v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 281, 283 (3d Cir. 1982); Brountas v. Com-
missioner, 692 F.2d 152, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 73 T.C. 491 (1979); Gibson Prods. v. United 
States, 637 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1981); Rodman v. Commissioner, 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976); 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1266, 1269 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Estate 
of Baron v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 542, 549 (1984); Lemery v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 367, 377-
78 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1971 ); Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Commissioner, 
42 T.C. 834, 848 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1966). More recently, in the 
face of tax shelter abuses, courts have begun to deny the inclusion of liability in basis when the 
liability exceeds the fair market value of the property. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 
F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976); Estate of Baron, 83 T.C. 542 (1984); Wildman v. Commissioner, 
78 T.C. 943, 952 (1982). Treatment of contingent liabilities is beyond the scope of this Article. 
35. l.R.C § 338 (West Supp. 1986). The purpose of§ 338, in conjunction with the installment 
reporting provisions, is to produce tax parity with asset purchases (§ 337) at the following levels: 
(I) the former T shareholder level; (2) the T level; and (3) the P level. Therefore, in the paradigm 
transaction, the former T shareholders may installment report the capital gains that are received 
on the surrender of their stock to the P. P or its surrogate new target (Neo-T), is deemed to start 
off with a clean slate of corporate attributes and a hypothetical cost basis in Old T's assets equal 
10 P's basis in its T stock, adjusted for T's liabilities and other relevant items. The toll charge 10 
Old T for such step up is recognition of the recapture income that Old T would have recognized 
in a hypothetical § 337 bulk sale had it sold all of its assets at fair market value in a bulk sale 
10 which § 337 was applicable. /d. §§ 338(a) and (b); see STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND 
fiSCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT of 1982, 133 (Comm. Print 1982) Jhereinafter 1982 BLUEBOOK). However, 
parity was not obtained in all circumstances. See, e.g., Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.05[7], 
at 12-54; Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, 38 TAx L. REv. 171, 269 (1983). 
36. l.R.C. § 338(a)(l) (West Supp. 1986). The acquisition date is defined generally as the 
first day that there is a qualified stock purchase of the stock of the T. /d. § 338(h)(2). The 
requirements for a "qualified stock purchase" are discussed infra at note 113. 
37. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
536, 539 (1982); S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1982). -
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liquidating and P elects section 338, the tax consequences at the Old T level 
of this distribution, nevertheless, are governed by section 336 . .1x 
In a stock sale to P, the T shareholders enjoy an actual sale or exchange, 
and if P's payments are paid in installments the former T shareholders may 
installment report any gain.-'~ Moreover, if P makes contingent payments, or if 
T distributes contingent items in a bootstrap acquisition, •o the former T share-
holders either may report their gain or may elect out of section 453 and treat 
the contingent payments or items as though they were received in an open 
transaction with common-law basis recovery reporting} 1 However, a former T 
shareholder cannot both hold the contingent portion of the bootstrap acquisition 
open by electing out of section 453 and installment report future P payments 
for the T stock. Thus, as in a sale of assets by T, election out of section 453 
may not be practical at the former T shareholder level. 
If P is unrelated to the former T shareholders, payments by P and any 
distribution by T to such shareholders in connection with the sale of their stock 
of T to P will qualify for capital gains treatment under the "bootstrap acqui-
sitions" doctrine. The bootstrap acquisitions doctrine combines the former T 
shareholder level redemption by T and the sale at the former T shareholder 
level for most tax transactions}~ 
Section 338 also provides that the Neo-T is deemed to have purchased Old 
T's assets (on the day following the date P acquired control of Old T's stock) 
for an amount equal to P's cost in Neo T's stock. This basis is adjusted for 
T's liabilities and other relevant items}-' Consequently, in a section 338 stock 
purchase, Neo-T's basis in its assets is the analogue of P's basis in T's assets 
in a section 337 transaction. 
B. Historical Development of Sections 336 and 337: Asset Acquisitions 
I. Pre-1954 Code 
Prior to the 1954 Code, there were no express statutory provisions governing 
the tax treatment of a corporation that had distributed appreciated or depreciated 
property in either liquidating or nonliquidating transactions}• However, long-
standing Treasury regulations provided that no gain or loss would be recognized 
38. I.R.C. § 338(c)(2) (West Supp. 1986). Section 338{c){2) provides that if, in connection 
with a qualified stock purchase when § 338 is elected, T makes a distribution in complete redemption 
of all the stock owned by a shareholder, § 336 is deemed to apply to the distribution as if it were 
a distribution in complete liquidation. The purpose of § 338(c)(2) is to preclude gain from being 
recognized by T under the provisions of § 3ll(c) which relates to stock redemptions by a continuing 
corporation. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 134; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, supra note 37, at 
540. 
39. I.R.C. § 543(c) (West Supp. 1986); see infra note 123. 
40. In a bootstrap acquisition coupled with a § 338 election, T distributes unwanted assets 
in a partial redemption of the former T shareholder's T stock. See supra note 13. I.R.C. § 338(c)(2), 
discussed supra at note 28, applies in this context. 
41. See infra text accompanying notes 237-318. 
42. See supra note 23. 
43. I.R.C. §§ 338(a)(2), 338(b) (West Supp. 1986); see infra note 101. 
44. Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of the 
General Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 81, 82-83 (1985). 
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from a mere in-kind distribution in partial or complete liquidation}~ Approx-
imately twenty years prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, in General Utilities 
& Operating Co. v. Helvering,~h the Supreme Court ruled that a nonliquidating 
distribution of appreciated property did not constitute a sale at the corporate 
level.., In addition, the Court stated that such distributing corporation did not 
realize discharge of indebtedness income under the government's theory that the 
distribution discharged the corporation's obligation to pay a dividend once 
declared."" Interestingly, the circuit court in General Utilities held that the 
distributing corporation was liable for the taxes on the appreciation because the 
corporation, in substance, had made a sale of the distributed appreciated property. 
The circuit court stated that the sale had been made by the shareholders because 
the continuing corporation had negotiated the sale. 49 The Supreme Court declined 
to address this issue because it was not raised in the trial court below. so 
A decade later, in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,~ 1 the Supreme Court 
held that a shareholder sale of appreciated assets that were distributed to T's 
shareholders by T in its complete liquidation could be recharacterized as a taxable 
sale by T followed by a liquidating distribution of the proceeds to the share-
45. See Treas. Reg. § 39.22(a)-20 (1953) (originally promulgated as Treas. Reg. § 45, Art. 
547 (1919)); Wolfman, supra note 44, at 82 n.3. 
46. 296 U.S. 200 (1935); see supra text accompanying note 3. General Utilities involved a 
dividend distribution, by the corporate taxpayer, of stock in a subsidiary to the taxpayer shareholders 
with the understanding that the shareholders would sell the stock to the buyer according to the 
terms of a prearranged, but not executed, sale between the taxpayer's officers and the buyer. The 
Commissioner sloppily raised various arguments so that the precise holding of the Supreme Court 
permitting nonrecognition by the continuing corporation upon the dividend distribution is difficult 
to determine. See TAx REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 33. 
/d. 
[TJhe term "General Utilities rule" is often used ... in a broader sense to refer to 
the nonrecognition treatment accorded in certain situations to liquidating as well as 
nonliquidating distributions to shareholders and to liquidating sales. The rule is codified 
in several elaborate and often complex Code provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Section 311 governs the treatment of nonliquidating distributions of property (dividends 
and redemptions), while section 336 governs the treatment of liquidating distributions 
in kind. Section 337 provides nonrecognition treatment for certain sales or property 
pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation. 
47. 296 U.S. at 206. 
48. /d. 
49. General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1935). The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the distribution of the stock of a subsidiary and subsequent 
sale of the stock by the shareholders under a prearranged agreement was, in substance, a corporate 
sale of the stock followed by distribution of the proceeds to the shareholders under the step 
transaction doctrine. /d. at 976. This result is similar to the result reached ten years later by the 
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), except that in Court 
Holding Co., the corporation liquidated completely. 
50. 296 U.S. at 206; see also TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 35. 
51. 324 U.S. 331 (1945). In Court Holding Co., T had negotiated the terms of the sale of 
its sole asset, an apartment house. /d. at 332. Just before the sales contract was to be reduced to 
writing and executed, the attorney for T and its two shareholders recommended that the sale be 
consummated instead between the shareholders and the purchaser in order to reduce substantially 
the federal income tax on the sale. !d. at 333. Accordingly, T distributed the apartment house to 
its shareholders in complete liquidation. !d. The shareholders then sold the apartment house under 
substantially the same terms as previously agreed upon to the same purchaser. /d. 
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holders. This recharacterization was appropriate if T in substance had negotiated 
the sale that was consummated in form by its former shareholders following 
the liquidation. The Court's rationale was that under the step transaction doctrine 
the former T shareholders act merely as a conduit for the sale made by T. ~l 
Unfortunately, as is too often the case with the step transaction doctrine, form 
came to control with postliquidating distribution sales generally not being at-
tributed to a liquidated T when T had not negotiated the sale despite the fact 
that T had contemplated such a sale.~-' 
52. /d. at 334. The step transaction doctrine has been defined as follows: 
Under the step transaction doctrine, formally distinct transactions may be integrated 
to determine the tax treatment of the entire series. 
There is some controversy regarding the appropriate standard that is to be employed 
in applying the step transaction doctrine. The doctrine has been variously expressed 
as requiring a binding commitment, a mutual interdependence of steps, or merely a 
particular end result. 
Under the binding commitment approach, formally distinct transactions are in-
tegrated only if the affected taxpayers are contractually bound 10 take subsequent steps 
after they take the initial step. Under the mutual interdependence approach, transactions 
are integrated if they would have been fruitless without completion of the series. Finally, 
under the end result approach, if a series of otherwise independent transactions, on 
the one hand, and a single transaction, on the other hand, would have produced the 
same end result, the series of independent transactions may be integrated. 
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON fiNANCE, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT 
OF 1985: A fiNAL REPORT PREPARED BY THE STAFF, 16 (Comm. Print 1985) !hereinafter fiNAL STAFF 
REPORT). See generally Biuker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 21 How. L.J. 693, 717-23 (1978); Murray, Step Transactions, 24 U. MIAMI L. REv. 
60 (1969). 
One case has held that the step transaction doctrine must take into account the particular 
Code provision being addressed. McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd 
sub nom. McDonald's Restaurants of Ill. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). 
53. In United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950), the T shareholders 
and purchasers danced an elaborate minuet under which the T shareholders first offered 10 sell the 
T stock. The purchaser refused, but counteroffered to purchase some of the T's assets. T, in turn, 
refused because it would have been compelled to pay a heavy capital gains tax. The T shareholders 
supplied the solution by offering to sell the assets upon liquidation of the T. P accepted the offer. 
T transferred the desired assets 10 its shareholders in partial liquidation and the remaining assets 
were sold and the proceeds distributed in complete liquidation. The former T shareholders then 
executed the previously contemplated sale to purchaser. The Supreme Court distinguished Court 
Holding Co. on the grounds that T had negotiated the sale of its assets and then, belatedly 
recognizing the tax consequences, purported to "call off" the sale at the last minute and distribute 
the properties in kind to the shareholders who promptly conveyed them to the same persons who 
had negotiated with T upon substantially the same terms. The Court reasoned that: 
[f]he corporate tax was aimed primarily at the profits of a going concern. This is 
lruc despite the fact that gains realized from corporate sales are taxed, perhaps to 
prevent tax evasion, even where the cash proceeds are at once distributed in liquidation. 
But Congress has imposed no tax on liquidating distributions in kind or on dissolution, 
whatever may be the motive for such liquidation. Consequently, a corporation may 
liquidate or dissolve without subjecting itself to the gains tax, even though a primary 
motive is to avoid the burden of corporate taxation. 
!d. at 455 (footnote omiued). Note the emphasis placed on the going concern. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cen. denied, 343 U.S. 
934 (1952), taxed an ongoing corporation upon a shareholder executed sale of distributed inventory 
assets that had not been negotiated, but was contemplated prior to the distribution, and was executed 
by the corporation after the distribution. 
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2. Post-1954 Code 
In 1954 Congress addressed both the General Utilities and Court Holding 
decisions by enacting sections 31 P~ and 336~~ which provide generally that no 
gain or loss is recognized by T with respect to the distributions described above. 
The purpose of sections 311 and 336 was to prevent recognition of market 
appreciation that had not been realized by an arm's length transfer to an unrelated 
party. ~6 Consequently, narrow exceptions to the corporate level shield of sections 
311 and 336 were drawn for distribution of installment obligations. ~ 7 Moreover, 
the legislative history to section 311 noted an exception for common-law attri-
bution of income. ~s The section 311 case-law exceptions were applied readily to 
section 336. ~" T level treatment of contingent income items in liquidating dis-
tributions largely falls within this section 336 interstice. Subsequent legislative 
and regulatory developments which began twenty years ago largely would repeal 
General Utilities with respect to nonliquidating distributions and would override 
54. I.R.C. § 311(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 311(a) provides that a distributing corporation 
generally does not recognize gain on a nonliquidating distribution of appreciated property. For the 
past 30 years, however, Congress steadily has whittled away at the general rule with a series of 
exceptions that now virtually encompass the rule. As early as 1954, Congress carved out three 
exceptions 10 the general rule that were targeted largely at the following specific types of potentially 
abusive transactions: (I) nonrecognition was not available for distribution of installment obligations 
to shareholders, id. § 4538; (2) upon distribution of LIFO inventory, a corporation recognized gain 
to the extent that the basis of the inventory determined under FIFO exceeded the inventory's LIFO 
value, id. at § 311(b); and (3) a corporation recognizes gain on the distribution of encumbered 
property to the extent that liabilities exceed the basis of the property in the distributing corportion's 
hands, id. § 31 l(c); see STAFF FtNAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 60-61. Congress also intended to 
retain the judicially created exceptions to General Utilities, such as the assignment of income doctrine. 
S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 14, at 247. Further exceptions and limitations were enacted in major 
tax acts throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s with the end result that distributions of appreciated 
property, in redemptions or dividends, triggered gain unless certain historic shareholder or business 
tests were met at either the corporate or shareholder level, or both. I.R.C. § 311(d) (West Supp. 
1986). See generally Lee, Capital Gains Exception to the House's General Utilities Repeal: Further 
Indigestions From Overly Processed Corn Products, 30 TAX NoTES 1375, 1376-77 ( 1986) (summary 
of rules regarding distributions of appreciated property and comparison with proposed repeal of General 
Utilities.). 
55. I.R.C. § 336(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 336(a) provides for nonrecognition of gain 
or loss by a corporation on the distribution of property in complete liquidation. Similar to § 311, 
§ 336 provides for recognition with respect to distribution of installment obligations acquired other 
than in a § 337 liquidating sale. More recently, § 336 has been made subject to a LIFO inventory 
rule, similar to the rule applicable to § 311. /d. § 336(b). The depreciation recapture provisions 
override § 336 distributions just as they override § 311 distributions. See infra note 57. Unlike § 
311, however, § 336 "has survived with relatively few modifications since its enactment" and hence, 
the rules that it provides are more liberal than the rules applicable 10 nonliquidating distributions 
under § 311. See TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 38-39. The markedly different tax 
consequences for nonliquidating and liquidating distributions create tremendous pressure in favor 
of a §§ 336-338 transaction. "This pressure makes the system non neutral and subject to manipulation, 
and adds great complexity to the area." FtNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 60. 
56. See generally Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). 
57. I.R.C. §§ 311(a), 336(a), 4538 (West Supp. 1986). Similarly, subsequently enacted recapture 
of income provisions override §§ 311 and 336. !d. §§ 1245(a), 1250(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(b), 
1.1250-l(c)(2) (1982); see Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 398. 
58. S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 14, at 247; Hillsboro Nat 'I Bank, 460 U.S. at 398-99 & 
n.35. 
59. Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524, 528-29 (Ct. Cl. 1961); see infra text accom-
panying note 346. 
1987) Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions 149 
sections 311, 336, and 337 in the case of distributions of items subject to 
"recapture" under various statutory provisions (recapture income)."" 
Having codified General Utilities, Congress finessed the issue of whether T 
or T's shareholders had, in fact, made a sale of the property distributed in T's 
complete liquidation by enacting section 337. Section 337 shields a liquidating 
corporation from taxation on gain or loss with respect to its "property" if such 
property is sold during the twelve-month period following the corporation's 
adoption of a plan of complete liquidation, provided that the corporation also 
distributes all of its assets in complete liquidation within the twelve-month 
period."' Thus, in 1954 Congress generally intended identical shareholder level 
tax consequences regardless of whether T "sells its assets and [then) distributes 
the proceeds to its shareholders in complete liquidation or, conversely, distributes 
[the) assets in kind to its shareholders" before subsequent sale by them-in 
short, the goal sought by Congress was to achieve parity between sections 336 
and 337 ."2 Ironically, General Utilities was extended to situations when clearly 
there was a "realization" by the liquidating corporation."-' 
As originally enacted, sections 336 and 337 contained similar exceptions for 
distribution and sale of installment obligations. 04 The subsequently enacted "re-
capture income" provisions apply equally to both sections."~ As discussed more 
fully below,"" the Supreme Court ended lower court conflicts in Hillsboro National 
Bank v. Commissioner,"7 by ruling that sections 336 and 337 must be "construed 
in tandem. ""x Thus, the rule adopted by the courts which provides that the tax 
benefit rule overrides the nonrecognition provisions, applies equally to both 
provisions."~ Additionally, some, but not all, courts construed the term "prop-
erty" under section 337 to rule out nonrecognition of items to which the 
assignment of income doctrine normally would apply. 711 Those are the T level 
60. See the list of statutory recapture exceptions and limitations to §§ 311 and 336 set forth 
in fiNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 61. See generally Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 
12.05, at 12-30 n.76. The legislative trend of denying the General Utilities shield to nonliquidating 
distributions is traced in TAx REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 36-39. 
61. I.R.C. § 337(a) (West Supp. 1986). "Thus, the distinction drawn in Court Holding Co. 
and Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co. between a sale of assets followed by a liquidating distribution of 
the proceeds and a liquidating distribution in kind followed by a shareholder sale, in large part 
was eliminated." TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 36. 
62. Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110, 114-15 (6th Cir. 1973); S. Rep. No. 
1622, supra note 14, at 258. See generally Bonovitz, Problems in Achieving Parity in Tax Treatment 
Under Sections 337 and 334(b)(2), 34 INST. ON fED. TAX'N 57, 60-75 (1976). 
63. See Wolfman, supra note 44, at 82-83. 
64. I.R.C. §§ 336(a), 337, 453B(a), 453B(d)(2) (West Supp. 1986). 
65. See supra notes 57 & 60. 
66. See infra text accompanying notes 421-36. 
67. 460 u.s. 370 (1983). 
68. /d. at 400. 
69. /d. at 401-02; see also infra text accompanying notes 357-58. 
70. In Pridemark Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) the court equated the 
definition of property in § 1221 with the definition in § 337(b). /d. at 44-45. Under this reading, 
any gain on the sale of a noncapital asset would not be shielded by § 337(a) The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, however, refused to equate§§ 1221 and 337(b) and applied the doctrine announced 
in Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) to § 337. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n 
v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494, 500-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970). Using the 
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section 337 crevices into which contingent income items fall. While both sections 
336 and 337 are subject to the proviso that the liquidating corporation's method 
of accounting must reflect its income clearly, this doctrine traditionally fails to 
meet contingent income problems. 71 
C. Historical Development of Section 338: Stock Acquisition 
1. Pre-1954 Code 
Prior to 195472 the Internal Revenue Code provided, as does the current 
Code, that when a parent corporation liquidates a controlled subsidiary the 
parent does not recognize gain or loss. As a concomitant, the parent holds the 
liquidated subsidiary's assets with a "carryover" basis, (the parent's "inside" 
basis in the subsidiary's hands). 73 Several years prior to the 1954 Code the Tax 
Court applied the step transaction doctrine relied upon in Commissioner v. Court 
Holding Company,74 in Kimbe/1-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner75 and 
held that when P acquired control of T and liquidated it as part of a single 
transaction in order to acquire T's assets, P's basis in such assets was its 
"outside" cost rather than T's historic "inside" adjusted basis. The Tax Court 
reasoned that, in substance, P had acquired T's assets, rather than T's stock, 
by disregarding the acquisition of the stock as a transitory step. 76 As is the 
usual case with the step transaction doctrine, certainty with respect to whether 
P would succeed in linking the first step of buying T's stock with the last step 
of acquiring T's assets in liquidation was not possible. 77 
2. 1954 Code to TEFRA 
In 1954 Congress effectuated the principles of Kimbe/1-Diamond in (now 
repealed) section 334(b)(2),n which provided that if P purchased "control" of 
T in a taxable transaction within a twelve-month period, adopted a plan of 
"integral asset" reading of Corn Prods., the court held that the petitioner was liable for taxes on 
the sale of the player contracts made during the liquidation period. 423 F.2d at 501-03. Finally, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has followed a functional approach to the definition of "property" 
under § 337(b) in order to achieve parity between §§ 336 and 337. Midland-Ross Corp. v. United 
States, 485 F.2d I 10, 116-18 (6th Cir. 1973). Under this approach, "property" is restricted to the 
definition expressed in § 337(b). However, the case-law doctrines overriding § 336 are applied directly 
to § 337. /d. at 118. For a more in-depth discussion, see Lee, supra note 54, at 1379-80. 
71. I.R.C. §§ 446(b), 482 (West Supp. 1986); see infra text accompanying notes 377 & 385-
89. 
72. I.R.C. § 112(b) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 332(a) (West Supp. 1986)). 
73. I.R.C. § 332(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 332(a) provides that a parent corporation 
does not recognize gain or loss on the receipt of property distributed in complete liquidation of a 
subsidiary in which the parent holds at least an 8007o interest. The distribution must take place 
over a specified period. /d. § 332(b). In such a nonrecognition liquidation, the corporate shareholder 
generally takes a carryover basis in the property received from the liquidating subsidiary. /d. § 
334(b). In addition, the corporate shareholder inherits the tax attributes of the liquidated subsidiary. 
/d. § 381. See generally FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 25. 
74. 324 u.s. 331 (1945). 
75. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 
(1951). 
76. 14 T.C. at 80. 
77. See B. WOLFMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 74 (2d ed. 1979). 
78. /d. 
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complete liquidation within two years thereafter and liquidated T within three 
years after such adoption, P's basis in the T assets received in liquidation was 
P's basis in the T stock, adjusted for T's liabilities and certain postacquisition 
transactions including T income and distributions. Because section 334(b)(2) 
required the liquidation of T in order for P to obtain a cost basis in T's assets, 
section 336 applied at the T level to the liquidating distributions. 79 P did not 
recognize a gain or loss on the liquidation of such a controlled T under section 
332. Whether Kimbe/1-Diamond itself remained alive after the enactment of 
section 334(b )(2) was uncertain. xo 
The goal of section 334(b)(2), albeit unarticulated, was parity: this time 
between a stock purchase and an asset purchase at the P Ievel.x 1 However, due 
to the potentially long delay between P's acquisition of control of T and its 
liquidation, substantial discontinuities existed at the T and P levels under the 
original version of section 334(b )(2). 12 In addition, at one time discontinuities 
were thought to arise at the T level between the application of section 336 to 
T's in-kind section 332 liquidating distribution of its assets to its new controlling 
shareholder P and the application of section 337 to the sale by T of its assets 
to P followed by complete liquidation of T and distribution of the sales proceeds 
to T's shareholders. 83 Furthermore, prior to the Installment Sales Revision Act 
of 1980, substantial T shareholder level discontinuities existed between an in-
stallment sale of control of T's stock by the T shareholders to P and an 
installment asset sale by T to P followed by T's liquidation.x• However, the 
Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 in new section 453(h), discussed below, xs 
largely eliminated these T shareholder level discontinuities. Moreover, by 1982 
the courts largely had eliminated any T level discontinuities between sections 
336 and 337 with respect to common-law attribution of income.x• Indeed, Hills-
boro National Bank v. Commissioner,x7 decided by the Supreme Court in 1983, 
expressly stated that the function of sections 336 and 337 "reveals that they 
should be construed in tandem. "MM Nevertheless, due to the potential five year 
gap between acquisition of control of T and its liquidation under old section 
334(b)(2), discontinuities remained at the T and P levels. 
3. TEFRA Reform: Section 338, Consistency at What Price? 
In 1982, Congress focused on the inconsistencies inherent in permitting the 
continuation of T's tax attributes, including net operating losses (NOL's), x9 for 
79. See Bonovitz, supra note 62, at 87. 
80. See B. BtTTKER & J. EusTICE, supra note 23, , 11.45, at 11-48 n.ll3. 
81. The legislative history of § 334(b)(2) did not speak of parity. See S. Rep. No. 1622, 
supra note 14, at 257. 
82. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 25, at 132. 
83. /d. 
84. S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22 (1980). 
85. See infra text accompanying notes 146-47. 
86. See, e.g., Stewart's Trust v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 682 (1975); Rev. Rul. 77-190, 1977-
C.B. 88. 
87. 460 U.S. 370 (1983). 
88. /d. at 400. 
89. I.R.C. § 172(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 172(a) provides a deduction for net operating 
loss carryovers and carrybacks. "If consolidated returns were filed by the acquiring corporation, 
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up to five years after a cost basis stock acquisition while also treating the 
transaction as thoughT's assets had been purchased.'~<' Moreover, if consolidated 
returns~1 were filed by P and T, T's tax attributes, subject to certain limitations, 
continued to be reflected in P's postacquisition consolidated returns until T's 
complete liquidation.92 Perhaps even more significantly, T's "recapture income," 
triggered by its liquidation, could be offset by losses of other members of the 
P consolidated group.~3 Additionally, the technical adjustments for T's earnings 
(including recapture income) or deficits during the period between acquisition 
and liquidation, as well as the rules for allocation of P's basis adjusted for T's 
liabilities (including any recapture income tax liability), could lead to a step-up 
basis exceeding what would have been P's cost basis in a section 337 asset 
acquisition.~4 Finally, the congressional modifications of the stock purchase treated 
as asset purchase rules were supported by the following rationale: 
[The pre-1982 law] provided unwarranted tax motivations for struc-
turing a corporate acquisition as in part a purchase of assets and in 
part a purchase of stock or as a purchase of several corporations 
historically operated as a unit in order to preserve selectivity of tax 
treatment. These motivations included the ability to achieve a stepped-
up basis for some assets while avoiding recapture tax and other 
unfavorable tax attributes with respect to other assets.~j 
For these reasons, in 1982 Congress repealed section 334(b)(2) and enacted new 
section 338. 
Section 338 abandoned the liquidation of T as the triggering event for P's 
obtaining a cost basis in T's assets when P purchased control of T's stock. 
Instead, Congress introduced an explicit election and at long last laid Kimbe/1-
Diamond to rest. 96 Indeed, the requirement of T's liquidation was eliminated, 
and instead Congress sought to achieve parity at the T and P levels with respect 
to asset acquisitions (section 337) and stock acquisitions treated as asset ac-
quisitions (section 338), through the mechanism of a "deemed bulk sale" of 
T's assets to which section 337 applied.~7 Thus, in order to achieve parity at 
the T level between a T shareholder sale of stock and a T asset sale pursuant 
the tax attributes of the acquired corporation (including carryovers, subject to certain limitations 
in the Code and the consolidated return regulations) were reflected on such returns for the period 
prior to its complete liquidation." 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 132-33; see also S. REP. No. 
494, supra note 37, at 192. 
90. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 132; see also S. REP. No. 494, supra note 37, at 192. 
91. See generally B. BtTTKER & J. EusTICE, supra note 23, , 15.21, at 15-52 to -56. 
92. /d. , 15.24, at 15-74 to -82. 
93. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133. 
94. R.M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 317 (1977); 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, 
at 133; Bonovitz, Taxable Dispositions of a Corporate Business Before and After TEFRA [Part If, 
60 TAXES 812, 820 (1982). 
95. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133. These attempts to close the loophole included 
stringent section 311 (d) restrictions on target level escape of recognition with respect to distribution 
of appreciated property in a partial liquidation. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 239-45. Similarly, 
the § 338 consistency rules fall into this pattern. 
96. S. REP. No. 494, supra note 37, at 192; 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133. 
97. I.R.C. § 338(a) (West Supp. 1986). See generally 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133-
34. 
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to a plan of its complete liquidation, Old T is treated under a section 338 
election as having sold all of its assets on the date that P acquired control of 
T at fair market value in a single transaction to which section 337 applied."" 
To preclude Old T's "recapture income" from being sheltered by losses of the 
P group the deemed bulk sale is bifurcated:"" the continuing purchased target 
corporation, Neo-T, is deemed to have purchased Old T's assets on the day 
following the deemed sale by Old T."x' Neo-T's basis under a section 338 election 
is derived from P's cost adjusted for T's liabilities and other relevant items. 101 
However, Congress eliminated the old section 334(b)(2) interim adjustments' 02 
and provided numerous refinements for circumstances such as postacquisition 
outstanding T minority shareholders"'3 and T stock purchased by P prior to the 
twelve-month acquisition period ending on P's acquisition of control.'""' 
Section 338 was intended to provide nonrecognition of gain or loss at the 
T level to the same extent that gain or loss would not be recognized under 
section 336. In order for section 336 to apply there had to be an actual liquidation 
of T on the acquisition date to which old section 334(b) applied. •os Nevertheless, 
98. See TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 41-42; S. Rep. No. 494, supra note 37, 
at 192-93. 
99. See S. Rep. No. 494, supra note 37, at 193; 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 135. 
100. l.R.C. § 338(a) (West Supp. 1986). Congress intended that the T be treated as a "new" 
corporation (Neo-T) after the acquisition date for all purposes relating to its tax liability either as 
Old T or as a surrogate for P. S. REP. No. 494, supra note 37, at 193. The different direction 
that the temporary regulations take regarding contingent income of Neo-T is discussed infra at notes 
572-73. 
101. l.R.C. § 338(b) (West Supp. 1986). The adjusted grossed-up basis (AGUB) must be 
allocated among Neo-T's assets beginning the day after the acquisition date pursuant to the rules 
under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T (1986). Generally, the AGUB is allocated first to Class I 
assets, then in turn to Class II, III, and IV assets. Class I assets consist of cash, demand deposits, 
and similar bank or savings and loan accounts. Class II assets include certificates of deposit, 
government obligations, and other readily. marketable stock and securities. Class II I assets consist 
of all assets other than Class I, II, and IV assets. Class IV assets are intangible assets in the nature 
of goodwill and going concern value. Within each class, the basis is allocated according to the fair 
market value. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T(b) (1986). The amount of AGUB allocated to an 
asset (other than a Class IV asset) is limited to the asset's fair market value the day after the 
acquisition date. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T(c)(l) (1986). However, this fair market value 
subsequently may be modified with respect to certain contingent income assets. /d.; Temp. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(g) (1986). 
The Temporary Regulations also provide a "transitional allocation election" for stock acquisitions 
that occur after August 31, 1982 and before January 30, 1986, or under a written contract entered 
into between those dates. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-4(T) (1986). A corporation that makes such 
an election may allocate AGUB pursuant "to the rules of Federal income tax law that apply to 
the purchase on the acquisition date of a combination of assets for a lump sum." Temp. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.338(b)-4T(e)(2) (1986). In other words, an electing corporation is not bound by the fair 
market value limitation in the Temporary Regulations. However, any allocation that exceeds an 
asset's fair market value will be scrutinized carefully by the Internal Revenue Service. Temp. Treas. 
Reg. § I .338(b)-4T(e)(4) (1986). For a discussion of the old allocation rules under § 338, see Rogers, 
Purchase Price Allocations in Taxable Acquisitions: New Frontiers-New Hazards, 62 TAXES 813 
(1984). Under 1986 legislation (l.R.C. § 1060 (1986)), the tier system of allocation in the § 338 
Temporary Treasury Regulations will also be applicable to § 337 transactions. See infra note 653. 
102. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
103. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 289-93. 
104. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98th CONG., 2o SESS., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION AcT OF 1984 995-96 (Comm. 
Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 BLUEBOOK]. 
105. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133. 
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numerous instances may arise in which section 338 is more favorable than an 
actual liquidation, because its shield is available in instances when section 337 
would not be available if T actually sold its assets pursuant to a plan of complete 
liquidation. 1116 More significantly, discontinuities arise because T actually is not 
liquidated under section 338 107 (although a liquidation is permissible, in which 
case P or any drop-down subsidiary takes Neo-T's carryover "cost" basis), wx 
106. A number of discontinuities (including one in which § 338 is favored) arise because of 
this situation. First, the collapsible corporation prohibition in an actual § 337 sale and the installment 
reporting requirement under § 453(h) will arise, particularly when a bootstrap acquisition is involved. 
See I.R.C. § 341(e) (West Supp. 1986); Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 169. Second, an actual liquidation 
pursuant to a § 337 asset sale serves double duty for the dividends received credit rules under the 
accumulated earnings and personal holding company provisions. See Bonovitz, supra note 94, at 
335. A similar credit does not appear to be available to Neo-T in a T stock sale when § 338 is 
elected. See id. at 335. Third, a discontinuity in favor of a § 338 stock sale arises when T has 
sold a portion of its inventory to someone other than P. The remaining portion of the inventory 
would be shielded under § 338, but would not be protected under an actual § 337 sale because 
the bulk sale exception would not be reached. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 278-79. Fourth, 
more significant discontinuity can arise with regard to T's NOLs. Recapture income at the T level 
in the case of an actual asset sale under § 337 can be shielded by the NOLs of the entire T 
consolidated group, if any NOLs exist, whereas under the § 338 temporary regulations, only T's 
deconsolidated share of any T consolidated group NOL is available to shield T's recapture income. 
See Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.05[8), at 12-55; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 51.338-1T(f)(3)(iv) 
(1984). Fifth, T may be able to obtain greater deductibility with respect to its share of the cost 
of the transfer of its assets under a § 337 sale, than in a sale of its stock accompanied by a § 
338 election. See Stone, Planning Cash and Other Nonreorganization Mergers, 37 lNST. ON FED. 
T AX'N § 1.04[5), at 1-22 to -25 (1979). Sixth, conventional wisdom holds that an allocation between 
T and P of purchase price in a § 337 transaction is more efficacious than an allocation between 
P and Neo-T in a § 338 transaction. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 289. In reality, allocations 
are not tax adverse in classic cost basis acquisitions when T's nonrecapture gain is sheltered by §§ 
337 or 338. Only when T does not shelter recapture income with NOLs, will the allocations between 
P and T reach sufficient tax adversity to establish fair market value under the willing buyer-willing 
seller definition. See Grow v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1057 (1984). See generally Black 
Indus. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 242, 252-53 (I979); Ganier, Treatment of Goodwill: 
Allocating a Lump Sum Purchase Price Among Mixed Assets of a Going Business, 7 J. CoRP. 
T AX'N Ill (1980). Any allocation between P and T must be completed at the time of the stock 
acquisition. Cf. Bane One Corp. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 476, 494-95 (1985). Current allocations 
between P and T may not be able to vary the tiers of allocation set forth in the temporary 
regulations. Last, minor discontinuities between stock and asset acquisitions exist because of the 
differing rules between purchases of stock from related parties for purposes of § 338 and purchases 
of T's assets by a related P, followed by distributions to common shareholders for purposes of 
"D" reorganization status. See Ginsburg, Stepped Up Basis Corporate Acquisitions, 37 VA. CONF. 
ON FED. TAX. 507, 516-17 (June 7, 1985). 
I 07. Congress addressed one discontinuity between an actual § 337 asset sale and a s!Ock sale 
with a § 338 election. If a T adopted a plan of complete liquidation and subsequently made sales 
intending to obtain the shield of § 337, but the control of stock was sold and § 338 was elected 
prior to the liquidation of T, then the technical requirement of complete liquidation of T in the 
12 month period under § 337 was not met. Section 338(h)(l2) provides that in such circumstances, 
for purposes of § 337, T is treated as having distributed all its assets as of the close of the acquisition 
date. See H.R. REP. No. 432 Part 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1619-20 (1984). The double duty actual 
§ 337 liquidation-dividend credit for accumlated earnings and personal holding company taxes, 
described supra at note 106-has not been addressed by Congress. Nor has Congress addressed clearly 
the contingent income discontinuities when T is not liquidated in a § 338 acquisition. 
108. Once P has control ofT, it then can liquidate T under § 332 and obtain T's assets with 
a carryover basis. Of course, if § 338 has been elected, the carryover basis is that of Neo-T. 
Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 260-61. In this case P also inherits Neo-T's tax attributes, but only 
from the day following acquisition in the case of a § 338 election. Therefore, any consequences 
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despite the fact that Congress intended treatment of Neo-T as a "new" cor-
poration after the acquisition date for all purposes relating to its tax liability 
either as the selling or purchasing corporation. u» The absence of an actual 
liquidation of T in a section 338 transaction creates problems with respect to 
a contingent income item because the conventional rules, at times, are more 
favorable to T when it liquidates pursuant to section 337 rather than continuing 
to transact business. 
Section 338 was "crafted" during intense congressional scrutiny of asset 
selectivity transactions. 11 " Consequently, Congress included a "consistency" re-
quirement in section 338. 111 This requirement probably is the raison d'etre for 
section 338. 112 Under the "consistency" requirement, P and its affiliates must 
be consistent in their treatment of qualified stock purchases of, ll.1 and asset 
purchases 11 • from, T and any of T's affiliates115 during a two to three year 
consistency period. 116 A direct purchase of assets from T or its affiliates by P 
or its affiliates during such consistency period is treated statutorily as a section 
338 election by P. 117 The temporary regulations attempt to force the transaction 
into a carryover basis with respect to the T assets acquired by P or its affiliates. 11M 
In any event, P cannot easily obtain cost basis for some assets and a carryover 
basis for other T assets, as was possible prior to 1982. 
that would apply to Neo-T with respect to contingent income should apply to P if Neo-T has been 
liquidated because P inherited Neo-T's tax attributes and status as successor to earner of the con-
tingent income. 
109. See supra note 100. 
110. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 299. 
Ill. I.R.C. §§ 338(e), (f), (h)(4) (West Supp. 1986). The goal of these rules is to preclude 
P from obtaining a cost basis in some T assets and a carryover basis in other T assets (by not 
electing§ 338), as it could prior to TEFRA. See Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.01[2), at 
12-7. The consistency rules have been criticized, however, as the "one major misconception" in § 
338. /d.; accord Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 299. 
112. See 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 132-33 & 137; S. REP. No. 494, supra note 37, 
at 192, 195. 
113. Section 338(f) requires consistency with respect to all stock acquisitions by P or affiliates 
from the same T affiliated group during the consistency period by mandating that any election with 
respect to the first such qualified stock purchase will apply to each subsequent purchase, and no 
election may be made with respect to a second or subsequent purchase if a § 338 election was not 
made for the first such qualified stock purchase. I.R.C. § 338(f) (West Supp. 1986). 
114. Section 338(e) similarly mandates that P "shall be treated as having made an election 
under [§ 338) with respect to any target if, at any time during the consistency period, [P) acquires 
any asset of the target corporation." However, a laundry list of exceptions is provided, the most 
important of which include sales by the T in the ordinary course of business and carryover basis 
acquisitions of property. /d. §§ 338(e)(2)(A), 338(e)(2)(8). 
115. The term "target affiliate" is defined as each corporation that was "at any time during 
so much of the consistency period as ends on the acquisition date of the target corporation, a 
member of an affiliated group which had the same common parent." /d. § 338(h)(6)(A). 
116. The consistency period is defined as "the period consisting of-(i) the 1-year period 
beginning before the beginning of the 12-month acquisition period for the target corporation (ii) 
such acquisition period (up to and including the acquisition date) and (iii) the 1-year period beginning 
on the day after the acquisition date." /d. § 338(h)(4)(A). The Secretary can extend the period to 
"include any period during which . . . there was in effect a plan to make a qualified stock 
purchase." /d. § 338(h)(4)(8); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-4T(g) (1985). 
117. I.R.C. § 338(e) (West Supp. 1986). 
118. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-4T(f)(6)(i)(A) (1985); Income Taxes; Questions and Answers 
Relating to Domestic Maners Under Section 338 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; Temporary 
Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,402, 16,403 (1985). 
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D. Historical Development of Section 453: Installment Reporting of 
Leveraged Acquisitions; Legislative Regulations for Open Transactions 
Sections 453(a)119 and 453(c)120 require a seller of realty, or a nondealer seller 
of personalty, 121 to report gain on the installment method in qualifying circum-
stances, unless the seller otherwise "elects out." 122 Installment reporting con-
templates ratable recognition, that is, the seller's basis in property conveyed, 
and hence the gain, if any, is prorated among all payments present and future. 1 ~' 
119. I.R.C. § 453(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 453 provides that income from an installment 
sale is to be taken into account under the installment method. /d. § 453(a). In turn, "installment 
sale" is defined as a disposition of property with at least one payment being received after the 
close of the taxable year in which the disposition occurs. /d. § 453(b)(l). Section 453(b) excludes 
from the simplified installment reporting provisions dealer dispositions of personal property and 
inventories of personal property. /d. § 453(b)(2). This simplified version, enacted in the Installment 
Sales Revision Act of 1980, eliminated various technical requirements such as a 300Jo initial payment 
limitation and a requirement of two payments. See S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 3. 
120. l.R.C. § 453(c) (West Supp. 1986). Section 453 is the operative provision and defines 
"installment method" as recognition of income for any taxable year, under a fraction applied to 
that year's payments. The fraction is equal to the proportion the gross profit from a sale bears 
to the total contract price. Generally, the contract price is the amount that will be paid to the 
seller. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 7. 
121. Dealers in personal property must report installments under § 453A(a), which is identical 
to the pre-1980 general installment ·reporting provisions. See I.R.C. § 453A(a) (West Supp. 1986). 
122. I.R.C. § 453(d) (West Supp. 1986) provides that a taxpayer may elect to have the 
installment method of reporting income not apply to the disposition of any property-an "election 
out." The pre-1980 law provided that the taxpayer had to elect to report gains from an installment 
sale-an "election in"-on a timely filed return, a delinquent return, or an omitted return for the 
year of sale that was not barred by the statute of limitations if the facts indicated that no taxpayer 
position inconsistent with the installment election had been made with respect to the sale. Rev. Rul. 
65-297, 1965-2 C.B. I52. See generally S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 7; Emory, Installment 
Method of Reporting Income: Its Election, Use, and Effect, 53 CoRNELL L. REv. 181, 220-27 (1968); 
Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment, 30 TAX L. REv. 469, 527-56 (1975). Alternatively, 
if the return that was filed included the entire gain from the installment sale, under pre-1980 rules 
an amended return or claim for refund could not be used to elect installment sale reporting; the 
reporting of the gain in full in the year of sale was treated as a binding election not to report on 
the installment method. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 10. As Ginsburg pointed out, the pre-
1980 election in rule was a prime illustration of "[o]ne of the few reliable rules of human conduct 
... if something can go wrong, it will." Ginsburg recommended the election out. Ginsburg, supra, 
at 478-79. Congress chose this method, and the temporary regulations draw narrow lines requiring 
essentially a timely election on the tax return for the year of sale. The regulations permit elections 
after the due date only in rare circumstances when the Service concludes that the taxpayer had 
good cause for failing to make a timely election. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 15a.453-l(d)(3)(i) to -
l(d)(3)(ii) (1981). Conditional elections are forbidden expressly. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(d)(3)(ii) 
(1981). 
123. I.R.C. § 453(c) (West Supp. 1986). "Gain is recognized as payments are received; the 
gain recognized for any taxable year is the proportion of the installment payment received in that 
year which the gross profit, realized or to be realized when the contract is completed, bears to the 
total contract price." Temporary Income Tax Regulations; Installment Sales-General Rules, T.D. 
7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 297. See generally Friedman, The Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, 
35 MAJoR TAX PLAN. , 700, at 7-3 (1983). "Gross profit" consists of the "selling price" less adjusted 
basis. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(b)(2)(v) (1981); see Friedman, supra 1 701.4, at 7-14 to -15. 
"Selling price," in turn, is defined as the gross selling price, without any reduction for existing 
encumbrances or selling expenses. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(b)(2)(ii) (1981). "Contract price" 
is defined as the total contract price reduced by the "qualifying indebtedness" assumed by the 
buyer, to the extent that such assumed indebtedness does not exceed the seller's basis in the property 
and adjusted upward for selling expenses. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(b)(2)(iii) (1981). "Qualifying 
indebtedness" consists of indebtedness encumbering the property (e.g., a mortgage) and unsecured 
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Under current law only a single future payment is required. 12~ Although first 
enacted in 1926, m the installment method for reporting gain was inapplicable 
to contingent payments or items until the Installment Sales Revision Act of 
1980. 126 The pre-1980 rationale was that installment reporting traditionally turned 
on the ratio of the "gross profit" to the "total contract price," 127 neither of 
which were known when the sales price was contingentY" Moreover, prior to 
1980, installment reporting at the T shareholder level could not be achieved 
readily when T sold its assets on the installment basis to P, pursuant to a plan 
of complete liquidation, and distributed P's installment obligations to the former 
T shareholders. This situation existed because the liquidating distribution of such 
obligations constituted payment for the former T shareholder's stock in the year 
of distribution. m In some jurisdictions installment reporting could be achieved 
by T shareholders selling their stock under the installment method to a related 
party who, in turn, liquidated T and subsequently sold its assets on the installment 
method, or even for cash, to P. 130 
1. Legislative Regulations For Installment Reporting 
of Contingent Payments 
In 1980 Congress overturned prior case law and permitted installment re-
porting of contingent sales price transactions by authorizing regulations that 
provide for "ratable basis recovery in transactions where the gross profit or the 
total contract price (or both) cannot be readily ascertained." 131 Temporary reg-
ulations provide for basis recovery when the aggregate selling price in a sale or 
indebtedness incurred or assumed by the purchaser incident to the acquisition, holding, or operation 
of the property in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business or investment activities. Temp. 
Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l (b)(2)(iv) ( 1981 ). Taxpayer obligations that are unrelated or incurred instant 
to the disposition are excluded. /d. 
124. I.R.C. § 453(bXI) (West Supp. 1986). In defining "installment sale," § 453(b)(l) requires 
only a disposition of property in which at least one payment is to be received after the close of 
the taxable year in which the disposition occurs. Thus, no more than one payment, albeit a future 
payment, is required. This requirment is in contrast with prior law which required two payments. 
See Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 482-84. 
125. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 23 (1926). Prior regulations permitted installment 
reporting. The rationale of the statutory installment reporting option was to relieve taxpayers who 
adopted it from having to pay an income tax in the year of sale, based on the full amount of 
anticipated profits, when in fact the taxpayers had only received a small portion of the sales price. 
S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 7. 
126. See S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 22-23; Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 493-95. 
127. See supra notes 120 & 123. 
128. Gralapp v. United States, 458 F.2d 1158, 1160 (lOth Cir. 1972); accord In re Steen 509 
F.2d 1398, 1402 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975); Rev. Rul. 76-109, 1976-1 C.B. 125. See generally Pusey, When 
Adjustments to Selling Price Bar Use of Installment Reporting, 47 J. TAX'N 22 (1977). When 
taxpayers desired installment reporting and faced a possible contingent payout, a sophisticated 
technique was developed in order to provide a fixed payment that was reducible in the event of 
the occurrence of certain contingencies. Installment reporting was available as to the fixed amount. 
See Rev. Rul. 77-56, 1977-1 C.B. 135. 
129. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 14; Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 484-85. 
130. See Rushing v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 888 (1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971). 
See generally S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 107, at 113-14; Newman, Structuring the Sale of the 
Closely Held Corporate Business: Alternate Strategies, 41 INST. ON fED. TAX'N § 3.03[1], at 3-29 
(1983). 
131. I.R.C. § 4530)(2) (West Supp. 1986). 
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disposition of propertym cannot be determined by the close of the taxable year 1-'-' 
in which the disposition occurred. These regulations carefully overrule various 
case law analogues of, and variations on, the common-law open transaction 
doctrine which is discussed below. 1-'4 In addition, the regulations echo the opinion 
of both the Commissioner and Congress 13 ~ that the value of an installment 
obligation for a contingent amount cannot be ascertained reasonably only in 
rare and extraordinary circumstances. 136 The temporary regulations divide con-
tingent payments into three categories of prescribed basis recovery: (I) when 
the maximum selling price is determinable, but the period over which payments 
are to be received is not; 137 (2) when such period is determinable, but the 
132. A "sale" or "other disposition" constitutes a prerequisite for installment sales reporting. 
When an indefinite sales price payable over an indefinite period is involved, the initial issue is 
whether a sale has, in fact, occurred. Ginsburg pointed out that in such circumstances it is "proper 
to inquire at the threshold whether the transaction fairly qualifies as a sale or whether, instead, 
the taxpayer has retained a continuing economic interest in the property which might more appro-
priately be accounted for on a royalty or similar basis." Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 495. The 
temporary regulations state that "[i]f the agreement neither specifies a maximum selling price nor 
limits payments to a fixed period, a question arises whether a sale realistically has occurred or 
whether, in economic effect, payments received under the agreement are in the nature of rent or 
royalty income. Arrangements of this sort will be closely scrutinized." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-
l(c)(4) (1981). 
133. Historically, the Service has taken the position that the opened or closed status of a sale 
or other disposition is determined as of the close of the tax year. See Rev. Rul. 76-109, 1976-1 
C. B. 125. The temporary regulations define "contingent payment sale" as "a sale or other disposition 
of property in which the aggregate selling price cannot be determined by the close of the taxable 
year in which such sale or other disposition occurs." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453(c)(l) (1981). 
134. This doctrine is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 237-55. The temporary reg-
ulations, in the context of an election out and reporting on other than the installment basis, state 
that "[a] taxpayer who elects not to report an installment sale on the installment method must 
recognize gain on the sale in accordance with the taxpayer's method of accounting." Temp. Treas. 
Reg. § 15a.453-l(d)(2) (1981). Fair market value is determined without regard to any provision of 
contract or local law that restricts the transferability of the installment obligation. Furthermore, 
the receipt of an istallment obligation is to be treated as receipt of property in an amount equal 
to the fair market value of the installment obligation, regardless of whether it is the "equivalent 
of cash." "An installment obligation is considered to be property and is subject to valuation ... 
without regard to whether the obligation is embodied in a note, an executory contract, or any other 
instrument, or is an oral promise enforceable under local law." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-
l(d)(2)(i) (1981). Under the regulations an installment obligation for a fixed amount obligation is 
not considered an "open" transaction. Additionally, "[i]n no event will the fair market value of 
the installment obligation be considered to be less than the fair market value of the property sold 
.. " Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(d)(2)(ii)(A) (1981). 
135. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 24. 
136. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1 (dX2)(iii) (1981 ). 
137. A contingent payment sale is treated as having a "stated maximum selling price," if the 
agreement provides a basis for determining, as of the end of the taxable year in which the sale or 
other disposition occurs, the maximum amount of sales proceeds that may be received. Temp. Treas. 
Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(2)(i) (1981). See generally S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 23 (Generally 
the maximum selling price is to be "determined from the 'four corners' of the contract agreement 
... assuming all contingencies, formulas, etc., operate in the taxpayer's favor."). Thus, incidental 
or remote contingencies are not taken into account initially. Using the general basis allocation rules, 
the stated maximum selling price as determined initially is thereafter treated as the selling price, 
unless and until the maximum amount is reduced. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(2)(i)(A) (1981). 
If the price ultimately paid is less than the stated maximum selling price as determined originally, 
the gross profit ratio is recomputed in the subsequent tax year. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-
l(c)(2)(i)(A) (1981). The legislative history indicates that in the event of such year 2 recomputation, 
the taxpayer would repon reduced income as adjusted with respect to each installment payment 
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maximum selling price is not determinable; 138 and (3) when neither a maximum 
selling price nor a definite payment term are determinable. 139 In addition, the 
temporary regulations provide for "income forecast" reporting in certain limited 
circumstances. 140 
Stated maximum selling price payments, fixed period payments, and payments 
when neither the stated maximum selling price nor the period is fixed are subject 
to special rules designed to prevent substantial distortion of income. One set 
of rules involves substantial and inappropriate deferral, in which case the taxpayer 
will seek to have a more rapid basis recovery. The taxpayer may use an alternate 
method of basis recovery if he is able to demonstrate prior to the date that 
the return is due that the application of the normal basis recovery rule will 
received in the taxable year of adjustment and subsequent taxable years. If the taxpayer already 
had "reported more income from installment payments received in previous taxable years than the 
total recomputed income, the taxpayer would be permitted to deduct the excess in the adjustment 
year as a loss." S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 23. 
138. "When a stated maximum selling price cannot be determined as of the close of the 
taxable year in which the sale or disposition occurs," but the installment obligation is payable over 
a fixed maximum period, the basis of the property sold (inclusive of selling expenses) generally is 
allocated in equal annual increments to the taxable years in which the payments may be received. 
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(3)(i) (1981). If the payment in any taxable year is less than the 
basis allocated to that year (or if no payment is received), the temporary regulations deny any loss 
until the final payment year, unless the future payment obligation of the agreement has become 
worthless under the general tax rules applicable to worthless debts. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-
l(c)(3)(i) (1981). When no loss is allowed, the unrecovered portion of the basis allocated to the 
taxable year is carried forward to the next succeeding taxable year. The rules in this context are 
subject to the substantial distortion of income provisions discussed infra in text accompanying notes 
141-45. 
139. When both the selling price and the term for payment are indefinite, Congress intended 
that the legislative regulations would permit a ratable basis recovery over some reasonable period 
of time. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 23-24. Indeed, the temporary regulations provide for 
a recovery of basis in equal annual increments over a period of 15 years commencing with the 
date of sale. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(4) (1981). These payments are indefinite and are 
scrutinized closely by the Service. See supra note 132. As in the case of fixed period payments 
without a stated maximum selling price, when in a given taxable year no payment is received or 
the amount of payment received is less than the basis allocated to that year, a loss is not allowed 
generally, unless the remaining debt is worthless. Rather, the excess basis is allocated in equal 
amounts to the balance of the 15 year term and is allowed as a loss to the extent unrecovered, 
but only after it has been carried forward to the final year or until the future payment obligation 
has been determined to be worthless. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(4) (1981). These rules also 
are subject to the distortion of income exceptions discussed infra in text accompanying notes 141-
45. 
140. While the nature and productivity of the property sold generally is not relevant to basis 
recovery rules, when the property sold is of a type normally eligible for depreciation on the income 
forecast method, or for cost depletion in which total future production must be estimated and 
payments under the contingent sales price agreement are based upon receipts for units produced 
for the property, the taxpayer's basis may be recovered appropriately using an income forecast 
method. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(6)(i) (1981). Appropriate situations that meet such criteria 
consist of sales of mineral property, motion picture films, television films, or taped television shows. 
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(6)(ii) (1981). Other taxpayers must seek specific rulings. /d. The 
income forecast method uses a fraction, the numerator of which is the payment (exclusive of interest) 
received in the taxable year under the contingent payment agreement and the denominator is the 
forecast or estimated total payments (also exclusive of interest) to be received under the agreement. 
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(6)(iii) (1981). This fraction is multiplied by the taxpayer's basis 
to determine the basis recoverable in the given tax year. An adjustment may be provided when the 
income forecast is overestimated (or underestimated) substantially by reasons of circumstances 
occurring in subsequent tax years. /d. 
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defer the recovery of basis substantially and inappropriately. 141 The taxpayer 
must request a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) before using 
an alternative of basis recovery. The I.R.S. will not allow the use of an alternative 
method unless the taxpayer can show that the alternative is a reasonable method 
of ratably recovering the basis, and that the alternative method reasonably 
supports the conclusion that over time the taxpayer likely will recover his basis 
at a rate that is twice as fast as the rate under the otherwise applicable rule. 142 
Conversely, the Service may find that the normal basis recovery rule will 
accelerate the recovery of basis substantially and inappropriately, in which case 
an alternate method of basis recovery may be required. 143 The taxpayer may 
escape such a requirement if he can demonstrate either that the method of basis 
recovery required by the Service does not constitute a reasonable method of 
ratable recovery or that it is not reasonable to conclude that the taxpayer over 
time is likely to recover basis at a rate that is twice as fast under the normal 
rule as the rate at which the Service is proposing. 144 In some cases contingent 
sale payments that would have been reported properly under the applicable 
recovery rule, are reported improperly because of changes in circumstances during 
the term of the agreement. In such cases the special rule is applicable as if the 
subsequent year were the initial year. 145 
2. Shareholder Installment Reporting of a T Level 
Section 337 Credit Sale to P 
The 1980 amendments provide explicitly, in section 453(h), that a liquidating 
distribution by T of P installment obligations from T's section 337 sale of assets 
to P is not treated by the former T shareholders as payment for their T stock. 146 
Rather, principal payments under such P indebtedness are treated upon receipt 
141. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 15a.453·1(c)(7)(i) and (ii) (1981). To demonstrate that the application 
of the normal basis recovery rule would defer recovery of the taxpayer's basis substantially and 
inappropriately, the taxpayer may rely in appropriate circumstances on "contemporaneous or im· 
mediate past relevant sales, profit, or other factual data subject to verification." Ordinarily, the 
taxpayer may not rely upon projections of future productivity, receipts, profits, etc., unless the 
projection is based upon a specific event that has occurred already. Temp. Trea~. Reg. § 15a.453-
l(c)(7)(iii) (1981). 
142. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(7)(ii) (1981). 
143. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(7)(iii) (1981). 
144. /d. 
145. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(7)(iv) (1981). 
146. I.R.C. § 453(h)(l) (West Supp. 1986). Section 453(h)(l) provides that if in connection 
with a § 331 liquidation to which § 337 applies, the former T shareholder receives, in exchange 
for T stock, an installment obligation acquired in a sale or exchange by T during the 12-month 
period set forth in § 337(a), then for purposes of § 453 the former T shareholder's receipt of 
payments under such an obligation (but not the receipt of such obligation) shall be treated as a 
receipt of payment by the former T shareholder for the T stock. Congress intended for this statutory 
mechanism to work in lieu of the Rushing approach which was subject to abuse. S. REP. No. 1000, 
supra note 84, at 20-22. Rushing itself was overturned statutorily by § 453(e) (related party resales) 
discussed infra in note 148. Thus, parity in most, but not all cases, was obtained with respect to 
installment sales ofT stock. See.Friedman, supra note 123, at 7-53. In order for the P obligations 
received by T from the sale of inventory to qualify for installment treatment by the former T 
shareholders, the inventory must have been sold in a bulk sale to P. I.R.C. § 453(h)(I)(B) (West 
Supp. 1986). This treatment is available in cash option mergers of T with a transitory or phantom 
subsidiary of P. S. Rep. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 21 n.27. Complete parity, however, is not 
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as the payments to the former T shareholders for their T stock. 147 Conversely, 
sales by T to a related party followed by resales by such party generally cause 
the initial sale to be "accelerated" to the extent that the resale directs income 
more quickly to the related economic group. 14M 
For installment reporting purposes, the distribution of a T contingent claim 
to its shareholders in connection with their sale of stock to P is treated as a 
single transaction. A section 337 liquidating distribution together with P in-
stallment obligations for the purchase of T's assets is also treated as a single 
transaction. 149 As long as P's purchase price is for a fixed amount, basis recovery 
reporting probably is no longer available under the "cash equivalency" doctrine. 
Therefore, if the former T shareholders elect out of section 453, the present 
value of P's future payments and its current payments must be reported in year 
1. 15° Consequently, open transaction reporting with respect to any contingent T 
claim or P purchase price, through election out of section 453, effectively would 
preclude installment reporting of the balance of P's purchase price. Hence, 
election out is not practical. Shareholder level treatment of contingent income 
items in connection with a liquidation of T after sale of T's assets to P or 
sales of T stock to P by the T shareholders fits into this nonstatutory area. 
E. Time Value of Money Rules 
1. Pre-1984 
Time value of money generally means the difference "in value between a 
right to an amount today and a right to the same amount at some time in the 
obtained. For example, when T is collapsible, § 337 may not be available, particularly if a bootstrap 
acquisition is involved. See supra note 106. If § 337 status is not available, § 453(h) also is not 
available at the former T shareholder level following T's liquidation. In this instance installment 
reporting is available only with a stock sale followed by a § 338 election. 
147. I.R.C. § 453(h)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1986). When liquidating distributions are received by 
a former T shareholder in more than one taxable year, he is required to recompute the gain when 
the year 2 distribution varies from the amount estimated in year I. This recomputation is effectuated 
by allocating the basis in the stock prorata over all actual payments received or to be received. 
/d. § 453(h)(2). In this situation, Congress chose to reopen year I by requiring amended returns 
if all of the liquidating distributions from T were not received during the same taxable year of the 
former T shareholder. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 21. 
148. I.R.C. § 453(e) (West Supp. 1986) provides that when a taxpayer makes an installment 
sale of property to a related party who thereafter disposes of the property and receives cash or 
other property from a third party more rapidly than he is obligated to pay under the installment 
contract to the taxpayer, the taxpayer will be treated as the seller of the property to the third party 
and will recognize income to the extent that the amount realized under the second disposition exceeds 
the actual payments made by the related party under the installment contract. See S. REP. No. 
1000, supra note 84, at 13-18. There is a two year cutoff exception for property other than marketable 
securities, I.R.C. § 453(e)(2) (West Supp. 1986), and broad attribution rules for determining whether 
the purchaser is a related person. /d. § 453(f)(l). 
149. See Farha v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 526 (1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1973); 
see Ginsburg, supra note I22, at 507. 
150. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(d)(2)(iii) (1981), provides that "[ilf an installment obligation 
contains both a fixed amount component and a contingent payment component, the fixed amount 
component" is treated as an amount equal to the fair market value of the installment obligation 
under the normal installment reporting rules (under which receipt of an installment obligation is 
treated as a receipt of property). The contingent amount component will be treated under the open 
transaction rules if installment reporting is elected out of and the contingent component has no 
ascertainable fair market value. 
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future." 151 Prior to 1984, the predecessors to the current time value of money 
rules primarily dealt with character distortion of income and not timing dis-
tortion. 152 This approach is outlined in the legislative history of the enactment 
of section 483 which states: 
For example, an individual taxpayer might sell a capital asset 
worth $1,000 for $1,300 payable over 10 years. In this case, if no 
mention is made that part of this payment is to be treated as interest, 
and the seller elects to report any gain on the installment basis, then 
each payment might be treated [prior to section 483] partly as a 
return of capital and partly as capital gain. Over the 10-year period, 
the taxpayer would report $300 of capital gain (assuming he had the 
full fair market value of $1,000 as his basis for the property). However, 
had $300 of this $1,300 payment been specified as an interest payment, 
this amount would have been ordinary income to the seller rather 
than capital gain. From the buyer's standpoint, the $300, if treated 
as part of the price of the property, would have been added to the 
basis of the property and, in the case of depreciable property be 
recoverable over the life of the property. He might also, if the property 
qualified, be eligible for an investment credit with respect to this 
$300. On the other hand, if this $300 were treated as interest, he 
could receive an interest deduction for this amount. 15-' 
This character distortion was intensified under the accelerated cost recovery 
system. 154 "In some cases, the present value to the purchaser of the ACRS 
deductions and investment credit may far exceed the present value of the ob-
ligation to pay the seller amounts in the distant future." 155 Similar character 
distortion of income arises when a debt is issued for less than its face amount. 
"The difference between the issue price of an obligation (the amount received 
by the borrower) and its stated redemption price performs the same functions 
as interest; it compensates the lender for the use of its money." 156 The earlier 
time value of money provisions, however, by focusing only on the character of 
the "disguised" interest, ignored the economic accrual of interest. 157 "An eco-
nomic accrual formula would take into account the compounding of interest, 
that is, the fact that more interest economically arises in later periods because 
the amount of debt is increased by the accrued but unpaid interest from earlier 
151. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS AND OTHER 
TAX-MOTIVATED TRANSACTIONS 60 (1984) (hereinafter TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS). "The right tO $1 today 
is worth more than the right to $1 ten years from today, by the amount that could be earned by 
investing $1 for ten years. In many instances, the Code [prior to 1984] ignores, or fails to properly 
account for, the time value of money." /d. 
152. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1242 (1984). 
153. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess. 72 (1963). 
154. The accellerated cost recovery system, I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1986), was introduced 
in 1981 as a substitute for a "reasonable allowance for depreciation" with respect to tangible 
property. The system greatly accellerated depreciation deductions significantly by shortening useful 
lives. See 2 TREASURY DEP'T. REP., Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 
152 (Nov. 1984). 
155. TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 61. 
156. ld. at 62 (citing United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S: 54 (1965)). 
157. TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 62. 
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periods." ~~M Distortion of income occurred if the agreement did not call for 
interest to be paid currently and in accordance with such economic accrual. The 
major pre-1984 statutory antidistortion of income tools in the time value context 
were sections 1232 and 483. To a lesser degree, when related creditors and 
borrowers were involved, sections 482 and 267 addressed time value problems. 
a. Section 1232 
Section 1232 1 ~~ was enacted in 1954 and provided "constructive" sale or 
exchange treatment'~><' for the premature retirement of corporate or governmental 
bonds that are issued for money or publicly traded property. This "constructive" 
sale treatment entitled bondholders to capital gains treatment on any redemption 
premium. Conversely, section 1232(b) 161 mandated ordinary income treatment 
for any "original issued discount" (OlD), that arose when a borrower holding 
the debt as a capital asset received less from the lender (the "issue price") than 
the amount owed to the lender (the "redemption price"). As enacted, the holder 
of the bond was not taxed under section 1232 on any OlD until redemption 
of the bond or upon an earlier disposition in a taxable transaction. However, 
the borrowing corporation, in nonparallel treatment, was required to amortize 
the OlD, that is, currently deduct a prorata portion of the "interest," over the 
life of the bond. 162 In 1969 Congress mandated the same parallel timing treatment 
for the bondowner by requiring the bondholder to include the OlD in income 
on a ratable basis over the life of the bond. 16·1 As the holder included such 
OlD in income, his basis for the bond was increased correspondingly. 164 
By 1982 Congress realized that a ratable deduction of OlD gave rise to 
larger deductions in the earlier years of a bond's term, relative to deductions 
allowed to issuers of interest bearing bonds that were not issued at a discount."'~ 
This distortion as well as other inequities led to the enactment of sections 
1232A"6 and 163(e)167 in 1982. These sections imposed new rules for computing 
the method of amortizing and including in income the OlD at the corporate 
and bondholders level, respectively. The method parallels the manner in which 
interest would accrue under interest-paying, nondiscounted bonds-that is, yield 
to maturity. 16M 
Nevertheless, sections 1232 and 1232A were relatively limited with respect 
to covered transactions. Pre-1984 OlD rules "do not apply to obligations issued 
158. /d. 
159. I.R.C. § 1232(a) (1954) (repealed in 1984). 
160. The "sale or exchange" requirement for capital gains treatment 1s discussed in the 
authorities cited infra in note 270. 
161. I.R.C. § 1232(b) (1954) (repealed in 1984). 
162. S. REP. No. 552, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1969). 
163. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3) (1954) (repealed in 1984). See generally S. REP. No. 552, supra note 
162, at 147. 
164. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3)(E) (1954) (repealed 1984); S. REP. No. 552, supra note 162, at 147. 
165. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 160. 
166. I.R.C. § 1232A (1982) (repealed in 1984). 
167. While I.R.C. § 1232A was repealed in 1984, I.R.C. § 163(e) simply was modified to 
conform with the new original issue discount rules. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess. 65-66 (1984). 
168. The yield to maturity (or technically, the internal rate of return) is the yield promised 
to the buyer of a debt instrument under the assumption that all payments will be made in full 
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by a natural person, obligations that are not capital assets in the hands of the 
holder, or obligations issued in exchange for property where neither the obligation 
nor the property received is publicly traded." 16~ This broad exception was based 
upon a perceived difficulty in determining the issue price of the obligation, 1711 
that is, the value of the property sold. 
b. Section 483 
In 1964 Congress extended the application of the limited time value of money 
rules to most sales transactions in the form of "imputed interest." 171 Prior to 
that time, buyers and sellers could disguise interest by not providing specifically 
for interest payments. 172 To remedy this problem, section 483 17) was enacted. 
Section 483 recharacterized as "unstated interest" a portion of the ostensible 
and on time, and that interest rates will not change before he sells the instrument. The yield to 
maturity may be determined by solving for "i" in the following equation: PB = C/(1 + i) + C/(1 + i)' 
. . . + C/(1 + i)111 + A/(1 + i)111 ; 
where: PB = price of the bond or present value of the payments; 
C = promised interest payments; 
A= par or maturity value at m; 
i = interest rate for m periods; 
m = term to maturity; 
G. KAUFMAN, THE U.S. fiNANCIAL SYSTEM: MONEY, MARKETS, AND INSTITUTIONS 74-76 (2d ed. 1983). 
169. TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 63 (footnotes omitted). Other exceptions 
included: (I) "obligations with a maturity of less than one year;" (2) "obligations exempt from 
tax under § 103 or any other provision of law;" (3) obligations issued for the use of property; 
and (4) "obligations issued in exchange for services." H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 152, at 1241-
42 (footnote omitted). 
170. See TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 63. 
171. See generally S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1964). 
172. /d. Arguably, case law would have imputed interest. Cf. United States v. Midland-Ross 
Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965). 
173. I.R.C. § 483 (West Supp. 1986). 
Section 483 generally provides that if the total deferred payments of the sales 
price under a contract for the sale or exchange of property includes any unstated 
interest, a portion of each deferred payment will be treated as interest instead of sales 
price (sec. 483(a)). In determining whether the total deferred sales price payments 
include any unstated interest, the total deferred payments of sales price are compared 
to the sum of the present values of such payments plus the present values of any 
stated interest payments due under the contract (sec. 483(b)). If the total deferred sales 
price payments exceed the total present values of sales price and stated interest payments, 
there is unstated interest. 
The present value of a deferred payment is the amount that the parties would 
agree to pay and receive today instead of waiting for the deferred payment. The 
determination of this value depends on two factors. The first is the length of time 
until the deferred payment is to be made. The second factor is the interest rate that 
represents the value of money over that period. Present values are determined by 
discounting payments at an interest rate prescribed in regulations by the Secretary (sec. 
483(b)). Under existing regulations, the interest rate used to determine whether there 
is unstated interest is 6 percent simple interest. This rate is referred to as the "test 
rate." 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., BACKGROUND ON REGULATIONS UNDER 
SECTIONS 482, 483 AND 2032A OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 5-6 (Comm. Print 1981) (hereinafter 
BACKGROUND ON REGULATIONS). 
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principle payments from the buyer-borrower to the seller-creditor if their sales 
agreement did not require the buyer-borrower's payment of a minimum "safe-
harbor rate" of 9"7o interest by 1984. 174 The interest rate that the buyer-borrower 
was required to pay is prescribed in the regulations. The imputation and safe-
harbor rates failed miserably due to the inflation that existed prior to 1984. 175 
This failure occured despite the congressional directive that the regulations would 
"reflect the going rate of interest and will not be higher than the rate which 
a person, in reasonably sound financial circumstances and with adequate security 
could be expected to borrow from the bank." 176 
In addition to the inadequate stated interest rate and resulting inadequate 
discount to present value, substantial distortion occurred because the test rate 
was simple interest. 177 If the buyer and seller met the test rate, they could 
allocate contractually the annual payments to principal and interest under various 
noneconomic accrual tax accounting methods that could produce substantial 
revenue abuses.m These methods had the effect of front loading the interest 
deduction, whereas economic accrual placed larger amounts of interest at the 
end of the loan term. 179 
In addition, section 483 contained the following significant exceptions: ( l) 
it applied only to sales or exchanges of property made more than six months 
after the date of the sale or exchange; (2) it did not apply to contracts with 
a sales price in excess of $3,000; (3) it did not apply to certain sales or exchanges 
of patents; (4) it did not apply to "s·ates or exchanges that result only in ordinary 
income to the seller;" 180 and (5) most significantly, for purposes of this Article, 
a liquidating distribution was not treated as a sale or exchange. 181 Note that 
section 483 applied explicitly to contingent transactions. 182 
c. Related Party Provisions 
Provisions that are substantially identical to section 482 have been in the 
tax law since the Revenue Act of 1921. 183 Section 482 permits the Secretary of 
the Treasury to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, 
credits, or allowances" between two or more trades or businesses controlled 
directly or indirectly by the same interest if necessary to prevent evasion of 
/d. 
174. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1 (c), (d) (as amended in 1981 ). 
175. TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 64. 
176. S. REP. No. 830, supra note 171, at 102. 
177. TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 64. 
[A) simple interest computation ignores the compounding of interest on unpaid interest 
which occurs as an economic matter. For example, a debt obligation bearing a stated 
rate of 9 percent simple interest payable at the end of 30 years actually bears interest 
at a rate of 4-1/2 percent on a constant interest basis. 
178. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 152, at 1243. 
179. /d. at 1243 n.7. 
180. See BACKGROUND ON REGULATIONS, supra note 173, at 6. 
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-l(b)(l) (1966). 
182. /d.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.483-l(e)(2) (1966). 
183. Revenue Act of 1921, § 240(d), ch. 85, 42 Stat. 227 (1921). See generally Cooper, Section 
45, 4 TAX L. REV. 131 (1948-49). 
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taxes or "clearly to reflect the income" in any such trade or business. 184 Extensive 
legislative regulations, promulgated initially in 1968, define the purpose of section 
482 as placing controlled taxpayers on a parity with uncontrolled taxpayers "by 
determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true 
taxable income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer" 18~­
the arm's length standard. Section 482 regulations specifically deal with sales 
and loans between controlled taxpayers. 186 In the case of loans, the regulations 
provided safe-harbor rates that often were parallel to those provided in section 
483. 187 Unlike section 483, which recharacterized a part of the sales price as 
interest under the imputed rate, 188 section 482 imputed interest income and expense 
on the stated principal amount. 18~ 
Section 267, 1 ~0 also has a long history in the Code. 1 ~ 1 Prior to 1983, section 
267 combated some of the time value of money abuse that arose when the 
borrower and the debtor were utilizing different methods of accounting. Prior 
184. I.R.C. § 482 (West Supp. 1986). The § 482 regulations state that the allocation applies 
to any controlled taxpayer, regardless of whether the taxpayer makes a separate or a consolidated 
return. Treas Reg. § 1.482-l(b)(2) (as amended in 1968). Funhermore, in determining whether to 
make an allocation under § 482, the district director is not limited to cases of improper accounting, 
fraudulent or sham transactions, or devices used to reduce or avoid taxes. Rather § 482 may apply 
to any case in which, by inadvertence or design, the taxable income of a controlled taxpayer is 
other than it would have been had the taxpayer been an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's 
length with another uncontrolled taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(c) (as amended in 1968). Note 
that if an allocation is made with respect to one controlled taxpayer, a correlative adjustment should 
be made to any related controlled taxpayer involved in the allocation, if such allocation would 
affect the tax liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(d)(2) (as amended in 1968). 
The method of making an allocation generally depends on the substance of the particular 
transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(d)(l) (as amended in 1968). However, the regulations provide 
special rules for the following items: (I) imputed interest on intercompany loans and advances; (2) 
services performed by one member for another; (3) use of tangible property; (4) pricing of inter-
company sales of tangible property; and (5) transfers of intangible property. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
2 (as amended in 1983). A detailed discussion of these rules is beyond the scope of this Article. 
See generally Fuller, Section 482 Revisited, 31 TAX L. REv. 475, 491-514 (1976). 
185. BACKGROUND ON REGULATIONS, supra note 173, at 5. "The standard applied in every 
case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer." 
/d. 
The regulations define "controlled" as "any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally 
enforcable, and however exercisable or exercised. It is the reality of the control which is decisive, 
not its form or the mode of its exercise. A presumption of control arises if income or deductions 
have been arbitrarily shifted." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(a)(3) (as amended in 1968). This definition 
has been construed broadly such that voting rights or even stock ownership is unnecessary for 
control. See Fuller, supra note 184, at 481-86. 
186. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (as amended in 1983). 
187. /d. 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 171-74. 
189. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(l) (as amended in 1983). 
190. I.R.C. § 267 (West Supp. 1986). 
191. Congress enacted the predecessor to§ 267(a)(l) in 1934 to stop "the practice of creating 
losses through transactions between" related parties. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 
24(a)6 (1934), reprinted in, 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 554, 571. The predecessor prohibited the deduction 
of losses on sales or exchanges of property between related parties. In 1937 Congress added the 
predecessor to § 267(a)(2) which adopted the draconian approach of denying the accrual basis 
debtor's deduction for interest or expenses owed to a related cash-basis creditor, if not paid within 
2 months after the close of the tax year in which due. See Rose, Related Party Transactions under 
Section 267, 102 3o TAX MAT. A-9, A-10 (1985). 
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to amendment in 1984, section 267(a)(2) disallowed any deduction for an accrual 
basis borrower when accrued interest was not timely paid to a related cash basis 
creditor. 1 ~2 
2. Post-1984 
By 1984, Congress became aware of a number of time value of money 
abuses under the existing tax provisions. For example, the exception to section 
1232 for obligations issued for nonpublidy traded property was often exploited 
to achieve deferral of income tax on interest income and accelerated deductions 
of interest expenses. In addition, tax shelters often exploited the imputed interest 
rates under section 483. This exploitation was possible because the interest rates 
failed to keep current with inflation and noneconomic accrual of interest formulas. 
The exploitation produced substantial distortion by taking "advantage of the 
artificially low safe-harbor rate to obtain excessive ACRS deductions and in-
vestment credits, stating interest at just above test rate and achieving an overstated 
sales price and tax basis. Moreover, no Code sections had been applied to 
deferred payment transactions involving services or the use of property." ~~J After 
examining the entire area, Congress concluded that rules similar to the OlD 
rules should be extended to a broader range of transactions including obligations 
issued for nontrade or property, services and the use of property, and obligations 
issued by individuals. Furthermore, obligations that were not capital assets in 
the holder's hands were required to be included under periodic inclusion rules.~~~ 
a. OlD Rules: Sections 1271-1275 
Section 1271 performs the role of old section 1232A'~5-supplying a con-
structive sale or exchange for the retirement of a debt instrument. 1"" Section 
1272 is the successor to section 1232A. It requires inclusion of OlD in income 
on the basis of a constant interest rate. 1 ~7 Section 1272(a)(3) provides for daily 
allocation of OID. 1 ~x OlD is determined under the following sections: (1) section 
1273 in the case of debt instruments that are not issued for property; 1w and 
(2) under section 1274 in the case of debt instruments that are issued for 
property. 21x1 Section 1274, which is applicable when neither the debt instrument 
nor the property received in exchange are publicly traded, performs two distinct 
functions: ( 1) "testing the adequacy of stated interest" and, when inadequate, 
imputing interest as discussed above; and (2) "placing the parties to a transaction 
192. I.R.C. § 267 (1986). 
193. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 152, at 1243-44. 
194. /d. at 1244. 
195. I.R.C. § 1232(a) (West Supp. 1986). 
196. /d. § 1271(a)(l). If there was an intention at the time of original issue to call a debt 
instrument before maturity, an amount of gain equal to OlD not yet included in income is treated 
as ordinary income. /d. § 1271 (a)(2). 
197. I.R.C. § 1272(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 1272(a)(2) lists the general exceptions to 
such OlD inclusion. /d. 
198. /d. § 1272(a)(3); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-l(a)(3), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,049 (1986). 
199. I.R.C. § 1273 (West Supp. 1986). 
200. /d. § 1274. Throughout the process of enacting the new time value of money rules, 
Congress constantly added to the § 1274 exceptions. See, e.g., 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 
119-20, 125-27; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-l(a)(2), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,049 (1986); Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1274-l(b), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,964-65 (1986). 
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involving nontraded debt and property on the accrual method of accounting as 
to any interest whether stated or imputed but not paid currently. " 201 
The post-1984 "time value of money" rules demand in the context of 
contingent payments in a sale or exchange of property that when future contingent 
P payments to former T shareholders do not provide for a minimum or "ad-
equate" amount of interest, a portion of the stated principal amount of the 
contingent payment must be recharacterized as interest for tax purposes. 202 New 
sections 1271-1275 apply at the T shareholder level to any transaction treated 
as a sale or exchange for tax purposes. These sections contain limited exceptions, 
but these exceptions do not include a complete liquidation. 203 
The proposed time value of money regulations provide that contingent 
payments first must be separated from fixed payments. 204 The time value of 
money rules are applied in year I and subsequent years to the fixed payments. 20~ 
In addition, the proposed regulations provide that a contingent payment received 
in year 2 that does not provide for adequate interest is treated as consisting of 
a principal payment in year 2. This principal payment is equal to the discounted 
201. 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 114. 
202. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(3), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986). Generally contingent payments 
are not taken into account in applying the original issue discount and imputed interest rules. Income 
Taxes; Debt Instruments With Original Issue Discount; Imputed Interest on Deferred Payment Sales 
or Exchanges of Property; and Safe Haven Interest Rates for Commonly Controlled Taxpayers; Pro-
posed Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,021, 12,023, 12,026 (1986) [hereinafter Preamble]. Rather, contingent 
payments are segregated from noncontingent payments and accounted for separately. Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986). The noncontingent payment then is tested under 
the general time value of money rules not taking the contingent payment into account. Preamble, 
supra, at 12,023. Next, the contingent payments are examined and may be "recharacterized" as in-
terest in certain situations. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(3)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986); Pream-
ble, supra, at 12,026-27. In determining whether a payment constitutes a contingent payment, the 
Commissioner may disregard incidental contingencies, but the parties to the transactions are bound 
by its form. A payment is not considered contingent "merely because the amount of or the liability 
for the payment may be impaired by insolvency or default" of the purchaser. Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1275-4(b)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986). 
203. For purposes of § 1274, "the term sale or exchange means any transaction treated as a 
sale or exchange for tax purposes." Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.1274-l(a)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,063 (1986). 
There is no exception similar to the old § 483 exception, discussed supra at note 181, for distributions 
in a complete liquidation that are treated under § 31 as a sale or exchange. 
204. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986). 
205. To prevent the imputation of interest under § 1274, the noncontingent portion of the P 
installment obligation must provide for adequate "stated interest." Preamble, supra note 202, at 
12,023. For this purpose, a debt instrument generally provides for adequate stated interest if it calls 
for interest over its entire term at a rate no lower than the applicable "test rate of interest." Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-3(a), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,066 (1986). If a debt instrument does not provide for 
a fixed rate of interest at least equal to the test rate, the adequacy of the stated interest is determined 
by comparing the stated principal amount involved with the sum of the "present value" of all payments 
due under the debt instrument. The present value is determined by discounting such payments at 
a rate equal to the test rate of interest. Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,023; Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 
1.1274-2(b)(l), 1.1274-3(c)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,066, 12,068 (1986). A debt instrument generally has 
adequate stated interest if the stated principal amount of the instrument is less than or equal to the 
sum of these present values. Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,023; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-3(c)(l)(i), 
51 Fed. Reg. 12,068 (1986). The test rate of interest varies depending upon the type of transaction 
and the term of the obligation, but generaUy is based upon an applicable federal rate (i.e., yields 
to maturity of outstanding marketable obligations of the United States, with special test rates for 
installment obligations). Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,023; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-6, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 12,077 (1986). 
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value of the contingent payment (using the applicable "test rate of interest")2'1(, 
from the date of the year 2 payment back to the date of the year I sale or 
exchange. 201 The balance of the contingent payment in excess of a discounted 
value is treated as interest. 20x 
b. Imputed Interest: Section 483 
In 1984 Congress reduced the scope of section 483 significantly by subjecting 
a "debt for nonpublicly traded property transaction" to interest adequacy under 
section 1274. Section 483 now tests the adequacy of interest only in sales 
transactions specifically excepted from section 1274, for example, sales of a 
principal residence, certain sales of farms, and transactions involving total pay-
ments of $250,000 or less. 2"" Unlike section 1274, section 483 applies only if 
the contract for sale or exchange calls for payments that are due more than 
one year from the date of the sale or exchange, and it does not apply to any 
sale or exchange of property, if the sales price does not exceed $3,000 or in 
the case of a purchaser, any amount treated as outstanding interest under section 
163(b). 210 When section 483 is applicable, economic accrual rules that essentially 
are equivalent to the OlD accrual rules apply in recharacterizing ostensible 
principal as interest. Thus, the test and imputation rates are based on the 
applicable federal rate. 211 Proposed section 446 regulations effect economic accrual 
of such interest.212 Essentially, the same rules as described abovew apply to 
contingent payments214 in liquidations and other sales and exchanges.215 
c. Unresolved Problems With Respect to Contingent Payments in Cost 
Basis Acquisitions Under Proposed Time Value Regulations 
The bifurcation of contingent payments and noncontingent payments and 
the inclusion of liquidating distributions in covered sales or exchanges work at 
the former T shareholder and P levels in contingent earn-out transactions that 
involve either asset or stock acquisitions. The former T shareholders are treated 
as receiving principal and interest income attributable to the contingent payment 
in year 2, and P is treated as paying interest and principal in year 2. In a 
section 337 asset acquisition, the time value of money rules should not apply 
at the Old T level with respect to post sale date OlD unless Old T holds the 
contingent P payment for a period of time prior to distributing it to the former 
T shareholders. 216 A section 338 transaction seemingly is complicated by the 
206. The "test rates" applicable to contingent payments in year 2 are based upon the applicable 
federal rates in effect on the date of the sale or exchange or contract date in year I. It is based 
upon a term beginning on the date the overall debt instrument is issued and ending on the date 
the contingent payment is due. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(3)(iii)(B), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (1986). 
207. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(3)(ii)(A), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986). 
208. Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,027. 
209. 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 122; Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,023. 
210. Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,023. 
211. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(a), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,039 (1986). 
212. See generally Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,027-28. 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 204-08. 
214. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.483-5(b)(l), (3), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,038 (1986). 
215. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-l(a)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,038 (1986). 
216. Old T may hold its assets, including the P contingent claim, for up to 12 months following 
the date of its adoption of a plan of complete liquidation. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
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temporary regulation's treatment of Neo-T as a continuation of Old T. 217 How-
ever, because no actual sale or exchange of T assets between Old T and P 
occurs, the time value of money rules should not apply as between Old T and 
P. 
The application of the time value of money rules to T's distribution of a 
contingent claim that it held prior to the acquisition date in connection with a 
section 338 sale of stock or section 337 asset sale is less clear. Under the proposed 
regulations, the pattern of payment for the contingent portion of the time value 
of money sale or exchange is to match the timing and character treatment of 
the seller and the purchaser or payor with respect to principal and interest in 
year 2 when the contingent payment becomes fixed and is paid. m A liquidating 
distribution and a distribution in a bootstrap acquisition generally are treated 
for tax purposes as a sale or exchange between the shareholder and the cor-
poration. 219 Thus, applying the proposed time value of money regulations literally, 
the former T shareholders and T constitute the seller and payor respectively 
when T distributes a contingent claim in such transactions. However, this is not 
the economic reality of the transaction and could cause further discontinuity 
and lost deductions under the Neo-T year 2 continuation of Old T concept 
relied upon by the proposed and temporary section 338(b)-3T contingent income 
regulations. 220 
The true payor of a contingent claim held by T at the time of the acquisition 
is not T, but rather the obligor under T's claim. For example, if the contingent 
claim arose from an actual or deemed sale or exchange of property by T prior 
to its acquisition, the purchaser should be treated as the payor and the former 
T shareholders should be viewed as the sellers for purposes of the time value 
of money rules. Similarly, if the underlying claims were for senices rendered 
by, or rents due to, T, the post-1984 time value of money rules applicable to 
rents and services221 should apply as between the former T shareholders and the 
third party lessee or service receiver. If, however, the underlying contingent 
claim does not fit into these categories (for instance, if T distributed a legal 
217. See infra text accompanying notes 616-19. 
218. Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,027. 
219. This is clearly the case at the shareholder level. When §§ 331 and 302 apply to the 
redemption portion of the transaction, it is treated as a sale or exchange. See supra note 23. Inside 
at the T level, however, the presence of a deemed sale or exchange with respect to redemptions 
or liquidations is far less clear. I.R.C. § 311(d) (West Supp. 1986) treats most dividend or redemption 
distributions of appreciated property as if the property were sold at the time of the distribution, 
but unlike §§ 302(a) and 331(a) no constructive sale or exchange itself is provided. Moreover, the 
General Utilities premise of §§ 336-338 is that a liquidating distribution does not constitute a sale 
or exchange, or at least a realization at the T level. 296 U.S. at 200. 
220. Under the temporary § 338 regulation's approach of treating Neo-T as a continuation 
of Old T for purposes of contingent payments and the usual workings of the assignment of income 
and related doctrines, Neo-T would be entitled, in a separate return in year 2, to appropriate 
deductions or basis adjustments when the contingent payments are distributed to the former T 
shareholders. However, in the case of an actual liquidation of T, in year 2 there would be no 
corresponding corporate obligor. 
221. I.R.C. § 467 (West Supp. 1986). Section 467 applies to leases (§ 467 rental agreements) 
that involve total payments in excess of $250,000 and that either increase (or decrease) rents or 
constitute rents payable beyond the close of the calendar year following the year in which the 
associated use occurs. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 891 (1984). Section 467 
rental agreements that involve leasebacks or terms in excess of 7511Jo of the property's ACRS life 
will be subject to a tax avoidance purpose test. /d. at 891-92. The tax avoidance standard basically 
is a facts and circumstances standard. A major factor is the actual and expected tax brackets of 
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claim for injury to it arising out of a transaction other than a sale or exchange, 
rent or services), the statutory time-value of money rules should not apply. In 
essence, the regulations here should adopt a pass through entity approach with 
respect to contingent claims distributed by T in an asset or stock sale to P. If 
the time value of money rules would have applied to T if T had held the 
contingent claim until maturity, the rules should apply to the T shareholders 
and the ultimate obligor. 
If the statutory time value of money rules would not have applied inside 
to T, they should not apply outside to the former T shareholders and T. Rather, 
an interest factor between the former T shareholders and the ultimate obligor 
should be imputed only under open transaction reporting. In open transactions, 
a case-law interest factor modified by the model discussed below at times might 
be appropriate at the former T shareholder and ultimate obligor levels if the 
payment actually reflects time value of money concepts. 222 
When T distributes the contingent claim in a tax year that is subsequent 
to the year in which the claim arises, but prior to its maturity, a modification 
to the above analysis must be made. Namely, any discount imputed under the 
model in open transaction reporting that is attributable to the lapse of time 
between year 1 (the year in which the claim arose) and year 2 (the year in 
which it is distributed) should be accounted for by T and not the former T 
shareholders. This interest element should be taken into account, however, only 
in year 3 or even year 5 when the contingent claim finally matures. The proper 
taxpayer in that year for reporting this discount element is discussed below in 
Section v.m 
III. CoNVENTIONAL DocTRINE 
A. T Shareholder Level Treatment 
1. Annual Accounting Principle 
A fundamental feature of the federal income tax system is the "annual 
accounting principle," under which each tax year stands on its own and income 
the lessor and lessee over the term of the lease. /d. at 893. If a tax avoidance purpose is found, 
the rental payments will be "leveled" for tax purposes, that is, rent and interest will be deemed 
to accrue on a level present value basis over the term of the lease. /d. at 891-92. A number of 
tax avoidance safe harbors exist. ld. at 892-93. If a § 467 rental agreement does not involve 
leasebacks or long-term leases or is not entered into for tax avoidance purposes, the rents specified 
in the lease will be respected. However, these payments must be reported on an accrual basis, 
regardless of the taxpayer's actual method of accounting. /d. at 891. 
Lessors, who are not subject to rent leveling because of a lack of tax avoidance purpose will 
be subject to a recapture provision if they dispose of the leased property. Any gain realized will 
be treated as ordinary income to the extent of the excess of the accruals that would have been 
taken into account had the lessor been subject to the rent leveling provision over actual accruals 
of rents up to the date of the transfer. /d. 
The conference agreement delegated authority to the Treasury Department to issue regulations 
requiring reporting of the interest elements of deferred payment transactions involving services in 
a manner consistent with the rules described above. ld at 895. These regulations will apply only 
to transactions exempt from the provisions of I.R.C. §§ 404 or 404A. 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 
104, at 284. See generally Whitesman, Section 467: Tax Planning for Deferred-Payment Leases, 5 
VA. TAX REV. 345 (1985). 
222. See infra text accompanying notes 543-45 & 552. 
223. See infra text accompanying notes 560-73. 
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is computed annually as the net result of all transactions within the tax year. 22• 
Events in a subsequent tax year (year 2) cannot, absent an express statutory 
requirement, serve to reopen a prior year (year 1) and adjust a transaction 
reported in year 1. This is true regardless of whether the statute of limitations 
has run on year 1 transactions. 225 The annual accounting principle is an ad-
ministrative rule226 and yields to statutory exception when Congress so provides.m 
Most of these statutory exceptions operate by reopening year 1 and adjusting 
the original transaction as in certain favorable redemption and liquidation pro-
visions that depend on year 2 events.m 
When a transaction has effects in more than one tax year, some commentators 
have called for transactional reporting under which year 1 and year 2 events 
would be taken into account in year 2. The transactional reporting system adjusts 
for rate and bracket changes by charging an interest factor for any deferral of 
reporting. 229 This "exact" transactional approach, after a false start,230 has not 
224. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931 ). See generally Note, Tax Benefit 
Rule, Claim of Right Restorations, and Annual Accounting: A Cure for the Inconsistencies, 21 
VAND. L. REV. 995 (1968). 
225. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 378 n.IO (1982); Note, supra note 
224, at 995. 
226. Burnet, 282 U.S. at 365. 
It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue ascertainable, 
and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it 
practicable to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, 
assessment, and collection capable of practical operation .... While, conceivably, a 
different system might be devised by which the tax could be assessed, wholly or in 
part, on the basis of the finally ascertained results of particular transactions, Congress 
is not required by the [16th) amendment to adopt such a system in preference to the 
more familiar method, even if it were practicable. 
/d. (citations omitted). 
227. A thesis of this Article is that the courts and the regulations cannot reopen year I upon 
the occurrence of a year 2 inconsistent event unless Congress expressly so provides. See infra note 
602. 
228. If the acquisition of a "prohibited interest" within the 10-year look-forward period occurs 
under a waiver of family attribution, then generally year I is reopened and what originally was 
treated as "redemption" under §§ 302(a) and (b) may now be a dividend. See l.R.C. § 302(c)(2) 
(West Supp. 1986). A tax free § 332 liquidation of a "controlled" subsidiary by a corporate parent 
on a tax free basis may take as long as three years. However, if the transaction commenced in 
year I does not produce a complete liquidation within the three-year period, year I is reopened 
and any distributions treated as distributions in complete liquidation of a controlled subsidiary are 
recharacterized as dividends in year I. l.R.C. § 332(b)(3) (West Supp. 1986). 
229. Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax Consequences 
of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L. REv. 85, 109-153 (1972); Note, supra note 224, at 
995, 1009-10, 1015-16. 
230. The Court of Claims initially ruled in Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 
1958), nonacq. Rev. Rul. 59-141, 1959-1 C.B. 17, that in a tax benefit recovery, the taxpayer was 
taxed at the year I rates in year 2 on the "restored deduction." However, a decade later the Court 
of Claims overruled itself in Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 
1967). The court stated: 
To insure the vitality of the single-year concept, it is essential not only that annual 
income be ascertained without reference to losses experienced in an earlier accounting 
period, but also that income be taxed without reference to earlier tax rates. And absent 
specific statutory authority sanctioning a departure from this principle, it may only 
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been accepted judicially.231 A number of doctrines that modify the annual 
accounting principle have evolved. All the doctrines are aimed at minimizing 
distortion of income and approximating transactional reporting. 232 The failure 
of these doctrines to explore adequately the deep structure tax policy of minimum 
distortion of income constitutes the central problem with respect to contingent 
income items at both the T shareholder and T corporate levels. The lack of 
deep structure analysis is also the cause of many other inconsistencies and 
complexities in the tax law. 
Except in a nonrecognition transaction, a taxpayer generally must recognize 
as a gain (or loss) under section 1001 the excess of the "amount realized" from 
a sale or other disposition of property over his adjusted basis. A loss is the 
excess of the adjusted basis over the amount realized. 233 The "amount realized" 
is the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of any property 
received in the transaction.B~ Section 331 treats the amounts received by a 
shareholder in a complete liquidation as a "constructive" sale or exchange of 
his stock. 235 Absent installment reporting, a shareholder normally would recognize 
the entire amount distributed by a liquidating corporation in the year of receipt 
of the distribution. 2)(, T's liquidating distribution of a claim generally would 
result in a recognition transaction to T's shareholders to the extent of its fair 
market value in the year of the receipt of the claim (year 1). 
a. Open Transaction Exception 
When the amount that the former T shareholders will receive under the 
claim cannot be determined in year 1 because the determination of such amount 
depends upon contingencies that will not be resolved finally until year 2, ad-
justments generally are made to the annual accounting principle to produce the 
least distortion of income. Thus, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in 
Burnet v. Logan 231 found "the promise of future money payments wholly 
contingent upon facts and circumstances not possible to foretell with anything 
be said of Perry that it achieved a result which was more equitably just than legally 
correct. 
/d. at 403 (footnote omitted). The Perry approach ignored the time value factor in deferred restorations 
and deferred deductions. 
231. Hillsboro Not'/ Bonk, 460 U.S. at 380 n.l2; Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp., 381 F.2d at 
403; see Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REv. 265, 270.71 (1978). 
232. See infra text accompanying notes 442-52. 
233. I.R.C. § lOOl(a) (West Supp. 1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-l(a) (1957). 
234. I.R.C. § IOOI(b) (West Supp. 1986). Inclusion of indebtedness to which property is subject 
in the amount realized fits poorly within this terminology, notwithstanding Crane v. Commissioner, 
331 U.S. I (1947), and Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (1980). See generally Rosenberg, Beller to Burn 
Out Than to Fade A way? Tax Consequences on the Dispositon of a Tax Shelter, 71 CALIF. L. 
REV. 87, 88-95 (1983). 
235. I.R.C. § 331(a) (West Supp. 1986); see supra note 16. 
236. Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 484. 
237. 283 U.S. 404 (1931). Mrs. Logan owned stock of a steel company that in turn owned 
a 120Jo interest in a mining company. The steel company received a 120Jo share of all the ore 
extracted from a mine leased by the mining company. The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company 
purchased all the stock of the steel company, including Mrs. Logan's, for $2,200,000 and future 
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like fair certainty. The promise was in no proper sense equivalent to cash. It 
had no ascertainable fair market value. The transaction was not a closed one. " 238 
Accordingly, the taxpayer in Logan was not required to report P's promise of 
future payments until she had recovered her basis in her T stock. The Logan 
case arose prior to the enactment of the installment sales reporting provisions 
and the capital gains provisions. 239 In short, Logan involved only a question of 
the timing of income. More specifically, the Court in Logan had to determine 
whether the taxpayer could recover her basis before being taxed on her profit. 240 
The Court noted that the open transaction doctrine is an administrative rule 
and can yield to necessity. The Court illustrated such a situation with an example 
of a contingent claim that must be valued in year I for estate tax purposes so 
the estate can be closed and the executor discharged from further liability. w 
The open transaction doctrine was extended to the character of income 
received under an open transaction by a series of decisions, 242 the best known 
of which are Commissioner v. Carter243 and Westover v. Smith. 244 In Carter, 
payments of 60 cents for each ton of ore the steel company would receive from the mining company. 
Id. at 408-12. 
The Commissioner determined that the fair market value of Mrs. Logan's share of the future 
payments along with her share of the $2,200,000 payment was less than her basis in the stock sold. 
The Commissioner thus closed the ·transaction in the year of sale. Subsequently, when the future 
payments were received, the Commissioner apportioned them between income and return of capital. 
/d. at 411. Mrs. Logan argued that the subsequent payments should be considered a return of 
capital to the extent of her basis because the transaction should have been kept open. ld. at 413. 
238. /d. The "open transaction doctrine" has been discussed widely. See Ginsburg, supra note 
122, at 559-74; Note, "Open" Transactions in Federal Income Taxation, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 62 
(1969). 
239. The sale in question in Logan took place in 1916. The installment method of reporting 
income was first recognized in 1918 under Treas. Reg. § 33 Art. 116 and 117 (1918) and codified 
in the Revenue Act of 1926. See generally 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 
15.02 (rev. vol. 1985). The capital gains provisions were first enacied in 1921. Sre Note, supra note 
238, at 64 n.IO. See generally 38 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§ 22.02, at 22-
9 (rev. vol. 1980). 
240. Logan involved a higher basis than is found in many transactions because the taxpayer's 
basis was the fair market value on March I, 1913, and by the end of the tax year in question 
(1920) the taxpayer's receipts from the sale of the stock had not yet equaled their value on March 
I, 1913. Logan, 283 U.S. at 411. 
241. /d. at 412. Cases implementing or referring to this exception include Estate of Roberts 
v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 128, 132 (1972) and Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 656 
(1972). See McShain v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 998, 1009 n.4 (1979); cf. Commissioner v. Estate 
of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1955) (involving valuation of conditional deduction from gross estate). 
242. United States v. Yerger, 55 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1944); Bradford v. Commissioner, 
22 T.C. 1057, 1072-73 (1954). See generally Farer, Corporate Liquidations: Transmuting Ordinary 
Income Into Capital Gains, 75 HARV. L. REV. 527 (1962); Note, supra note 238, at 66-79. 
243. 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948). 
244. 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949); accord Lentz v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1157 (1957). In 
Westover, the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of Quickwork Company. Quickwork sold all its 
assets, including certain patents, in exchange for cash and I 0% of the gross receipts from the 
buyer's sale of machinery manufactured pursuant to the patents. Quickwork thereafter liquidated 
and distributed the cash and the rights to future royalties to the taxpayer. At the time of the 
distribution, the parties stipulated that the rights to the future royalties did not have an ascertainable 
fair market value. 173 F.2d at 91; see also Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 850, 853 (7th 
Cir. 1961) ("Furthermore, in ... Westover ... the parties had stipulated that the contracts had, 
in fact, no ascertainable fair market value."); accord Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195, 198 
n.4 (9th Cir. 1959). 
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the former T shareholder received, as a liquidating distribution, commission 
contracts for which no material additional services were required. Both the 
Commissioner and the taxpayer stipulated that these contracts did not have an 
ascertainable fair market value at the time of the distribution in year I. 245 The 
Commissioner argued before the Tax Court that the payments to the former T 
shareholder under the commission contract were ordinary income when received 
in year 2 because the payments did not result from a sale or exchange of a 
capital asset. 246 Reasoning that the Logan decision spoke of profit and not 
ordinary income after the recovery of basis, the Tax Court concluded that capital 
gains applied to payments received in year 2 under an open transaction if the 
transaction in year I was capital.247 The outcome in Carter did not present an 
abuse by a liquidating corporation who was escaping tax on the distribution of 
a contingent claim because the Tax Court, in the consolidated cases before it, 
taxed the liquidating T at ordinary income rates on the distributed claim in its 
final (year I) return. The decision of the Tax Court was based on the theory 
that such treatment was necessary in order to reflect T's income clearly. Otherwise, 
the court reasoned, a corporation could avoid liability on tax by the simple 
expedient of liquidation. 248 Unfortunately, this insight was soon forgotten. 
The taxpayers in Carter did not appeal the taxation of the liquidated T, 
but the Service did appeal the Tax Court's decision to hold the transaction open 
at the T shareholder level for capital gains purposes. The Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court,249 stating that: 
The Supreme Court spoke of the annual payments as constituting 
"profit" after the seller's capital investment should be returned. Until 
such return, it cannot be known whether gain or loss will result from 
a sale; thereafter it becomes certain that future payments will result 
in gain. No reason is apparent for taxing them as ordinary income. 250 
Because a complete liquidation is treated as a sale or exchange at the share-
holder level under section 331 and its predecessors, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that the open transaction doctrine equally applied to distributions 
without an ascertainable fair market value received in a complete liquidation. m 
245. 170 F.2d at 911. 
246. Carter v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 364, 369 (1947). 
247. /d. at 369-71. 
248. The case before the Tax Court was a consolidated case with both Carter (the shareholder) 
and Oil Trading Co. (the liquidated corporation) as petitioners. Thus, the Tax Court faced the 
taxability of the claims that were stipulated to lack an ascertainable fair market value at both the 
shareholder and target level. Apparently, the distributed claims for commissions were in a fixed 
amount, but the lack of an ascertainable fair market value arose from a contingency of possible 
nonpayment. /d. at 365. Furthermore, the claims were collected a short time after the liquidation. 
ld. at 365-66, 373. The Tax Court taxed the liquidating corporation on the amounts of the claims 
in year I (the year of distribution), despite the fact that the claims at issue were not collected until 
the following year. /d. at 373. 
249. 170 F.2d at 911. 
250. ld. at 912-13. 
251. /d. at 913. 
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In Westover v. Smith/52 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals came closer 
to the heart of the matter by reasoning that the predecessor to section 1001 
did not require immediate measurement of market value when there was no 
ascertainable fair market value at the time of liquidation. m The court stated: 
In such a situation the only practicable and accurate method of 
measuring the contract's value is through the application of money 
to such valuation as it is received. The alternatives are to ascribe a 
fictitious or speculative value to the property, which was condemned 
in the Logan case, or to allow it no value, as urged by appellants 
[taxpayers]. Such methods result in inaccuracies and inequities. We 
think the proper procedure is to measure the value of the contract 
as payments are received. 254 
In short, Westover articulated an awareness of the open transaction rule as a 
transactional exception to the annual accounting principle which otherwise would 
require a fictitious or speculative closed value. More recently, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals provided a good explanation of the open transaction doctrine 
stating that: 
Upon collection the amount received relates back to the initial 
exchange for tax purposes. Thus, if the "open transaction" event 
qualified for capital gain treatment, the amounts ultimately collected 
do also. 
The "open transaction" doctrine is a rule of fairness designed 
to ascertain with reasonable accuracy the amount of gain or loss 
realized upon an exchange, and, if appropriate, to defer recognition 
thereof until the correct amounts can be accurately determined.255 
The shortcomings of the classic open transaction doctrine as applied to time 
value of money principles and the remedies provided by the proposed and 
temporary regulations are discussed below. 256 
b. Transmutation of Income: A voidance of T Level Recapture Income 
Contemporaneously with the developments presented in Carter and Westover, 
the courts allowed a completely liquidated T to escape corporate level tax on 
amounts earned by it and assigned to its shareholders while still contingent, if 
T was not in existence at the time that the shareholders collected payments 
under the matured claim.257 Ironically, in the leading Tax Court cases developing 
this doctrine, the transaction was held closed at the shareholder level. m The 
252. 173 F .2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949). 
253. /d. at 92. 
254. /d. 
255. Dennis v. Commissioner, 473 F.2d 274, 285-86 (5th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted). 
256. See infra text accompanying notes 542-52. 
257. See infra notes 335-36, 350, 583, 385 & 398. 
258. O'Brien v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 376 (1955); accord Poro v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 
641 (1963); cf. Waring v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1969) (value of royalty licensing 
agreement closed because of individual taxpayer's return position). Note also that the initial open 
transaction-liquidating distribution decisions involving contingent claims were closed at the corporate 
level. 
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two trends converged in Shea Co. v. Commissioner59 when the Tax Court 
announced a two-part holding. First, the court permitted the liquidated T to 
avoid a corporate level taxation on income that it had earned, but only when 
it had no fixed and determinable rights at the time of liquidation. In addition, 
the court held the transaction open at the T shareholder level, permitting recovery 
of basis and, thereafter, capital gains under the open transaction doctrine. The 
Shea court ruled that neither the clear reflection nor assignment of income 
doctrines could be used to deflect income that was not then accruable to T's 
final return, that is, income to which there was no fixed and determinable rights 
in a certain amount of income. 260 
At the T shareholder level, the Tax Court was troubled by the Government's 
argument that due to the escape of the T level tax on the contingent claims, 
the former T shareholders were able to "convert ordinary income into capital 
gain. " 261 The Tax Court responded that in the absence of the collapsible cor-
poration provisions of section 34J262 (not applicable to the case at bar and not 
259. 53 T.C. 135 (1969). In Shea, the corporation formed a JOint venture with four other 
corporations to build a tunnel pursuant to a contract with the Department of Interior's Bureau of 
Reclamation. During the construction period, the joint venture asserted claims against the Bureau 
for additional compensation and the Industrial Indemnity Co. for certain dividends on the workmen's 
compensation policies carried with the company. Before the claims were settled, the joint venture 
liquidated and distributed its assets, including the unsettled claims, to the four corporations. The 
Shea Company, in turn, liquidated and distributed its individual interest in the unsettled claims to 
its shareholders. The claims then were settled and the former shareholders of Shea received their 
proportionate share. A precursor to the result found in Shea is the decision of Lentz v. Commissioner, 
28 T.C. 1157 (1957), in which only the shareholder treatment was before the court. The court 
distinguished eariler decisions that taxed a liquidated corporation on the income earned, but not 
yet received, on the grounds that in the earlier decisions the right to receive income was fixed, 
whereas in the case before it the distributed rights to future commissions had no ascertainable fair 
market value at the time of liquidation and were contingent upon the fruition of future third party 
actions. /d. at 1161. 
260. 53 T .C. at 155-57. The identification of an assignment of income and an accrual of 
income is criticized in the conclusion of this section of the text. See infra text accompanying notes 
319-21. 
261. 53 T.C. at 159. Conversion of ordinary income into capital gain often has been used 
by commentators to describe the effect of the distribution of a contingent claim in a complete 
liquidation. See, e.g., Farer, supra note 242, at 527. However, the reality is not a conversion, but 
rather an escape of a corporate level ordinary income tax and a capital gains tax of the shareholder 
on a greater amount (not reduced by the inside corporate level tax). See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. 
Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 399 (1982). 
262. 53 T.C. at 159. I.R.C. § 341 (West Supp. 1986) was enacted originally as § 117(m) of 
the 1939 Code pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1950, § 212(a), which was amended by § 326 of 
the Revenue Act of 1951. The collapsible corporation was a device used to convert corporate ordinary 
income into individual capital gains. It was used generally in the motion picture and construction 
industries. A newly formed corporation would produce a film, for example, and upon completion 
of the film and perhaps an initial showing, but prior to realization by the corporation of any 
substantial income therefrom the corporation liquidated and distributed the film in kind to its 
shareholders. The corporation was not taxed on the distribution in complete liquidation of the film 
under the General Utilities doctrine and would not be taxed upon receipt of income by the shareholders. 
The shareholders would be taxed at capital gains rates to the extent that the fair market value of 
the film exceeded the basis of their stock. If the subsequent income from the film did not exceed 
its fair market value (i.e., basis), there was no further tax. Thus, the collapsible provisions were 
passed because the corporation escaped taxation and the shareholders were taxed at capital gains 
rates instead of ordinary income rates. S. REP. No. 2375, 8Ist Cong., 2d Sess. X(A)(6) (1950), 
reprinted in, 1950-2 C.B. 483, 516. Under the collapsible rules, certain shareholders are taxed at 
ordinary income rates on the sale or exchange (including liquidation) of stock in a collapsible 
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presently applicable to any T when the contingent value is less than 1/3 of the 
total consideration)263 and the open transaction doctrine, the government's con-
tentions would present a certain element of "simplistic appeal." Nevertheless, 
the Tax Court in Shea rejected the closed transaction approach. The court stated: 
[The Commissioner] argues that if we determine some ascertain-
able value, the difference between that value and the amounts ulti-
mately collected would constitute ordinary income to the shareholders. 
He however neglects to offer even so much as a hint as to how an 
ascertainable fair market value may be determined .... It is because 
of the impossibility of ascertaining the fair market value of contested 
claims such as are here involved, that transactions of this type are 
held open and the value ultimately determined when settlement and 
collection occurs . . . . A determination of fair market value here 
in accordance with respondent's [Commissioner's] contention would 
not be an ascertainment; it would be fictitious, speculative, and a 
wild guess which we are not willing to make. 264 
The government's argument which won the hearts of the Tax Court dissenters 
was the pragmatic or "rough justice" approach that a former T shareholder 
level tax that was partially ordinary was better than nothing. ZM This surrogate 
corporation. /d. Presumably, the prov1s1ons tax the entire production and sale of the film, for 
example, as if the transitory corporation never existed. Thus, there is no need to impute income 
to the corporation when the shareholders seU the film. For a general discussion of the collapsible 
provisions, see B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 23, ,, 12.01·.09, at 12-1; 48 J. MERTENS, 
supra note 239, § 22.53, at 22-412. 
263. Section 341 does not apply to a corporation when the stock is sold or exchanged (or 
redeemed by the corporation in a liquidation) after the realization of two-thirds of the taxable 
income to be derived from the property by the corporation manufacturing, constructing, producing, 
or purchasing property. I.R.C. § 341(b)(l) (West Supp. 1986). An interesting question is how 
contingent income items of the corporation are accounted for in the two-thirds of taxable income 
test. Two principal issues exist. First, whether the contingent income item is a § 341 asset. Second, 
whether, and to what extent, the contingent income item can be valued. The answer to the first 
issue can be found in I.R.C. § 341(b)(4) (West Supp. 1986), which defines unrealized receivables 
as "any rights (contractual or otherwise) to payment for" goods or services. /d. If a contingent 
income item is a claim for payment of goods or services it should be considered an unrealized 
receivable and, as such, a § 341 asset under § 341(b)(3). Other contingent income items probably 
would not be § 341 assets. The answer to the second issue depends on the ability to ascertain 
readily a fair market value for the item. Presumably, a claim for payment of goods or services 
can be valued so that its value can be included in the taxable income base. 
264. 53 T.C. at 160-61. 
265. The closest acknowledgment of this approach may be seen in Judge Simpson's dissenting 
opinion in Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 634-35 (1968). Judge Simpson pointed out that 
at least placing a year I value on the rights distributed in a complete liquidation achieves some 
allocation of income between capital gains and ordinary income. "Although any value so determined 
may be arguable, it is better to place some value on the rights than to treat the entire amounts 
received as capital gains." /d. at 635. Judge Simpson did not disclose the basis for why some 
allocation was better than none. Presumably some ordinary income allocation would either serve 
as a surrogate shareholder level tax for an escaped corporate level tax (although this was not at 
issue in Dorsey), or a partial ordinary income tax in lieu of an interest factor. The time value of 
money rules in effect at that time did not apply to a liquidation treated as a sale or exchange. 
See supra note 181. Other Tax Court judges also were opposed to the application of the open 
transaction doctrine to corporate liquidations. However, these judges did not articulate fully the 
underlying policy or rationale. See Osenbach v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 797, 804-05 (1951) (Turner, 
J., concurring), aff'd, 198 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1952). 
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shareholder level ordinary income tax, when the actual abuse was avoidance of 
the corporate level tax, was the approach adopted by Congress in section 341, 
a complex, ill working, statutory misfortune. 266 But two wrongs don't make a 
right. Furthermore, they frequently obscure and retard the path to the correct 
approach. The Commissioner's arguments for closing the liquidating transaction 
on any basis fortunately were not adopted judicially. 
2. Closed Transaction and Arrowsmith 
Under the closed transaction doctrine, when a claim with an ascertainable 
fair market value is received in exchange for property, the gain is computed 
and taxed at the time of receipt. The taxpayer is deemed to have received the 
fair market value of the claim. 267 Thereafter, the claim is viewed as an independent 
asset with a new cost basis equal to the fair market value previously charged 
as income to the taxpayer. 26R Payments subsequently received in excess of this 
new basis (as when the instrument was discounted in year 1 under the closed 
transaction doctrine) traditionally do not enjoy capital gains treatment because 
such receipts or collections in year 2 do not qualify as a sale or exchange26~­
a traditional prerequisite for the sale or exchange of capital asset treatment. 210 
The separation of the liquidating distribution of the (contingent) claim in 
year 1 and its maturation in year 2 into two unrelated transactions, contrasts 
starkly with the treatment of a liquidating distribution of property subject to 
a contingent liability. In Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 271 the former T share-
holders of a liquidated T argued that their year 2 payment, as transferees of 
the liquidated T's previously contingent liability, was ordinary income under 
"the well-established principle that each taxable year is a separate unit for tax 
accounting purposes." 272 In addition, the former T shareholders argued that the 
resulting absence of a sale or exchange in year 2 precluded capital loss treatment. m 
266. See Ginsburg, Collapsible Corporations-Revisiting an Old Misfortune, 33 TAX L. REv. 
307 (1978). 
267. Dennis v. Commissioner, 473 F.2d 274, 285 (5th Cir. 1973); accord Cowden v. Com· 
missioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961). 
268. Dennis, 473 F.2d at 285. 
269. Osenbach v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1952). 
270. See generally Bittker, Capital Gains and Losses-The "Sole or Exchange" Requirement, 
32 HASTINGS L.J. 743 (1981); Gallagher, Capitol Goins and Losses: A Primer (Part I of//), 7 FLA. 
ST. U.L. REV. (1979). 
271. 344 U.S. 6 (1952). In Arrowsmith two shareholders liquidated a closely held corporation 
receiving liquidating distributions in years 1-4. /d. at 7. The shareholders reported their gain as 
capital gain. /d. In year 8 a judgment was rendered against the liquidated corporation (and hence 
the shareholders as transferees) and against one of the shareholders individually. /d. at 8-9. Each 
of the shareholders paid half of the judgment and deducted the payments as an ordinary business 
loss in year 8. /d. at 7. See generally Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 85; Schenk, Arrowsmith and 
Its Progeny: Tax Characterization by Reference to Post Events, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 317 (1981 ). 
Conflicting readings of Arrowsmith are discussed infra at notes 468-70. 
272. 344 U.S. at 8. 
273. The sale or exchange prerequisite for capital gains treatment extends to losses as well as 
gains. "Sale or exchange" has been given a broad interpretation, such that involuntary sales or 
even abandonments constituted a "sale or exchange." See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 
(1941) (foreclosure sale); Middleton v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 310 (1981), off'd per curiam, 693 
F.2d 124 (lith Cir. 1982) (sale or exchange took place at time of foreclosure); Freeland v. 
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980) (sale or exchange took place at time of reconveyance of deed 
to the mortgagee in lieu of foreclosure). 
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The Supreme Court held that the annual accounting principle was not breached 
by considering the liquidation transaction events in years 1 and 2 together in 
order to classify properly the nature of the former T shareholders' payment of 
T's contingent liability in year 2.274 No change was made to year 1.275 
Taxpayer attempts to apply the Arrowsmith rationale to payments received 
in year 2, in excess of the amount at which a capital transaction was closed 
in year 1, were rebutted judicially on the ground that Arrowsmith involved a 
subsequent adjustment in year 2. The courts mechanically reasoned that when 
a fixed amount is closed in year 1 at less than its face value, payment in year 
2 is not pursuant to a subsequent adjustment to the year 1 obligation because 
such payment unconditionally was required at all timesY~ The error in this 
analysis and result, except to the extent of a discount factor, is discussed below. 277 
In addition to the potential all or nothing choice presented by open trans-
action and closed transaction reporting, truly contingent claims could not be 
installment reported prior to the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980. This 
was the case even if the taxpayer so desired. Courts reasoned that the contingent 
portion of the sales price rendered impossible a determination of the total contract 
price and, therefore, similarly impossible a calculation of the rate of proration 
of each payment representing gain under the installment method.m This bar 
probably was more apparent than real in that former T shareholders who assigned 
a fair market value to a contingent claim distributed by T in its liquidation 
universally found that the transaction was closed at the T shareholder level by 
their own efforts. 279 Hence, installment reporting would have been available. 
In any event, the all or nothing consequences of the open7closed controversy 
have persuaded courts to hold a transaction open. zso As the Tax Court pointed 
274. 344 U.S. at 8-9. 
275. /d. at 9. 
276. Campagna v. United States, 290 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1961); accord Grill v. United 
States, 303 F.2d 922, 928 (Ct. Cl. 1962). The Arrowsmith principle has not been applied to characterize 
the nature of a subsequent gain or "to treat unforeseen increases in annual receipts from income 
producing property as capital gains, where such property was distributed on the liquidation of a 
corporation but not thereafter sold or exchanged." /d. On the other hand, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals, in dictum, has indicated that the Arrowsmith doctrine might apply to a year 2 payment 
in excess of the year I closed amount. See Ayrton Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 741, 751 
(2d Cir. 1962). Also the Tax Court has hinted that it might not follow the Osenbach approach 
with respect to payments in excess of the closed amount by stating that: 
While the history ... may provide a method of determining some minimum value 
for the patents, it would not be the fair market value. And if, as respondent contends, 
receipts in excess of this ascertained value are reportable as ordinary income (he relies 
on Osenbach ... ) it would be inappropriate for us to assign to the patents a minimum 
value which is likely to be less than fair market value. Certainly we would not be 
justified in closing the transaction simply because we believed the fair market value 
to be at least $1. 
MacDonald v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 840, 860-61 (1971). 
277. See infra text accompanying notes 542-51. 
278. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28. 
279. See supra note 258; see also Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 631 (1968). 
280. See Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959); Miller v. United States, 235 
F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1956); Estate of Wiggon v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 701 (1979); MacDonald v. 
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 840 (1971). 
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out in MacDonald v. Comissioner, 2x1 if, as the government argued, year 2 receipts 
in excess of some minimum ascertained value are reportable as ordinary income, 
"it would be inappropriate for us to assign ... a minimum value which is likely 
to be less than fair market value. Certainly we would not be justified in closing 
the transaction simply because we believed the fair market value to be at least 
$1. " 2M2 In Gersten v. Commissioner,m the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
similarly noted that the closed transaction doctrine posed a serious problem for 
a taxpayer. 2x4 The court stated: 
If the fair market value as of date of dissolution be overestimated, 
taxpayer might be subject to payment of capital gain taxes which the 
event will not justify. If underestimated, taxpayer may be subjected 
to payment of ordinary income taxes on sums received in excess of 
fair market value figure set. These factors do not control or have 
bearing upon the problem before the court, but do highlight its 
seriousness. m 
3. Cash Equivalency Doctrine 
The same concern with ordinary income treatment for payments in excess 
of the closed amount lead the Tax Court in Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner2x" 
to extend the open transaction doctrine to a situation when the property received 
by the taxpayer had a fair market value and was marketable, but only at a 
substantial or "deep" discount. In its most extreme application, the "cash 
equivalency" doctrine dictated that a cash basis taxpayer realized no income 
when he or she received, upon the sale of property, a mere promise of future 
payment without any notes, mortgages, or other commonly negotiated evidences 
of indebtedness.m Such contractual obligations were not thought to be the 
281. 55 T.C. 840 (1971). 
282. /d. at 860-61. 
283. 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959). 
284. /d. at 199. 
285. /d. 
286. 60 T.C. 663 (1973), rev'd, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Llewellyn, Promises 
to Pay in the Future-A Modest Proposal for Reform, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1337 (1977). 
287. An accrual basis taxpayer realizes income when an obligation to pay becomes fixed and 
the amount of such obligation can be ascenained reasonably. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii) (1957). 
Accordingly, a mere promise to pay in the future, even though not the equivalent of cash, consistently 
has been taxable to an accrual basis taxpayer. See Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 562; Llewellyn, 
supra note 286, at 1338. In contrast a cash basis taxpayer historically has not been taxed on a 
mere promise to pay that is not evidenced by a separate promissory note or other indicia of cash 
equivalence. In Johnston v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 560 (1950), lhe Tax Courl staled that: 
An agreement, oral or written, of some kind is essential to a sale. If payment is made 
at the same time that the obligation to pay arises under the agreement, then the profit 
would be reponed at that time no matter which method [of tax accounting, cash or 
accrual) was being used. However, the situation is different when the contract merely 
requires future payments and no notes, mortgages, or other evidence of indebtedness 
such as commonly change hands in commerce, which could be recognized as the 
equivalent of cash to some entent, are given and accepted as a part of the purchase 
price. That kind of a simple contract creates accounts payable by the purchasers and 
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equivalent of cash and, hence, did not constitute an "amount realized" under 
the "cash equivalency" doctrine. Under a less extreme application of the doctrine, 
the test merely was whether the promise to pay was of a kind that frequently 
is transferred to lenders or investors at a discount that is not substantially 
greater than the prevailing premium for the use of money. zxx When the discount 
for the year 2 payments to (year 1) fair market value did not exceed the prevailing 
interest rate, the closed transaction doctrine produced the correct result because 
the excess of the amount received in year 2 over the value closed in year 1 
received ordinary income treatment in the T shareholders' hands similar to the 
treatment accorded interest income. Indeed, this result more accurately reflected 
income than did the classic open transaction reporting, which ignored the time 
value of money. A discount factor that is greater than the appropriate cost of 
money and risk return charge causes the conventional doctrine to produce an 
incorrect result. 
In Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner,zxy the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the Tax Court's decision with a sound reading of the legislative history 
of the predecessors to section 1001(b).2Y" The 1919 statute initially provided that 
property received in an exchange was treated as "the equivalent of cash" up 
to the amount of its fair market value. m This characterization clearly precluded 
the application of the classic cash equivalency doctrine. In 1921 the statute was 
revised to provide that no gain or loss would be recognized "unless the property 
received in the exchange has a readily realizable fair market value. "m The 1922 
regulations interpreted this section to mean that "[the property] can be readily 
converted into an amount of cash or its equivalent substantially equal to the 
fair value of the property, " 2Y3 in essence, the cash equivalency doctrine. However, 
in a third revision, Congress acknowledged that the "readily realizable market 
value" standard was most difficult and was not determinable with accuracy or 
accounts receivable by the sellers which those two taxpayers would accrue if they were 
using an accrual method of accounting in reporting their income. But such an agreement 
to pay the balance of the purchase price in the future has no tax significance to either 
purchaser or seller if he is using a cash system. 
/d. at 565; accord Perry v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 183 (1945); Edgar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 
717 (1971); Ennis v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465 (1950). 
288. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 
1961), stated that: 
A promissory note, negotiable in form, is not necessarily the equivalem of cash. 
Such an instrument may have been issued by a maker of doubtful solvency or for 
other reasons such paper might be denied a ready acceptance in the market place. We 
think the converse of this principle ought to be applicable. We are convinced that if 
a promise to pay of a solvent obligor is unconditional and assignable, not subject to 
set-offs, and is of a kind that is frequently transferred to lenders or investors at a 
discount not substamially greater than the generally prevailing premium for the use 
of money, such promise is the equivalent of cash and taxable in like manner as cash 
would have been taxable had it been received by the taxpayer rather than the obligation. 
/d. at 24 (footnote omitted). 
289. 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975). 
290. !d. at 794. 
291. Revenue Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060 (1919). 
292. Revenue Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 230 (1921). 
293. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1564 ( 1922). 
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consistency. 294 Hence, Congress returned to the formulation of the term "amount 
realized" as the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of 
property received. m This definition presently is contained in section I 001 (b). 
In Warren Jones Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
the last amendment to the predecessor to section 1001(b) manifested that Congress 
intended to establish the rule that if the fair market value of property received 
in an exchange can be ascertained, it must be reported as the amount realized. 2~" 
The court acknowledged that this reading of the statute could subject some 
taxpayers to the hardships of the closed transaction rule, but noted that shortly 
after the amendment in question, Congress enacted (in 1926) the installment 
basis for reporting gain.m The court stated that this reporting method better 
satisfies the various policy objectives supporting the cash equivalency doctrine 
and in addition, applies equally to an accrual basis taxpayer, unlike the cash 
equivalency doctrine. ~K Thus, in essence Warren Jones Co. restricted the open 
transaction doctrine to truly contingent amounts or promises that have no fair 
market value at a11.2w This restriction in itself was not erroneous. 
Instead, the doctrinal error arose in the closed transaction doctrine's incorrect 
refusal to extend Arrowsmith to year 2 payments in excess of the year I closed 
amount plus an appropriate interest factor. Traditional treatment of such excess 
as ordinary income distorted the taxpayer's income. At least fixed amounts that 
were contingent, due to collectability factors similar to those in Warren Jones 
Co., presumably could be installment reported by prorating gain to the actual 
payments received. 
4. Countervailing Policies to Open Transaction Reporting 
Unfortunately, the judicial focus on the distortions of the closed transaction 
approach overlooked the greater distortions arising from the following statutory 
shortcomings: (1) the avoidance of aT level tax upon its liquidating distribution 
of a claim with no ascertainable fair market value in year 1; and (2) the historical 
inapplicability of the time value of money concepts or interest charges in open 
transaction reporting at the former T shareholder level. Indeed the Tax Court 
has stated that open transaction reporting produces merely a distortion in timing 
and not a distortion in the amount of income.-~" Recent developments have 
revealed that the timing of the incidence of taxation, however, can have an 
economic impact that is substantial.:~" Moreover, the old problem of the absence 
of an ordinary income component in open transaction reporting, which may 
have been a primary motivating factor to those who wished not to extend the 
294. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 266, 275. 
295. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202(c), 43 Stat. 256 (1924). 
296. 524 F.2d at 792. 
297. See supra note 125. 
298. See 524 F.2d at 792. 
299. See infra text accompanying note 316. 
300. Simmons Precision Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 103, 118 (1980). The lack of 
timing of income considerations in judicial doctrines has been criticized severely. Johnson, Silk 
Purses From a Sow's Ear: Cost Free Liabilities Under the Income Tax, 3 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 231 
(1984). 
301. See supra text accompanying notes 136-77 (discussing pre-1984 time value of money 
abuses). 
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open transaction doctrine to character of income, has been obviated largely by 
the new time value of money rules. This is true because the rules apply generally 
to contingent amounts received by former T shareholders in a complete liqui-
dation. 302 
5. Rare and Extraordinary Circumstances: In Whose Eyes? 
The Service traditionally has attempted to confine Burnet v. Logan-"'-' "nar-
rowly to its facts. " 3' 14 The Service has argued that almost every contract or claim 
to receive indefinite amounts of income, such as those acquired by former T 
shareholders in a liquidation of T, can, and should, be valued upon receipt 
except in "rare and extraordinary cases. " 305 Those who oppose the Service's 
position rely on the so called transmutation of income potentialities of a dis-
tribution of a contingent item in a complete liquidation.-"}{, Of course, the real 
problem in the context of a liquidating sale is not the transmutation of income 
at the former T shareholder level, but the avoidance of income at the T level. 
On a practical level, however, the heart of the Treasury's opposition to open 
transaction treatment probably lies in the intuitive premise that a transaction 
held open until year 2 probably will not be reported in year 2. 3117 In any event, 
the courts traditionally have disagreed with the Commissioner with respect to 
whether a given set of circumstances is "rare and extraordinary." 30x The debate 
should have focused on whether such administrative concerns would override a 
clearer reflection of income. 
In 1980 Congress overturned prior case law to permit installment reporting 
when the selling price is subject to some contingency. 3'~'~ The legislative regulations 
described above in the statutory discussion provide for ratable basis recovery 
in transactions when the gross profit or total contract price (or both) cannot 
be ascertained readily. 31° Congress did not prescribe specific rules for every 
conceivable open transaction, but instead left this task to the regulations. This 
decision was consistent with that suggested by the commentators.-'" Congress 
did not preclude a basis recovery statutorily as suggested by the leading proponent 
302. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77. 
303. 282 u.s. 359 (1931). 
304. Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 629 (1968) (citing Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 
15). 
305. /d. 
306. See Cain, Taxotion of Promises to Pay, 8 GEO. L.J. 125, 143 (1973); Farer, supra note 
242, at 527, 540-45; Note, supra note 238, at 72-76. 
307. Congress explicitly pointed out in an analogous situation (reporting of 01 D at the 
shareholder level prior to 1969 reforms) that much of the ordinary income from OlD probably was 
not being reported by the owner of the bonds. "Not only is the fact that this discount is taxable 
at the time of disposition [year 21 likely to be forgotten, but also the fact that it is ordinary income 
rather than capital gain is likely to be overlooked." H.R. REP. No. 413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 109 (1969); see also Popkin, Taxation of Borrowing, 56 IND. L.J. 43, 46 (1980). 
308. See infra note 317. 
309. See supra text accompanying note 131. 
310. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39. 
311. See Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 472. See generally Committee on Tax Policy, Section 
of Taxation of New York State Bar Association, A Report on Complexily and !he Income Tax, 
27 TAX l. REV. 325, 348-49 (1972). 
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of installment reporting reform. m Rather, in the legislative history to the In-
stallment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Congress intended to redirect the common 
law of open transaction reporting. The Senate Report provides that: 
The creation of a statutory deferred payment option for all forms 
of deferred payment sales significantly expands the availability of 
installment reporting to include situations where it has not previously 
been permitted. By providing an expanded statutory installment re-
porting option, the Committee believes that in the future there should 
be little incentive to devise convoluted forms of deferred payment 
obligations to attempt to obtain deferred reporting. In any event, the 
effect of the new rules is to reduce substantially the justification for 
treating transactions as "open" and permitting he [sic] use of the 
cost-recovery method sanction by Burnet v. Logan . .. Accordingly, 
it is the Committee's intent that the cost-recovery method not be 
available in the case of sales for a fixed price (whether the seller's 
obligation is evidenced by a note, contractual provise, or otherwise), 
and that its use be limited to those rare and extraordinary cases 
involving sales for a contingent price where the fair market value of 
the purchaser's obligation cannot reasonably be ascertained. m 
The effect of this legislative thumb on the common Jaw scales is difficult 
to assess. -' 14 The pronouncement prohibiting open transaction reporting of fixed 
amounts, echoed in the ensuing regulations, goes only a step beyond the Ninth 
Circuit's Warren Jones Co. rationale of closing a fixed amount transaction 
having a determinable fair market value, regardless of the depth of the discount. m 
The Tax Court has not applied the Warren Jones Co. principle when a fixed 
amount obligation does not have a determinable fair market value.-' 1' Historically, 
the Service and the courts have disagreed with respect to whether a fair market 
value can be ascribed. 317 Following the 1980 Congressional directive, courts 
probably will be more receptive to closing a transaction by discounting predictable 
312. Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 476-78, 481. 
313. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 24. 
314. See generally Goldberg, Open Transaction Treatment for Deferred Payment Sales After 
the Installment Sales Act of 1980, 34 TAX LAW. 605, 644-49 (1981). 
315. Closed transaction treatment had been applied on occasion prior to Warren Jones Co. 
even when the fair market value was discounted far below face value. See, e.g., Campagna v. 
United States, 290 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1961) (800Jo discount). In contrast to these liquidation transactions, 
installment basis reporting was permitted when taxpayers "purchased" obligations that were deeply 
discounted due to the potential loss of investment. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Lift in, 317 F .2d 234 
(4th Cir. 1963); Willhoit v. Commissioner 308 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1962); Phillips v. Frank 295 F.2d 
629 (9th Cir. 1961). 
316. Estate of Wiggins v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 701 (1979); McShain v. Commissioner, 71 
T.C. 998 (1979). But see Stanton v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 191, 195 (1967) (450Jo discount 
is not indicative of a lack of ascertainable fair market value). On occasion, the Tax Court has 
been receptive to the argument that a deep discount indicates that there is no ascertainable fair 
.market value because no willing seller would sell at such a discount. See Simmons Precision Prods., 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 103, 122 (1980). 
317. See Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606 (1968). The Tax Court, in Dorsey, catalogued 
decisions in which contingent payments were valued or placed into four major categories: (I) when 
"there was an established industry with sufficient criteria for ascertaining fair market value;" (2) 
when the courts concluded that the taxpayer presented insufficient proof to establish that there was 
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future income streams.318 After all, open transaction reporting is a rule of fairness, 
and in this situation Congress has judged what is fair. Note, however, that in 
fact and policy, deeply discounted fixed amount payments pose the same un-
fairness under the traditional closed transaction doctrine as truly contingent 
payments. 
6. Conclusion 
The open transaction doctrine started off with a correct underlying idea-
measure income as it is received. Its major defect lies in the doctrine's failure 
to account for the time value of money. This defect is remedied largely in the 
proposed time value of money regulations. At the same time, the failure of the 
closed transaction doctrine to account properly at the T shareholder level for 
payments in excess of the closed value plus appropriate interest arose from a 
rigid, mechanical approach that lost sight of the basic principle of clear reflection 
of income. The contingent payment installment reporting regulations and time 
value of money regulations now obviate most of these difficulties. 
The fundamental flaw at the T shareholder level in the conventional doctrine 
and the current Code is based on the following two factors: (I) legislative 
regulations that provide for a mechanical recovery of basis and, hence, proration 
of contingent payments to basis and gain; and (2) a case-law elective basis 
recovery prior to gain recognition for payments that are contingent in amount 
and have no ascertainable fair market value. Basis recovery no longer is necessary 
and should have been supplanted by proration of basis under the regulations. 119 
The failure of some players, in the collegial process120 of tax "simplification," 
to rise above the narrow interests of their clients-a common failure of the 
political process itself-apparently is the genesis of survival of the case-law basis 
recovery reporting alternative to installment reporting. 321 The Treasury seems to 
have responded in kind during the legislative process by encouraging Congress 
to provide an election out procedure that "red flags" for audit any basis recovery 
reporting and the above legislative thumb on the case-law scales. All factors 
considered, it is fair to assume that only the most aggressive taxpayers will elect 
out of section 453 for such basis recovery reporting. 
no ascertainable fair market value; (3) when the taxpayer initially reported the contingent rights as 
having an ascertainable fair market value, but later attempted to reverse this position; and (4) when 
administrative necessity dictated "an immediate determination of value without awaiting future 
experience." /d. at 630-32; see Note, supra note 238, at 72-78 (criticizing decisions closing contingent 
payment). 
318. See, e.g., Warren v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 846 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Estate of Wiggins 
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 701 (1979); McShain v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 998 (1979). 
319. See Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 481. 
320. The "collegial process" refers to the working together of representatives from the ac-
counting and legal professions involved in taxation, the Treasury, and the Joint Committee on 
Taxation. See Hoffman, Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 TAx L. REv. 413, 500 
(1982). 
321. The bar was split over whether to reduce the availability of cost recovery reporting, but 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) "argued persuasively that cost 
recovery is necessary for some contingent sales where the value of the consideration is impossible 
to ascertain." Hoffman, supra note 320, at 503. 
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B. T Corporate Level Treatment 
Prior to 1954, courts fashioned two major doctrines for taxing a liquidating 
corporation on certain income or potential income items, notwithstanding the 
general rule in the regulations that sheltered a corporation from recognition of 
gain or loss in a liquidating distribution of its assets. The two doctrines were 
the case-law prohibition of assignment of (earned) income and the Code-derived 
requirement that the taxpayer's method of accounting clearly reflect its income 
which is now contained in section 446(b). 322 The court decisions often blended 
the doctrines together, reasoning that clear reflection of income requires that 
the taxpayer who earns income be taxed on such income when it is realized, 
notwithstanding prior assignment. The "tax benefit doctrine" in this context 
possessed antecedents prior to the 1954 Code, but only recently began to reach 
its full fruition. The failure of these doctrines to deal with contingent income 
at the T level arose from a tendency in the cases to equate clear reflection of 
income and earning of assigned income with the tax accounting accrual concept 
of a fixed right to a certain amount of ascertainable income. 
1. Assignment of Income Doctrine 
a. Pre-1954 Code 
The assignment of income doctrine originated quite naturally with a focus 
on who earned the income. This focus was the result of the landmark Supreme 
Court decision in Lucas v. Earf323 which involved a nontax motivated assignment 
of half of the husband-taxpayer's future income to his spouse in a community 
property system. In Lucas, the Court interpreted the definition of "gross income," 
contained in the predecessor to section 61 (a)( I) as mandating taxation of salaries 
to those who earned them and providing implicitly that such tax "could not 
be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised 
to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man 
who earned it. " 324 However, as the subsequent Supreme Court assignment of 
income decisions dealt with income from property, rather than from services, 
the focus shifted to the judicial "realization" requirement that was not deemed 
to occur until the income was paid . .m The Supreme Court explained further in 
Helvering v. Horst326 that such a postponement of "realization" was an ad-
ministrative rule postponing tax until the "final event of enjoyment" of the 
income, usually its receipt. 327 Note, however, that such enjoyment could be 
consummated by some event other than the taxpayer's personal receipt of money 
322. Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated By the P.G. Lake 
Case, 17 TAX L. Rev. 293, 396-400 (1962). 
323. 281 U.S. Ill (1930). 
324. /d. at 115. 
325. See, e.g., Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); accord Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, 
Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958). "Admittedly not all economic gain of the taxpayer is taxable income. 
From the beginning the revenue laws had been interpreted as defining 'realization' of income as 
the taxable event, rather than the acquisition of the right to receive it. And 'realization' is not 
deemed to occur until the income is paid." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940). 
326. 311 u.s. 112 (1940). 
327. /d. at 115. 
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or property. 328 Under this view, such enjoyment of income, and hence "reali-
zation," occurred when the taxpayer who owned or controlled the source of 
income also controlled its disposition. "The power to dispose of income is the 
equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment 
of income to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the income 
by him who exercises it. " 329 This focus on "power" undoubtedly arose from 
the property context of these cases. 330 However, the metaphors and legal fictions 
too often seized the mind's eye, blinding it to the absence of clear reflection 
of income. 
The implication of this assignment-enjoyment rationale is that the act of 
assignment is the taxable event.J3 1 However, subsequent decisions, continuing to 
draw gossamer lines, reasoned that the assignor realized income under the 
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine only when the assignee actually 
received the money or property. 332 Utilizing the rationale that the exercise of 
328. The Court in Horst stated that: 
lnhe decisions and regulations have consistently recognized that receipt in cash or 
property is not the only characteristic of realization of income to a taxpayer on the 
cash receipts basis. Where the taxpayer does not receive payment of income in money 
or property realization may occur when the last step is taken by which he obtains the 
fruition of the economic gain which has already accrued to him .... 
. . . The rule, founded on administrative convenience, is only one of postponement 
of the tax to the final event of enjoyment of the income, usually the receipt of it by 
the taxpayer, and not one of exemption from taxation where the enjoyment is con-
summated by some event other than the taxpayer's personal receipt of money or 
property. 
ld. at 115-16. (citations omitted). 
One decision surveying the landmark noncorporate assignment of income cases noted that income 
was attributed to the assignor because "his gratification in the assignee's possession of the proceeds 
was income arising at that time. On that theory one would suppose that the doctrine would be 
limited to occasions when the assignor and the assignee were associated by some affectionate 
relationship." J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F .2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1957). Of course, as the 
Unger court acknowledged, the assignment of income doctrine was extended to corporate distributions, 
usually with even more strained metaphors or legal fictions. /d.; see infra note 335. 
329. Horst, 311 U.S. at 118. 
330. See infra note 336. 
331. On occasion, the Service has been able to effect the super-accrual and taxation of a 
liquidating corporation in its final tax year (year 1), even though an amount without an ascertainable 
fair market value was not received until year 2. See Carter v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 364, 374-75 
(1947), aff'd on other grounds, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948). In Carter, however, although the 
parties stipulated that the payment had no ascertainable fair market value, it was in a fixed amount. 
9 T.C. at 365-68. 
332. Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948). 
Unrealized appreciation, since it is not taxable income, is not covered by the rule as 
to anticipatory assignments of income. The latter rule is sui generis; it applies to debts, 
including bad debts, to the extent that they represent income. The acquisition of the 
right 10 receive payment of a bad debt is not necessarily a taxable event; and therefore 
the realization of the gain by the assignor is not deemed to occur until the debt is 
paid to the assignee. After assignment and prior to payment the tax liability is incomplete. 
The rule is founded upon administrative convenience, and operates to postpone the 
taxable event until realization is consummated by the assignees receipt of the money. 
/d. at 1010 (citing Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940)). Several early decisions have taxed 
the assignor in year 2. Austin v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 593, 596-97 (1946), affd, 161 F.2d 666 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 767 (1947); Colby v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 536 (1941). There 
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the power to dispose of income is equivalent to realization, courts have applied 
readily the assignment of income doctrine to a corporation distributing, in 
complete liquidation, the right to payment of noncontingent income that was 
earned prior to liquidation. 333 The former T shareholders were liable as transferees 
for the liquidated T's year I tax liability.·134 Unfortunately, an analysis of the 
assignment of income doctrine, in terms of enjoyment of economic benefit from 
receipt of payment by its shareholders, led to a refusal to apply the doctrine 
to the liquidating distribution of a contingent item that was not collected by 
the former T shareholders by the end of the liquidating corporation's final tax 
year.m 
Another judicial basis for not applying the assignment of income doctrine, 
which derived from the assignment of income from property authorities, was 
that a liquidating T had not earned contingent income at the time of the year 
I assignment because T was not entitled to the payment of the income at the 
time of the assignment. 336 Unfortunately, these cases have focused on the nature 
has not been a pre-1954 Code decision that has considered the time of realization when the taxpayer 
sold a contingent claim prior to its maturity. See infra text accompanying note 339 for subsequent 
developments. 
333. Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952) (former shareholders of liquidated 
corporation taxed as transferees on accounts receivable distributed by liquidating corporation, but 
received by shareholders prior to its dissolution). 
334. I.R.C. § 311 (1939) (reenacted in substantially the same form in I.R.C. § 6901 (1954)). 
If a taxpayer transfers property to another, the transferee may become liable, at law or in equity, 
for taxes owed by the taxpayer. The imposition of transferee liability is governed by state law while 
§ 6901 provides for assessment and collection of the tax. Transferee liability will exist generally in 
cases of transfers of property for inadequate or no consideration. See generally 13 J. MERTENS, 
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 53.05, at 53-9 (rev. vol. 1982). 
335. In United States v. Horschel, 205 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1953), the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals refused to apply the assignment of income doctrine to tax a liquidated corporation on 
items that were similar to the apples in a warehouse pool in United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 
(9th Cir. 1951), and the accounts receivable in Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952), 
except that the items were not collected until after the corporation was liquidated. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has rejected the government's anticipatory assignment of income arguments based 
on Earl and Horst. The court's reading of Earl and Horst arguably was erroneous. The court stated 
that: 
The teaching of the cited cases was not based on the theory that the income was 
"already earned" at the time of assignment, but on the hypothesis that it was anticipated, 
used and realized before it was earned. The taxpayers were charged with the income 
because they retained the control of the property or agency by which it was earned 
and diverted the payments to others as a means of procuring the satisfaction of their 
own wants. Thus, they obtain the economic benefit which was tantamount to realization 
of the income. 
205 F.2d at 648. This reasoning was adopted by the Court of Claims in Telephone Directory 
Advertising Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 884, 889 (Ct. Cl. 1956). 
336. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957). The Tax Court 
had applied the assignment of income doctrine on the grounds that the claims in question represented 
income earned, although not accrued, prior to the date of assignment. This approach was the 
approach taken under the 1954 Code by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Storz v. Commissioner, 
583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978). However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Cold Metal 
Process was led astray in part by the "fruit-and-tree" analogy adopted in the area. The court 
distinguished such landmark cases as Horst, Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), and Harrision 
v. Schafner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941), on the grounds that they "involved a gift of income payable in 
the future [(the fruit)], as distinguished from a gift of income producing property [(the tree with 
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of the claim at the time of the assignment, rather than on whose efforts generated 
the ultimate income. Ironically, the Supreme Court's application of the assignment 
of income doctrine to "contingent" items in a companion case to the landmark 
Horst decision generally has escaped notice. m 
If the assignment itself was not a taxable event, the next question was 
whether the liquidated T was taxable when its former shareholders actually 
received the contingent payment in year 2. Under the majority literalist approach, 
if T no longer existed in year 2 when the former T shareholders received a 
payment of previously contingent items, T was not taxed at that time, under 
the rationale that a corporation that was not in existence had no duty to file 
an income tax return.m Because T had no duty to file a return, the former T 
shareholders were not subject to transferee liability. Conversely, if the distributing 
corporation remained in existence until the contingent claim matured, it was 
taxable under the assignment of income doctrine. 339 Not surprisingly, the Tax 
Court frequently strained to find continued corporate existence in year 2. -'~" 
Moreover, early corporate assignment of income cases, overriding the General 
Utilities principle, articulated that the doctrine was easier to apply to a continuing 
corporation than to a liquidating distribution by a T that is terminating op-
erations. -'41 
fruit)) where the donor relinquishes to the donee not merely the income which is payable in the 
future, but also complete ownership and control of the propeny which produces the income." 247 
F .2d at 871. A transfer of ownership of the income producing property transfers the income to 
the donee under this analysis. "In the present case there was no retention by Cold Metal of any 
right, title or interest of any kind in the patents transferred to the Trustee. Both the income 
producing property and the income therefrom were transferred in their entirety and unconditionally 
to the Trustee." /d. 
337. In Eubank, 311 U.S. at 122, the taxpayer (a general life insurance agent) assigned renewal 
commissions payable to him in year 2 for services that had been rendered in year I. /d. at 126. 
The Supreme Court held that the assignor was subject to tax in year 2 on the assigned amounts 
that were uncertain and contingent at the time of the assignment. !d. at 127. The dissent in Eubank 
adopted the now discredited "transfer of income producing property" analysis described supra in 
note 336, stating that: 
A mere right to collect future payments, for services already performed, is not presently 
taxable as 'income derived' from such services. It is property which may be assigned. 
Whatever the assignor receives as consideration may be his income; but the statute 
does not undertake to impose liability upon him because of payments to another under 
a contract which he had transferred in good faith, under circumstances like those here 
disclosed. 
311 U.S. at 127 (McReynolds J ., dissenting). 
While Eubank thus applied the assignment of income doctrine to the assignment of contingent 
claims, the taxpayer was in existence in year 2. See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 322, at 409; see 
also Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income- The Ferrer Case, 20 TAX 
L. REV. I, 41-49 (1964). 
338. Commissioner v. Henry Hess Co., 210 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1954); O'Brien v. Commissioner, 
25 T.C. 376 (1955). 
339. See, e.g., United States v. Jolliet & Chicago R. Co., 315 U.S. 44 (1942); Henry Hess 
Co., 210 F.2d at 557. 
340. Cold Metal Process, 25 T.C. at 1333; Henry Hess Co., 16 T.C. at 1363. See generally 
Lyon & Eustice, supra note 322, at 409-10. 
341. Horschel, 205 F.2d at 650 (distinguishing Lynch on the grounds that it involved an 
attempt by a "going concern" to distribute the profit from the sale of apples to its shareholders 
as a dividend in kind). 
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One court queried why T's transfer of a business or assets, for purposes 
of liquidation, to its shareholders should be treated differently than a liquidation 
conducted by a receiver which is treated as a continuation of the corporate 
business.·'42 The court stated: 
We cannot help thinking, therefore, that it would better have 
accorded with the underlying thesis of the Revenue Law for courts 
to regard an assignment in liquidation by corporation to its share-
holders, as no more than a procedural step in a corporate enterprise: 
that is, its termination. However, there is enough contrary authority 
to make it at least doubtful whether such a disposition of the case 
at bar would be permissible. m 
b. Post-1954 Code 
On their face, the original 1954 Code provisions governing corporate level 
treatment of in-kind liquidating and nonliquidating distributions and sales pur-
suant to a complete liquidation (sections 311, 336, and 337) contained only 
narrow exceptions to the general rule of corporate level nonrecognition announced 
in General Utilities. 344 The legislative history behind section 311, however, man-
ifested an intention to continue the existing case law "attributions of income" 
from shareholders to their corporation as exemplified in Commissioner v. First 
State Bank of Stratjord. 345 As noted above, the pre-1954 Code authorities 
generally had applied the attribution or assignment of income doctrine more 
readily to a continuing corporation than to a liquidating corporation, but the 
legislative history accompanying sections 336 and 337 was silent on this point. 
Nevertheless, in light of this legislative history the Court of Claims in Williamson 
v. United States346 applied the assignment of income doctrine to section 336. 
342. J. Ungar v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1957) (the court determined that 
corporations that are in the process of liquidation in year 2 are in existence at the time of the 
payment of the distributed claim). 
343. /d. (footnote omitted). 
344. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49. 
345. 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948); see also infra text accompanying note 395. 
346. 292 F.2d 524, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Closer to the mark, is the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeal's reasoning in Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963), which 
combined the enjoyment analysis with an earning rationale: 
The philosophy underlying these cases [classic assignment of income decisions such as 
Earl, Horst, and Eubank) is that the taxpayer has performed services or has a vested 
interest in property which gives him an unrestricted claim to compensation or income 
therefrom; the exercise of the unfettered power to dispose of that income is deemed 
analogous to its enjoyment or realization, thus resulting in a tax upon the assignor 
rather than upon the assignee who receives the income in fact. 
/d. at 922. 
Wood Harmon also pointed out the error in the conventional fruit-and-tree analysis: 
It is true that United [the liquidating corporation) had divested itself of the claim 
to the balance of the compensation award during the course of the liquidation dis-
tribution, but surely this is not the sort of "transfer of benficial ownership and 
property" which transfers the incidence of taxation under Blair v. Commissioner. In 
any case of an anticipatory assignment of rights to income, it is· not difficult to cloak 
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The Williamson court properly reasoned that sections 311 and 336 were designed 
as parallel provisions and should be interpreted consistently. Hence, "parity" 
dictated that both provisions should be subject to the Bank of Stratford rule. 
Unfortunately, Williamson wholeheartedly adopted the enjoyment of income 
version of the assignment of income doctrine rather than the earned income 
rationale. The Williamson court stated: 
When the Williamson corporation paid the dividend to the plaintiff 
it obtained the fruition of the economic gain which had accrued to 
it upon the performance of the well services; it realized income. 
Paying the dividend was the enjoyment of its income. A body corporate 
can be said to enjoy its income in no other way. -' 47 
Not surprisingly, the pre-1954 Code confusion of the assignment of income 
doctrine with the rules of accrual tax accounting intensified. Indeed, the tribunals 
ruled repeatedly, in the context of section 336, that allocation or assignment of 
income depends upon the existence of accruable or realized income, that is, a 
fixed and determined right to income in a certain amount. 34R Under the restricted 
assignment of income doctrine, distribution of a contingent claim did not result 
in taxation at the distributing corporate level at the time of distribution. However, 
if a corporation continued in existence until the assigned claim matured or 
accrued in the hands of the shareholders, the corporation was taxed. 349 Yet if 
the assignment so that it mascarades as a transfer of a property right or a capital 
asset, by arbitrarily assigning this label to the taxpayer's claim for future income. 
Wearing this disguise, even Lucas v. Earl, Horst, and Eubank would come within the 
Blair principle. In terms of the omnipresent botanical analogy, the "fruit" of the tree 
could always be transmuted into another "tree," the transfer of which would free the 
transferor from taxation. The appellant's argument therefore proves too much. 
/d. at 923. 
347. Williamson, 292 F.2d at 530. 
348. See, e.g., Shea Co. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 135 (1969); Poro v. Commissioner, 39 
T.C. 641 (1963). 
349. As the Tax Court explained in Siegel Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 15 (1966): 
Ordinarily, in deflection of income cases, a cash basis assignor is accountable for 
his assigned income in the year in which it is paid rather than in the year in which 
he makes the assignment . . . . To be sure, as the Government contends, there is 
language in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. I 12, susceptible of an interpretation that 
would support charging the assignor with realized income in the year of assignment. 
But no such problem was before the Court in Horst, since the bond coupons therein 
matured and were paid during the same year that the taxpayer gave them to his son. 
/d. at 23-24. 
The court pointed out that in Eubank, a companion case to Horst, the Court taxed the assignor 
in year 2 when the contingent payments were paid. The Tax Court, in Siegel Productions, stated: 
To be sharply distinguished are those cases in which the corporation was liquidated 
prior to the payments in controversy. In such situation there would be a distortion if 
fully earned but unpaid income were not included in the taxpayer's income prior to 
dissolution, and the Commissioner would thereby be amply justified in resorting to 
section 446(b). 
/d. at 25. This "superaccrual" explains decisions such as Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 
254 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959); Floyd v. 
Scofield, 193 F.2d at 594, 596 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718, 721 (9th 
Cir. 1961); and Carter v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 364 (1947), aff'd, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948). 
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the corporation was no longer in existence at the time of this "accrual," neither 
it nor its former shareholders as transferees were taxed on the inside corporate 
level gain. 350 The former T shareholders were taxed on their outside gain under 
the open transaction basis recovery method351 or, alternatively, under the closed 
transaction on present value in year 1 method. 352 
One approach that closely paralleled the decline of the cash equivalency 
doctrine at the T shareholder Ievel, 353 in effect, drew a distinction at the T level 
between items that were "contingent" because the precise money value of an 
uncontested claim in a fixed amount was not known due to a collectability risk 
and items that were contingent because the validity or existence of the claim 
was in doubt. Speculative payments that were fixed in amount were accruable 
under traditional accounting principles, but contingent amounts were not ac-
cruable. 354 Similarly, some courts applied the assignment of income doctrine to 
T in year 1, in effect, causing superaccrual of fixed amount speculative pay-
ments.355 
In all of these decisions, however, the corporation remained in existence, or a fixed amount was 
involved while the payments were contingent with respect to collectability. The abuse occurred when 
the amount of payment itself was contingent. See the distinction drawn in Wood Harmon Corp. 
v. United States, 311 F.2d 918, 924 n.6 (2d Cir. 1963). 
Interestingly when a liquidating corporation remained in existence in year 2 and its shareholders 
made direct payments of the liquidating corporation's obligations, the liquidating corporation was 
allowed to claim a deduction for having paid the expense in form and in substance. Royal Oaks 
Apartments, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 243 (1964). Similar approaches have been taken at one 
time or another in the § 351 and § 337 areas. See Thatcher v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1114 (9th 
Cir. 1976); Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67, 71-72 (8th Cir. 1964). 
If the liquidating corporation remains alive in year 2, the § 337 shield still may apply (assuming 
that the corporation meets the requirement of distributing all of its assets within the applicable 12-
month period that could overlap years I and 2). See Messer v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 774, 780 
(3d Cir. 1971). 
350. Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); United Mercantile Agencies 
v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 808 (1960). 
351. Shea v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 135, 159 (1969); see supra text accompanying notes 242-
56. 
352. See, e.g., United Mercantile, 34 T.C. at 808; supra text accompanying note 236. 
353. See supra text accompanying notes 286-99. 
354. Under traditional tax accounting concepts, an item of income accrues when all events 
necessary to entitle the taxpayer to a fixed and determined right to such income have occurred. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(2) (1957). Note, however, that the "all events" test will not be met before 
an economic performance occurs. I.R.C. § 46l(h) (West Supp. 1986). See 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra 
note 104, at 258. Conversely, a cash basis taxpayer under traditional principles realizes income only 
when payment is made. In a strong parallel to the discredited cash equivalency doctrine once applicable 
to property sales, income from service authorities permit deferral until receipt of payment when 
the taxpayer receives a mere promise to pay, unsecured by note or other obligation. Rev. Rut. 60-
31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; see McDonald, Deferred Compensation: Conceptual Astigmatism, 24 TAX L. 
REV. 201 (1969). 
355. Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963). Similarly, in the 
famous Carter decision the Tax Court applied superaccrual to a cash basis liquidating corporation 
in its final year to preclude distortion of income. See supra note 248. Of course, this is the true 
basis for the clear reflection of income doctrine and for its merger with the assignment of income 
doctrine. Both doctrines are directed not at tax accounting rules, but at avoiding distortion of 
income. Thus, like the model, practical correlative adjustments should be made to avoid distortion 
of income. Superaccrual in year I does not yield the greatest accuracy, but is better than an escape 
of taxation at the corporate level. The best approach is that advocated by the model (i.e. accurate 
measurement in year 2 by taxing if necessary a surrogate comprised of the target shareholders as 
transferees for hypothetical year 2 target level tax). 
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After an inauspicious beginning the conceptual breakthrough of the as-
signment of income doctrine occurred under section 337. While one early authority 
applied the assignment of income doctrine and the clear reflection of income 
principle to section 337, primarily to achieve parity with section 336,356 other 
early authorities did not apply these doctrines directly to section 337 transactions. 
Instead, these authorities denied the section 337 shield on alternative grounds. 
One such ground provided that when the assignment of income or clear reflection 
of income doctrines traditionally would apply, there was no sale or exchange 
of "property."357 Under an even more extreme approach, a few authorities 
equated "property" for purposes of section 337 with "capital asset" under 
section 1221 and hence, denied the section 337 exemption to ordinary income 
property. 358 This exemption of ordinary income property generally was thought 
to be yielded by the assignment of income doctrine.m 
Subsequently, the courts came to recognize the weakness of these approaches, 
particularly the lack of parity with section 336 that was generated by the 
misidentification of "property" as a "capital asset." Instead, the courts applied 
the assignment of income doctrine directly to section 337 transactions. ·160 The 
Tax Court in this context also limited the assignment of income doctrine to 
accrual concepts, declining to utilize the doctrine if T had "no fixed and 
determinable right to an ascertainable amount of income at the time of its 
liquidation. " 361 In Storz v. Commissioner62 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the Tax Court on this point. The court in Storz properly focused on . 
whose efforts produced the income rather than on accrual concepts. The court 
stated that: 
[The liquidated corporation] cannot avoid taxation by assigning 
the fruit of its efforts to another, when the fruit however green, has 
a market value at the time of assignment. The assignment of income 
doctrine causes income to be taxed to him who earns it. 
356. Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202, 202 (9th Cir. 1962). 
357. The Tax Court, in Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 305 (1961), aff'd 
on other grounds, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962), denied the shield of § 337 to a sale of accounts 
receivable on the grounds that the accounts did not meet the statutory definition of "property." 
ld. at 210. The accounts receivable were not "property" because the court equated "accounts 
receivable" with "installment obligations" which were excluded specifically from the definition of 
"property" by § 337(b). ld. at 309-11. The taxpayer argued that the "installment obligation" was 
an obligation that was reported under the installment method of reporting. /d. at 310. The court, 
reviewing the legislative history, said that for purposes of § 337, "installment obligation" was an 
obligation received for sales in the ordinary course of business, regardless of other installment 
reporting provisions. /d. at 309-10. 
358. See supra note 57. 
359. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 
U.S. 28 (1941); see also Shores, Reexamining the Relationship Between Capital Gains and the 
Assignment of Income, 13 IND. L. REv. 463 (1980). 
360. Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973); Stewarts Trust v. 
Commissioner, 63 T.C. 682 (1975); Rev. Rut. 77-190, 1977-1 C.B. 88. The parity approach to §§ 
336 and 337 as well as § 338, has now been adopted universally. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. 
Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 400 (1982); 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133. 
361. Schneider v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 18, 29 (1975); see also Storz v. Commissioner, 68 
T.C. 84 (1977), rev'd, 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978). 
362. 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978). 
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The Tax Court held that income is earned only when the assignor 
has a fixed and determined right to the income. This position appears 
to equate the concepts of earn and accrue, which are relevant to 
different issues of taxability. Income is taxed to whoever earns it. 
Thus, the concept of earn is relevant to determining the identity of 
the proper taxpayer. The concept of accrue, however, is relevant to 
the issue when income becomes taxable. Income is taxable only when 
it has been realized under an acceptable accounting method. The 
accrual method of accounting generally provides that realization occurs 
when the taxpayer has a fixed right to a reasonably ascertainable sum 
. . . . It is entirely possible that income may have been earned, but 
not yet realized because not yet accrued. 363 
I95 
Storz presented an easier case for assignment of income than most section 
336 liquidations because in the paradigm section 337 transaction P purchases 
T's assets and hence, an assignment of income arises by sale. J64 In a sale of 
an earned income claim, income is realized as of the date of the assignment, 
that is, the sale in year I, rather than when the claim is collected in year 2. -'65 
Furthermore, in Storz, P and T allocated the purchase price, in part, to the 
anticipated income. 366 The Storz approach is correct, but by itself cannot deal 
with a distribution under section 336, as contrasted with a sale under section 
337, of a contingent income item that does not become fixed until year 2. If 
the amount of the payments to be received under the claim cannot be determined 
and the fair market value of these payments cannot be ascertained readily in 
year I, the amount chosen if the year I transaction were closed might well vary 
from the amount of payments actually received in year 2. Because T no longer 
would be in existence in year 2, the problem of identifying the proper taxpayer 
for the year 2 correlative adjustments would continue to exist. Hence, the Service's 
attempts to allocate such contingent items to T's final return in year I generally 
have been unsuccessful, except when the amount of the contingent claim was 
fixed and collected shortly after year I by the T shareholders. _167 
363. /d. at 975-76 (citations omitted). The court further stated that: 
In determining whether to tax the assignor or the assignee for future income the 
question is whether the assignment transferred a right to receive future income as 
distinguished from a transfer of property which produces the future income. "Earn" 
is used in this context to distinguish the former situation from the latter. If the future 
income to the assignee arises, as in this case, from the assignor's efforts prior to the 
assignment and not from the property which he transfers, it is earned and subject to 
the assignment of income doctrine. 
/d. at 977. 
364. The Storz decision acknowledged that an agreement between the buyer and seller, with 
respect to the value of the assigned contract rights, makes it easier to establish the amount of 
earned income. /d. at 977. "But the failure of both parties to agree, or the fact that one party 
unilaterally fixes a value, does not mean there are no earnings, or that such an earnings amount 
cannot be ascertained." /d. at 978. 
365. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260, 270 (1958); United States v. Edison, 310 
F .2d Ill (5th Cir. 1962). 
366. 583 F.2d at 977. 
367. See infra text accompanying notes 381-82. 
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From a policy viewpoint of more accurate reflection of income, it is difficult 
to distinguish between contingencies that arise because the amount of the payment 
is unknown and contingencies that arise because the probability of collection is 
not ascertainable. From the Service's viewpoint, however, fixed amount contingent 
collection claims are more common than claims that are completely contingent 
with respect to amount. Hence, the Service undoubtedly prefers a test that limits 
holding the transaction open to claims that truly are contingent as to amount 
and, thus, prevents postponement from becoming exemption. 36x Furthermore, a 
fixed amount contingent collection claim gives the courts and the Service a basis 
on which to close the transaction in year 1. 
The assignment of income doctrine merely is an administrative rule post-
poning realization until the actual receipt of income. Superaccrual of the fixed 
amount in year 1 at the T level is but an extension of the developments discussed 
below, such as the switch of the taxpayer from completed contract to percentage 
of completion and similar switches of taxpayers from cash to accrual methods.·169 
Concededly, superaccrual takes a step beyond the tax accounting definition of 
"accruable" as a fixed amount the payment of which is determinable with 
certainty. If the choice is superaccrual of the fixed amount in year 1 versus no 
taxation at the T level in year 2, the choice is clear. The model proposed below, 
however, would choose neither alternative. Instead the model proposes year 2 
taxation of T or a surrogate, on the then accurately determinable amount as 
more clearly measuring income than super accrual in year 1. ·17" 
2. Clear Reflection of Income 
a. Pre-1954 Code 
The predecessors of section 446(b) provided in pertinent part, that if a 
taxpayer's method of accounting did not reflect its income clearly, the Com-
missioner could compute taxable income under such method as reflects the 
taxpayer's income more clearlyY' The current section 446(b) contains a similar 
provision. 372 Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Commissionerm was the first 
368. See supra note 307. 
369. See Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946); see 
also infra text accompanying notes 374-75. 
370. See infra text accompanying notes 536-37. 
371. The "clear reflection of income" requirement apparently originated in the Revenue Act 
of 1916, § 8(g), 39 Stat. 756, 762 (1986) and has remained largely unchanged. 
372. I.R.C. § 446(b) (West Supp. 1986); see also Lyon & Eustice, supra note 322, at 400-03 
(discussion of clear reflection of income in context of corporate distributions). Note that clear 
reflection of income, from a tax accounting standpoint and a financial accounting standpoint, 
presents two different concepts. See Dubroff, Cahill & Norris, Tax Accounting: The Relationship 
of Clear Reflection of Income to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 47 ALB. L. REv. 354 
(1983); Gunn, Molching of Cos/sand Revenues as o Goof of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REv. I 
(1984). 
373. 153 F.2d 681 (1946). In Jud Plumbing, the taxpayer corporation who used the completed 
contract method of accounting dissolved two-thirds of the way into its taxable year and distributed 
all its assets and liabilities including four uncompleted contracts. /d. at 682. Under the completed 
contract method, none of the income from the uncompleted contracts was included in the corporation's 
final return. /d. The Commissioner sought to change the corporation's accounting method to the 
percentage of completion method and thereby tax it on a percentage of the income to be derived 
under the uncompleted contracts. /d. at 682-83. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with 
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decision to apply the clear reflection of income requirement to a liquidating T. 
The Jud Plumbing court fused the clear reflection requirement with the assignment 
of income doctrine, in effect, reasoning that if income is not chargeable to the 
person who earns it under the taxpayer's method of accounting, such method 
does not reflect income clearly. 374 Jud Plumbing cited no case authority, but 
instead, loosely rested its conclusion on the Code provisions that required clear 
reflection of income. 375 Subsequent decisions explicitly have relied upon the classic 
assignment of income decisions for the conclusion that clear reflection of income 
requires taxation of income to the person who earned the income. 376 These early 
decisions, however, were easy to decide by placing T (in its final year) on 
another generally accepted method of tax accounting that would tax the T in 
year 1 on income that it earned in the final year. The existing method of tax 
accounting did not result in a taxation in year 1. 
Later cases presented the more difficult issue of the treatment of income 
that T had earned but had not yet accrued under traditional accrual tax accounting 
principles. These issues were difficult to resolve because T did not have an 
unconditional, fixed and determined right to a reasonably ascertainable amount 
of income at the time of liquidation. 377 The initial decision addressing the issue 
was rendered by the Tax Court in Carter v. Commissioner.m The Carter decision 
is known more widely for its open transaction treatment, at the T shareholder 
level, of receipt of claims without an ascertainable fair market value. 379 In Carter, 
the Tax Court taxed T, under the clear reflection of income doctrine, on the 
previously fixed amounts received by the former shareholders in the following 
tax year. 380 The Court, following Jud Plumbing, reasoned: 
[T]he corporation's earnings belong to it and liability to tax 
thereon cannot be discharged "by the simplest expedient of disso-
lution" and distribution of the right to such income. In the instant 
case, the corporation had fully earned the income, for the buyer and 
the Commissioner because the court found that, under the circumstances, the completed contract 
method, although proper in prior years, would not reflect clearly the income of the corporation in 
its final year. /d. at 684-85. 
374. /d. 
375. Jud Plumbing cited the predecessor to § 482, as well as the predecessor to § 446(b), as 
supporting the requirement that the taxpayer's reporting of the transaction should reflect its income 
clearly. /d. at 685. This generalized clear reflection of income concept goes beyond traditional tax 
accounting. Hence, the merger of the assignment of income and the clear reflection of income 
doctrines in these cases is proper. Beyond tax accounting rules lies the principle that distortion of 
income should be avoided and if necessary, correlative adjustments to the annual accounting principle 
and methods of tax accounting must be made. To this extent, criticism of this melding by 
commentators appears unwarranted. See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 322, at 403. These commentators 
recognize that there is an extra-Code clear reflection of income principle at work in this area. 
376. See, e.g., Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594, 596 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Lynch, 
192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951); Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330 (lOth Cir. 1951). 
377. See United States v. Horschel, 205 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1953); Telephone Directory Ad-
vertising Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 884 (Ct. Cl. 1956). 
378. 9 T.C. 364 (1947), aff'd, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948). 
379. See supra text accompanying note 345. At the Tax Court level, Carter was a consolidated 
case involving both the liquidating corporation and its former shareholders. At the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeal's level, only the shareholders and the government were involved. See supra note 
248. 
380. Carter, 9 T.C. at 370-76. 
198 The Journal of Corporation Law [Winter 
seller had been brought together in contracts, the contracts had been 
performed by them, and, because of such performance, the corporation 
had sent out bills for its earnings. Though the corporation was upon 
the cash basis, and had not, prior to dissolution, actually received 
the money, we think ... [the predecessor to section 446(b)] authorized 
the Commissioner to charge the income to it.-'x 1 
However, in Carter the distributed claim apparently was for a fixed amount 
that the government and the taxpayer stipulated had no ascertainable fair market 
value. 3x2 
When presented with transactions in which the claim was truly contingent 
with respect to amount, rather than a fixed amount that had no fair market 
value, the Tax Court mechanically refused to extend the clear reflection of 
income concept to tax contingent income to a liquidated T or its former 
shareholders as transferees. Rather, the courts equated clear reflection of income 
with traditional tax accounting principles.-'x3 Thus, the earlier Tax Court insight-
Carter's use of the clear reflection of income concept to preclude T from evading 
tax by the mechanism of liquidation-was lost in the devolutionary process of 
bad doctrine. 
b. Post-/954 Code 
The post-1954 Code authorities readily merged the assignment of income 
authorities with the clear reflection of income requirement for both liquidating 
distributions under section 336 and sales pursuant to section 337 . .1x• However, 
the cases continued to refuse to utilize the clear reflection of income concept 
to tax T or its shareholders as transferees with respect to income items that 
remained contingent at the time of T's liquidation. 3x~ Indeed, the broad concept 
of clear reflection of income, as it relates to the Code provisions manifested 
in Jud Plumbing, was obscured completely by explicit limitation to existing 
methods of tax accounting. This was true even when T's liquidation clearly 
resulted in a tax abuse. Thus, in Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc. ,-'x' 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to utilize section 446(b) to tax T 
on the built-in gain in crops that T had planted and cultivated, but that were 
harvested by its new sole shareholder, P. The new sole shareholder in South 
Lake Farms had purchased the T stock and then liquidated T receiving the 
unharvested crop. 3x7 The court's refusal to apply section 446(b) was based on 
the ground that no known "method of accounting" would achieve this result.m 
381. /d. at 373-74. 
382. A similar situation was involved in the landmark Westover decision, although there the 
amount was truly contingent. 173 F.2d at 91; see supra note 244. 
383. See Horschel, 205 F.2d at 649; Telephone Directory Advertising, 142 F. Supp. at 889· 
91. 
384. Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202, 204-05, 207-08 (9th Cir. 1962); Family Record 
Plan, Inc. v. Commission, 309 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1962). 
385. See, e.g., United Mercantile Agencies v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 808, 815·19 (1960). 
386. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963); see also Comment, An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax 
Benefit Rule, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1257, 1261-62 (1984). 
387. 324 F .2d at 838. 
388. /d. 
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The South Lake Farms court acknowledged that there was a tax windfall to 
T's former shareholders who sold their T stock for a price that reflected the 
value of the crop.-'~Y Note that some authorities would have disallowed T's 
deduction in the year of liquidation under the clear reflection of income doc-
trine.·"~" 
3. Tax Benefit Doctrine 
a. Pre-1954 Code 
The tax benefit doctrine in its classic (and misleading) form holds that a 
taxpayer must include in income, in the tax year of "recovery," an item or 
amount deducted in a prior tax year, unless the deduction failed to yield a tax 
benefit to the taxpayer in the prior year.·m Thus, if a taxpayer deducts, as 
wholly worthless, a bad debt in year 1, obtains a tax benefit, and in year 2 
the debtor unexpectedly repays the loan, the taxpayer must include the repayment 
or "recovery" in income in year 2. This is true despite the fact that the receipt 
of a loan repayment usually constitutes a tax-free return of capital. m 
Courts propounded a number of divergent rationales to tax such "recoveries" 
of income that did not constitute economic gain in the ordinary sense in year 
2. All these rationales required recoveries. The divergencies in the rationales are 
demonstrated by the following examples: (1) a loan that has been written-off 
was converted from capital to potential ordinary income; (2) the annual accounting 
principle required a "balancing entry" or offsetting income adjustment in year 
2 to balance the income item offset by the bad debt deduction in year 1; and 
389. !d. at 840. 
390. See, e.g., Tennessee-Carolina Trans., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440, 449-55 (1975) 
(Tannenwald, J., dissenting). 
391. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 265. White, An Essay on the Conceptual Foundations 
of the Tax Benefit Rule, 82 MtcH. L. REv. 486 (1983). 
392. In Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), the Court stated that: 
An annual accounting system is a practical necessity if the federal income tax is to 
produce revenue ascertainable and payable at regular intervals. Burnet v. Sanford & 
Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931 ). Nevertheless, strict adherence to an annual 
accounting system would create transactional inequities. Often an apparently completed 
transaction will reopen unexpectedly in a subsequent tax year, rendering the initial 
reporting improper. For instance, if a taxpayer held a note that became apparently 
uncollectible early in the taxable year, but the debtor made an unexpected financial 
recovery before the close of the year and paid the debt, the transaction would have 
no tax consequences for the taxpayer, for the repayment of the principal would be 
recovery of capital. If, however, the debtor's financial recovery and the resulting 
repayment took place after the close of the taxable year, the taxpayer would have a 
deduction for the apparently bad debt in the first year under § 166(a) of the Code, 
26 U.S.C. § 166(a). Without the tax benefit rule, the repayment in the second year, 
representing a return of capital, would not be taxable. The second transaction, although 
economically identical to the first, could, because of the differences in accounting, 
yield drastically different tax consequences. The Government, by allowing a deduction 
that it could not have known to be improper at the time, would be foreclosed from 
recouping any of the tax saved because of the improper deduction. Recognizing and 
seeking to avoid the possible distortions of income, the courts historically have required 
the taxpayer to recognize the repayment in the second year as income. 
/d. at 377-79. 
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(3) an estoppel or waiver theory under which the original bad debt deduction 
is allowed, subject to an implied consent to be taxed later on future recovery 
of the bad debt, regardless of whether such recovery actually is income.m 
A recovery requirement obviously would pose problems when taxing T on 
a liquidating or nonliquidating distribution because the distribution does not 
readily give rise to a recovery as would a loan repayment.m However, in the 
landmark case of Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford,m the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in effect, merged the general tax benefit and the 
assignment of income doctrines to reach a correct result when a continuing 
corporation distributed loans that had been written-off to shareholders, who 
then collected substantial payments in the same tax year. The Stratford court 
reasoned that under the tax benefit doctrine, the charged-off debts had been 
converted into potential income to the extent of the tax deduction allowed 
previously. 396 The court further concluded that by distributing this income item 
the corporation realized income because the power to dispose of income was 
the equivalent of ownership. Following other assignment of income authorities, 
393. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 267-69. "While divergent, these theories share the 
notion that recoveries do not constitute economic gain in the ordinary sense, and that their inclusion 
in income is an anomaly requiring an explanation." /d. In Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, the Court stated 
that: 
All these views reflected that the initial accounting for the item must be corrected to 
present a true picture of income. While annual accounting precludes reopening the 
earlier year, it does not prevent a less precise correction-far superior to none-in the 
current year, analogous to the practice of financial accountants. 
460 U.S. at 378 n.ll. 
394. See Note, The Tax Benefit Rule-A Judicially Broadened Tool for Transactional Tax 
Equity, 37 V AND. L. REv. 1351, 1368 (1984); Comment, An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax Benefit 
Rule, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1257, 1261-62 (1984). White correctly explains that the tax benefit rule 
(i.e., year 2 correlative adjustment under the model), applies to previously expensed supplies on 
hand at liquidation because the liquidating corporation "is merely recognizing income that it realized 
in year one-income that has nothing to do with its subsequent liquidation." White, supra note 
391, at 505. White reads Hillsboro, as does this Article, as establishing that the purpose of the 
tax benefit rule "is to reconcile certain inaccuracies in past reporting." /d. at 501 n.81. Feld 
constructs a scenario of a distribution in kind of previously expensed supplies by an ongoing 
corporation that illustrates the necessity of precluding a double deduction that the tax benefit rule 
should preclude. Feld, Tax Benefit of Bliss, 62 B.U.L. REv. 443, 461 (1982). 
Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank adopted Bittker's balancing entry or "rough" transactional parity approach 
in 1983. 460 U.S. at 380 n.ll, 383. Bittker & Kanner stated that: 
As a counterweight to the annual accounting principle, the tax benefit rule expresses 
a preference, from the perspective of accretions to wealth, for transactional equality 
of tax treatment over contemporaneous equality, that is equality of treatment of 
taxpayers within a single year ... with one short-lived exception, however, the courts 
have been satisfied with rough and ready adjustment that results from taxing the 
recovery at whatever rate prevails in the year of recovery, and have not insisted on 
exacting a tax equal to the amount saved by the taxpayer in the earlier year. 
Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 270-71 (footnotes omitted). As White explains, this concept 
supports the application of the tax benefit doctrine to previously expensed supplies that are still 
on hand at the liquidation, notwithstanding the lack of recovery and § 336's nonrecognition shield. 
White, supra note 391, at 503-05. 
395. 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948); see also Feld, supra note 
394, at 455-56; Lyon & Eustice supra note 322, at 400-01. 
396. 168 F.2d at 1006. 
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the Stratford court held that the bank did not realize the gain until the debt 
was paid to the assignee shareholders.m 
Due to the absence of a deep structure analysis during this era, a liquidating 
T was able to distribute, among other items, previously expensed supplies in 
complete liquidation. The former T shareholders would dispose of these supplies 
for cash shortly after termination of the corporation's existence. In order to 
escape taxation under the assignment of income doctrine, the former T share-
holders asserted that the connection between the corporation and the shareholders 
had been severed.m This assertion was supported by the fact that when the 
income was received, the corporation was not in existence and, hence, not taxable 
under the conventional doctrine of that time. 
In I942 Congress enacted a statutory version of the tax benefit rule excluding 
from income any recovery that had not produced a tax benefit in year 1.-w~ 
This statutory version was enacted against a background of administrative and 
judicial conflict with respect to the exclusionary component of the tax benefit 
doctrine; that is, "recoveries" are not to be accounted for in year 2 to the 
extent that there was no tax benefit in year 1.4'"' Nevertheless, this partial 
codification of the tax benefit doctrine was not exclusive. 4111 
b. Post-1954 Code 
The exclusionary component of the tax benefit doctrine, which excludes 
from income a recovery of a· prior deduction that does not result in a reduction 
of a taxpayer's tax, was recodified in section Ill of the 1954 Code. 4112 The 1954 
version of section Ill applied to income attributable to the recovery of a bad 
debt, prior tax, or delinquency amount during the tax year. 403 The regulations 
extended this provision to other transactions and the courts ruled that the 
provision was not exclusive. 4114 In 1984 Congress reformulated section Ill to 
encompass any year I deduction or credit.405 
The interplay between the tax benefit doctrine and the "liquidation" pro-
visions first arose under the 1954 Code in the context of a section 337 transaction 
in which a liquidating T sold its accounts receivable with respect to which a 
397. /d. at 1010. 
398. See United States v. Horschel, 205 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1953). Horschel clearly is 
now overturned by Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.5. at 370. 
399. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 116, 56 Stat. 798, 812-13 (1942) (codified at I.R.C. § 
22(b)(l2) (1952))_ 
400. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 271; Plumb, Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. 
L. REv. 129, 129-34, 151-75 (1943); Tye, Tax Benefit Rule Reexamined, 3 TAX L. REv. 329, 330 
(1948). 
401. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 505-07 (1943); see infra text accompanying note 
404. 
402. I.R.C. § Ill (West Supp. 1986). 
403. /d. at § lll(a). Section lll(a) now provides that "if an amount attributable to a deduction 
claimed in a prior year is recovered, such amount is excludable from gross income only to the 
extent it did not reduce income subject to tax." 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 522. A similar 
rule exists for an overstatement of a credit in year I due to a downward adjustment in the price 
in year 2. I.R.C. § lll(b) (West Supp. 1986); 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 522. 
404. For a discussion of§ Ill as it existed before the 1984 amendments, see Bittker & Kanner, 
supra note 231, at 271-81; Note, supra note 394, at 1353-95. 
405. See supra note 403. 
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bad debt reserve previously had been taken.~'JO Again the decision was easy 
because there was, in effect, a "recovery" by sale. After an initial conflict 
between the Tax Court, 4117 various circuit courts, and the Court of Claims, the 
courts uniformly extended the tax benefit doctrine to previously expensed supplies;'"x 
prepaid expenses, 409 and written off inventory sold pursuant to a complete liqui-
dation. ~ 10 The recovery was apparent in these instances because P had paid for 
the various items and T's gain was, in effect, attributable to previous basis 
deductions. 411 Note, however, that this focus on payment could lead to error 
with respect to the amount of the "recovery. "~ 12 
406. West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961). 
407. The Tax Court initially took the JX)sition that the tax benefit doctrine did not override 
§ 337. See Anders v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 815 (1967), rev'd, 414 F.2d 1283 (lOth Cir. 1969). 
However, other tribunals uniformly have arrived at the opposite conclusion. Connery v. United 
States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1972); Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970); S.E. 
Evans, Inc. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 423 (D. Ark. 1970); Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 
1147 (Ct. Cl. 1972). Consequently, the Tax Court properly yielded to the majority position that 
the tax benefit and other common-law attributions of income doctrines override the shield of § 
337. See Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 633 (1975); see also B. BITTKER & J. EusTICE, 
supra note 23, , 11.65 at 11-82 to -87. 
408. Anders, 414 F.2d at 1283; accord S.E. Evans, Inc., 317 F. Supp. at 423. 
409. Connery, 460 F.2d at 130 (pre-paid advertising); Spitalny, 430 F.2d at 195 (pre-paid feed). 
410. Bishop v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Ga. 1971). 
411. As the court JX)inted out in Bishop: 
Once these deductions were taken the hens took on a reduced basis and the result is 
that the corporations had a 'gain' on the sale of the hens and that gain is actually 
a recovery of part of the costs of the hens. It is only when an expense deduction is 
allowed for the hens in issue and Section 337 is attempted to be applied to make the 
sale price tax free that any "gain" to the corporation is involved. To allow this "gain" 
to pass tax free to the corporations would confer a double tax benefit on the cor-
porations, (I) a deduction of a cost of the hens in a prior year, and (2) what amounts 
to still another deduction (through nonrecognition) in the year of the liquidated sale. 
The purpose for precluding a double tax benefit through the use of deductions spawned 
the tax benefit rule. 
/d. at 1115. 
Note the strong similarity between the alternative Crane double deduction reasoning, infra at 
text accompanying note 490, and the Bishop court's analysis of the tax benefit doctrine. A major 
thesis of this Article is that such an equitable approach to preventing double deductions underlies 
the various manifestations of the correlative adjustment concept. See also Del Cotto & Joyce, Double 
Benefits and Transactional Consistency Under the Tax Benefit Rule, 39 TAX L. REv. 473, 478 
(1984). 
412. In Allee Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1795 (1977), the Tax Court measured 
the tax benefit "recovery" of a target that was selling its assets pursuant to § 337. Previously 
expensed drawings, tooling, and art work were sold on the basis of the fair market value of such 
assets at the time of the sale, rather than on the deductions taken previously. See id. at 1797, 
1803-05. The majority in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank did not resolve the question of whether the proper 
amount of a tax benefit recovery (given that a tax benefit was enjoyed) is the amount of the prior 
deduction or the lesser of such amount or the fair market value of the property (i.e., the basis 
that the shareholders would take). 460 U.S. at 402 n.37; see also Feld, supra note 394, at 463-64. 
In Justice Steven's dissent, he speculated that the majority's cancelling out an earlier deduction 
approach would not be receptive to any limitation of fair market value or shareholder's basis. /d. 
at 403, 419-20 n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's response suggests that fair market 
value can play a role. !d. at 402 n.37. Under the general concept of the model, the prior deduction 
and not fair market value would be relevant, similar to other areas. See, e.g., Commissioner v. 
Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). However, because depreciation or other cost recovery deductions actually 
do not reflect economic diminution in value, but rather a matching of cost and income, see Kahn, 
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Commissioner v. South Lake Farms Co.m was the first post-1954 Code 
case to consider the application of the tax benefit doctrine to section 336. South 
Lake involved P's timely liquidation of T that was subsequent to P's purchase 
of a T that had deducted the cost of planting and cultivating unharvested crops 
at a price reflecting the value of the unharvested crops. The P in South Lake 
thereby obtained a cost basis under old section 334(b)(2) in the T assets, including 
the unharvested crops, and the only parties charged with a capital gains charge 
were the T shareholders. As discussed above, 414 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected the Commissioner's assertion that the clear reflection of income 
requirement of sections 446(b) and 482 mandated that T include the fair market 
value of the unharvested crop planted and cultivated by T, but harvested by 
P. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invoked a narrow, technical reading of 
the clear reflection of income requirement. The South Lake Farms court concluded 
that the tax benefit doctrine was even less on point because the court could 
not "see any theory on which it can be barely said that the old corporation 
has recovered the expenses which it deducted. " 41 ~ 
Over a decade later, the Tax Court in Tennessee Carolina Transportation, 
Inc. v. Commissione,.. 16 adopted just such a theory. The Tax Court was motivated 
primarily by a desire to attain parity between transactions under sections 336 
and 337. The theory provided that the liquidated T had expensed the cost of 
purchased supplies (tires and tubes) on the assumption that their useful life 
would be exhausted fully in operations within a twelve-month period. Such 
supplies were deemed for tax purposes to have been consumed fully in operation 
so that upon a liquidating distribution, if such supplies have "a fair market 
value in a transaction of consequence in the scheme of Federal income taxation, 
it (T] would therefore necessarily be deemed to have received tires and tubes 
identical to them immediately prior to that transaction. " 417 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the "fictional" 
recovery theory and added that there was a recovery in still another sense-the 
liquidated corporation was given its own stock in exchange for the assets trans-
Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income, 18 
MtcH. L. REv. I (1979), to the extent items such as the drawings in A/tee had been used in business 
and generated income, recovery of the full deduction upon their sale is inconsistent. In other words, 
only to the extent that the prior deduction exceeds a proper economic matching with income should 
there be an inconsistent event and recovery. Cf. Feld, supra note 394, at 450 n.35. 
413. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963). 
414. See supra text accompanying notes 386-87. 
415. 324 F.2d at 840. The facts and reasoning of South Lake Forms are discussed extensively 
in Feld, supra note 394, at 452-54. For a theory under which T is properly taxed in its final year 
on tax benefit items, see supra note 394. 
416. 65 T.C. 440 (1975), off'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978). Feld, supra note 394, at 458-
60, discusses Tennessee-Carolina Tronsp. Judge Tannenwald dissented in Tennessee-Carolina Tronsp., 
65 T.C. at 449-55. Apparently, Judge Tannenwald felt that the same result could be achieved by 
the clear reflection of income doctrine under § 446(b). See supra note 390. The clear reflection of 
income doctrine is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 371-90. While case law 'by-and-large' 
inappropriately has limited the § 446(b) version of the doctrine to traditional tax accounting systems, 
see supra text accompanying notes 383 & 385, a thesis of this Article is that clear reflection of 
income lies at the heart of year 2 correlative adjustments for transactional equivalency. See Del 
Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 477-78; White, supra note 391, at 495-96 & n.60. 
417. Tennessee-Carolina Tronsp., 65 T.C. at 447. 
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ferred in the complete liquidation to its shareholders.418 The result of this exchange 
was a recovery that had considerable value at the time the stock was returned 
to the liquidating corporation. 419 More significantly, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that the tax benefit doctrine applied "whenever there is an 
actual recovery of a previously deducted amount or when there is some other 
event inconsistent with that prior deduction. " 420 The liquidating transfer of assets 
that resulted in the former T shareholder stepping up its basis in assets with a 
substantial useful life remaining, but which had a zero basis in T's hands, was 
inconsistent with T's prior expensing of the assets. 
Nearly ten years later, the Supreme Court in Hillsboro National Bank v. 
Commissioner, 421 resolved the conflict between South Lake Farms and Tennessee 
Carolina Transportation in favor of "parity" between sections 336 and 337 and 
established an expansive reading of the tax benefit doctrine that eliminated the 
absolute requirement of a "recovery. " 422 The Hillsboro National Bank majority 
accepted the view that has been proposed by some cases and commentators that 
the function of the tax benefit doctrine is to approximate the results of a 
transactional tax accounting system by serving as a counterweight to the con-
sequences of the annual accounting principle. 423 
As noted above, the annual accounting system in essence provides that each 
tax year stands on its own.424 Hence, if an apparently closed transaction in year 
1 unexpectedly reopens in a subsequent tax year (year 2), an adjustment is not 
made to year l's return. 425 Rather, a "less precise correction-far superior to 
none-"426 is made in the year 2 return. Thus, in the case of the tax benefit 
418. Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 1978). 
419. /d. at 384. 
420. /d. at 382. The latter inconsistent event alternative is precisely the approach taken by 
the majority in Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). See also infra text 
accompanying note 421. 
421. 460 u.s. 370 (1983). 
422. 460 U.S. at 397-402. See generally White, supra note 391; Del Cotto & Joyce, supra 
note 411. The Court was influenced strongly by the §§ 336-337 parity argument. 
423. 460 U.S. at 378 n.IO, 380 n.l1, 381. Judge Tannenwald analyzed the tax benefit rule 
as just such a counterweight to the annual accounting principle in Estate of Munter, 63 T.C. at 
678, (Tannenwald J., concurring). However, he saw a recovery as a necessary element under the 
doctrine. /d. See supra text accompanying note 393; see also Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 
270, which was relied upon by the majority in Hillsboro. 
White, supra note 391, at 501, and Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 477-78, believe that 
Hillsboro Nat 'I Bank properly articulated the theory and purpose undergirding the tax benefit rule: 
to require a taxpayer who has taken a deduction in year I to reconcile that deduction with what 
has acutally happened in year 2 so as to achieve a transactional equity that prevents a false reflection 
of economic gain. We agree with Del Cotto and Joyce's further conclusion that such "transactional 
equity" underlies various year I inclusions (claim of right, Crane and Kirby Lumber doctrines). 
See Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 476, 482-83. Commentators, however, tend to have 
problems with the "inconsistent events" test. See infra note 429. 
424. See supra text accompanying notes 224-321. 
425. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931). See generally Hillsboro Nat'/ 
Bank, 460 U.S. at 377; Comment, An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax Benefit Rule, 72 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1257, 1258-59 (1984). 
426. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 380 n.11. The Supreme Court recognized that exact 
transactional equivalence was not obtainable because of bracket or rate changes and, although 
unmentioned by the Court, time value of money. /d. 
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doctrine an income adjustment is necessitated in year 2 to back out the year 
1 deduction to the extent that it produced a tax benefit. This is necessary in 
order to achieve a rough transactional parity with a transaction in which all 
events occurred in year 1.427 The year 2 "correlative adjustment" approximates 
the results produced by a transactional tax system that would reopen year 1. 
However, complete transactional equivalence is not obtained necessarily because 
rates or brackets may change and the time value of money is not accounted 
for under the conventional doctrine. The model discussed below will remedy 
the latter problem. m 
Under Hillsboro National Bank, the triggering event for such correlative 
adjustment must be "fundamentally inconsistent" with the premise on which 
the deduction initially was based in year 1.429 As an example, the Court explained 
that a deduction might be allowed in year 1 on the basis of an assumption. 4 Jo 
The following are examples of such assumptions: ( 1) a loan will not be repaid 
and, hence, is worthless; or (2) supplies will be consumed within a twelve-month 
period. If in year 2 an event inconsistent with such assumption occurs (the loan 
is repaid or there is a liquidating or nonliquidating distribution of the remaining 
supplies), a correlative adjustment or balancing entry is necessary to cancel out 
the earlier deduction. The test is, had the year 2 inconsistent event occurred 
within year 1, would it have foreclosed the deduction in year 1?431 
Hillsboro National Bank noted an inherent tension that arises when the 
fundamentally inconsistent event in year 2 occurs in a traditional nonrecognition 
427. See Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 270. 
428. See infra text accompanying notes 437-559. 
429. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 383-85. The Hillsboro majority had precedents for its 
"fundamentally inconsistent" event test. See, e.g., Tennessee-Carolina Transp., 582 F.2d at 382. 
In response to Justice Stevens' charge in his dissent that the majority's formulation requires courts 
to distinguish "inconsistent events" from "fundamentally inconsistent events," Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 
460 U.S. at 418 (Stevens J., dissenting), Justice O'Connor pointed out "[t]hat line is not the line 
we draw; rather, we draw the line between merely unexpected events and inconsistent events." /d. 
at 383 n.l5. Nevertheless, even those commentators embracing Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank's transactional 
deep structure policy of more accurate measurement of income with respect to the tax benefit rule, 
find fault with the fundamentally inconsistent event test for application of this policy. White, supra 
note 391, at 495. White gives convincing examples for her belief that "this test is overbroad. It 
merely describes the inaccuracy that the rule is supposed to alleviate and does not, by itself, provide 
a sufficiently precise way of distinguishing circumstances where its use is appropriate from those 
where it is not." /d. at 496. White properly calls for a year 2 "reconciliation event" analysis (i.e., 
functional year 2 correlative adjustment analysis in this Article's terminology) of whether income 
realized in year I should be recognized in year 2 when it is apparent that the assumed events on 
which income was removed from the tax base in year I never occurred. /d. at 502-04. Del Cotto 
and Joyce believe, as do the authors of this Article, see infra text accompanying notes 444-51, that 
the transactional equity policy of Hillsboro "applies whether the prior benefit was a deduction or 
an exclusion, and . . . the reach of the rule is not limited to later inconsistent events, but extends 
to promote more generally the objective of consistency in the treatment of later events." Del Cotto 
& Joyce, supra note 411, at 478. 
430. 460 U.S. at 384-85. 
431. /d. at 383-84. When the inconsistent event or the concluding event of the transaction 
occurs in the same tax year, all events are taken into account in year I. See, e.g., Spitalny, 430 
F.2d at 198; Ballou Constr. Co. v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 375, 378 (D. Kan. 1985); cf. United 
States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297, 303-04 (9th Cir. 1954) (similar distinction made under "claim of 
right" rule). 
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transaction.432 The Court held that the tax benefit doctrine overrode the exemption 
of section 336 because the purpose of section 336 is to "prevent recognition of 
market appreciation that has not been realized by an arm's-length transfer to 
an unrelated party rather than to shield all types of income that might arise 
from the disposition of an asset. " 433 In addition, the court held that the assignment 
of income doctrine already had been applied, notwithstanding section 337. to 
prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxation by shifting income earned by the 
corporation to its shareholders who have a lower tax rate. 434 Because the tax 
benefit rule already had overriden section 337,435 the policy of parity between 
sections 336 and 337 mandated application of the tax benefit doctrine to a 
section 336 transaction. m 
4. Conclusion 
The doctrines of assignment of income and clear reflection of income started 
out with the correct policies of taxation of income to the person who earns it 
and prohibition of liquidation of a corporation as a means of avoiding the clear 
reflection of income principle. However, when applied to contingent items dis-
tributed in complete liquidation, the courts erroneously limited both doctrines 
to tax accounting "accrual" concepts-clear reflection of income was not applied 
beyond traditional tax accounting accrual systems and assignment of income was 
limited to accruable income. Thus, definitional minded judges lost sight of the 
deep structure policy of a minimum distortion of income. While T's sale of 
contingent income items to P pursuant to a section 337 transaction can be 
resolved properly under the more functional Storz approach of focusing on the 
earner of income rather than on accrual concepts, this approach will not solve 
the problem of year I distribution of contingent items, the value of which 
cannot be determined until year 2 when T no longer exists. Closing T's transaction 
in year 1 by estimating the claim merely raises the problem of correlative 
adjustments in year 2. The tax benefit doctrine does not resolve the problem 
either, but its development of a year 2 balancing entry, counterweight, or 
correlative adjustment to the annual accounting principle points the way to the 
correct conceptual solution which will be discussed next. 
432. 460 U.S. at 385-86. 
When the later event takes place in the context of a nonrecognition provision of 
the Code, there will be an inherent tension between the tax benefit rule and the 
nonrecognition provision. We cannot resolve that tension with a blanket rule that the 
tax benefit rule will always prevail. Instead, we must foucs on the particular provisions 
of the Code at issue in any case. 
/d. (footnote and citations omitted). 
Justice O'Connor sketched areas other than liquidation in which tax benefit and nonrecognition 
policies may conflict: (I) a gift of previously expensed supplies; (2) bequest of an expensed asset; 
and (3) personal use of an expensed asset. /d. at 386 n.20. For commentary on such noted intersections 
and others (particularly § 351) see Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 490-95; Note, supra note 
394, at 1358-78, 1386-92; Comment, supra note 425, at 1279-84, 1286-91. 
433. 460 U.S. at 398. 
434. /d. at 398-97. 
435. See supra text accompanying notes 406-07. 
436. 460 U.S. at 400; see infra note 467. 
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IV. CORRELATIVE ADJUSTMENTS FOR CLEARER REFLECTION OF INCOME 
A. Premises for Clearer Reflection of Income Model 
Courts have characterized clear reflection of income models as a "necessary 
counterweight to the consequences of the annual accounting principle . . . . "~.n 
The fundamental doctrinal failures at both the T and T shareholder levels with 
respect to a liquidating distribution of contingent items have arisen from an 
absence of deep structure analysism and a tendency to create legal fictions that 
appear to work well enough in the initial case at bar, but subsequently lead 
courts astray.439 These failures are compounded by the mechanical approach to 
the Code that the courts often adopt:wo The starting point for the clear reflection 
of income model is that contingent income items, by their very nature, cannot 
be handled under the annual accounting principle that separates year I and year 
437. Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., concurring) 
(describing the true character of the tax benefit doctrine). Bittker describes Tannenwald's insight 
as a perceptive comment. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 269. 
438. In some of the discrete doctrinal areas in which year 2 transactional correlative adjustments 
to the annual accounting principle have been fashioned judicially, the Supreme Court and lower 
tribunals have not explored underlying policy (e.g., year 2 deduction under the claim of right doctrine, 
see infra text accompanying note 460; year 2 restoration of percentage depletion as to advanced 
royalties in excess of production, see supra note 358; and the Kirby Lumber cancellation of 
indebtedness doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 510-16). In others, such as the Crane-Tufts 
doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 484-508, the Court recently has explored the policy 
underlying the doctrine but failed to correct past judicial errors. See infra text accompanying note 
518. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil lies between Crane and Tufts 
in clarity: Skelly's "double benefit" terminology points toward the underlying clearer reflection of 
income policy. See infra text accompanying notes 463-76. Only in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank is the 
underlying policy explored fully and clearly. See supra text accompanying notes 423-27. The underlying 
policy of the open transaction alternative of closing year I with a year 2 transactional correlative 
adjustment has been explored less frequently by the courts. See infra note 442. 
439. These fictions generally were cast as an accretion to wealth in year 2 as if it were realized 
in year 2. See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. 370, 381 (1983) ("recovery" under the tax 
benefit doctrine); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I, 14 ( 1947) (economic benefit from buyer's 
taking property subject to a non-recourse liability); Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275, 286 
( 1944) (recapture of percentage depletion on advance royalty, through the fiction that termination 
of lease releases property with value equal to the year I percentage depletion); United States v. 
Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. I (1931) (year 2 accession to income through freeing of assets previously 
offset by cancelled obligation). Conceptually the income was realized in year I; in year 2 it is 
recognized through a transactional correlative adjustment. Cf. White, supra note 391, at 486. However, 
these fictions, once created, take on a life of their own as may be seen in Justice Stevens' dissent 
in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 403-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting), or for that matter the Tufts 
opinion itself. See infra note 452. 
440. The most mechanical approach has been the Tax Court's limitation of the assignment 
and clear reflection of income doctrines to tax accounting accrual concepts in derogation of clear 
reflection of income. See supra text accompanying notes 335-36. In addition the Tax Court and 
other courts extended the Crane doctrine to create a fictional "sale" whenever property subject to 
nonrecourse debt is disposed of in the following transactions: (I) by gift, Guest v. Commissioner, 
77 T.C. 9 (1981); or (2) by abandonment, Freeland v. Commissioner 74 T.C. 970 (1980). In some 
instances such a fictional sale may trigger consequences arguably not consistent with a mere year 
2 transactional correlative adjustment, such as when a gift of encumbered property (with a purchase 
money liability less than basis) to a charity triggers the bargin-sale rules. Ebben v. Commissioner, 
783 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1986). Similarly, Arrowsmith has been read as creating a fictional sale in 
year 2. See infra note 468. 
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2 transactions. By definition a contingent item arising in year 1 cannot be 
ascertained finally until year 2 . .w 1 
When a transaction has effects in two tax years, cases that have originated 
primarily in the Supreme Court, have evolved two alternative modifications to 
the annual accounting principle. These exceptions ensure clearer reflection of 
income. One transactional exception, discussed extensively above, is to hold the 
transaction "open" and defer reporting until year 2 when the entire effect of 
the transaction is determinable. 442 The reporting of the transaction in year 2 
retains the same character that it would have had in year 1 had it been completed 
in year 1. This maintenance of character is necessary to approximate transactional 
reporting. Both gain and loss transactions can be held open!•-' 
An alternative transactional exception to the annual accounting principle 
that generally is preferred to open transaction reporting444 is to "close" the 
transaction in year 1 based on the best assumption possible at that time with 
respect to its ultimate outcome. To the extent that the final development of the 
transaction in year 2 proves the original assumption wrong, a transactional 
"correlative adjustment" or balancing entry is made in year 2 reversing the tax 
effects of the assumption in year 1. This adjustment is necessary in order to 
more clearly reflect the taxpayer's income. Thus, a year 2 correlative adjustment 
is a necessary counterweight to the annual accounting principle.44 j The year 2 
441. See Note, supra note 238, at 65. 
442. Open transaction-deferred basis reporting is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 
218-33. Deferred basis reporting with constant-character constitutes a transactional exception to the 
annual accounting principle designed to reflect the taxpayer's income more clearly. See supra text 
accompanying notes 232-33. Cases have not focused on open transaction year 2 reporting and closed 
transactional year I reporting, with year 2 transactional correlative adjustment, as alternatives to 
handling contingent items. A detailed analysis of the factors to be used in chosing between the two 
alternative exceptions to the annual accounting principle is beyond the scope of this Article. 
443. A loss transaction in year 2 is held "open" unless, a "closed and completed transaction" 
exists, Treas. Reg. § 1.165-l(d)(l) (1960), or if a claim for reimbursement with a reasonable prospect 
of recovery exists, id. § 1.165-l{d){2). 
444. This is an intuitive conclusion. Gain, basis, and loss are held open only in sales or 
purchases that have a contingent price or losses that may be reimbursed. The Crane, tax benefit, 
claim of right, and cancellation of indebtedness doctrines all close year I and provide some form 
of correlative year 2 adjustment to cancel out the year I inclusion. In such latter areas the transaction 
is held open only when the year I assumption is unlikely {e.g., nonrecourse acquisition liabilities 
in excess of fair market value). Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 {9th Cir. 
1977); cf. Graft v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 944, 948 {1984); Zappo v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 77, 
88 {1980). Note that an all-or-nothing approach almost always prevails-open or closed. A risk-
adjusted ye~r I reporting usually is not available under these doctrines. See Illinois Power Co. v. 
Commissioner, 792 F.2d 683, 690 {7th Cir. 1986). 
445. The year 2 transactional correlative adjustment to the annual accounting period has been 
perceived most clearly by judges {and perhaps commentators) in the tax benefit area. See Hillsboro 
Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 377-79, 378 n.IO, 381, 383. See generally Bittker & Kanner, supra note 
231, at 270; White, supra note 391, at 495-96. Even in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, the Supreme Court's 
acceptance of the deep structure policy of clear reflection of income through year 2 transactional 
adjustments was not unanimous. 460 U.S. at 403, 406-09 {Stevens, J ., dissenting in part) {opposes 
transactional equivalence and would require a year 2 recovery). Justice Marshall joined in Justice 
Stevens' opinion. /d. at 371. Justice O'Conner saw this same transactional equivalence as underlying 
the year 2 deduction under the claim of right doctrine. See id. at 377-78 n.9; cf. United States v. 
Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 686 n.5 { 1969) {year 2 claim of right deduction does not necessarily 
equal tax consequences of year I receipt-analogous to approach under tax benefit rule). Com-
mentators also have grasped the conceptual relationship between the inclusion component of the 
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correlative adjustment must be of the same character as the reported item in 
year 1.""6 However, because a correlative adjustment in year 2 must reverse or 
back out the transaction in year 1, the balancing entry must have the opposite 
tax effect of the entry in year 1. Thus, if the transaction in year 1 is reported 
as a deduction, the transactional correlative adjustment in year 2 must be an 
addition to income of the same character as the year 1 deduction. 447 Conversely, 
if the transaction was reported in year 1 as income, the transactional correlative 
adjustment in year 2 is a deduction of the same character.44x The same underlying 
approach comes into play when the transaction in year 1 constitutes an exclusion 
from income. The correlative adjustment in year 2 is an inclusion in income 
with the same character as the item would have had if it had been includable 
in income in year l. ""9 All this is directed at the deep structure of preventing 
distortion of income. 450 Neither the year 1 open transaction with year 2 deferred 
reporting, nor year 1 closed transaction with year 2 correlative adjustment 
exception, effect exact transactional reporting because they do not account for 
bracket and rate changes.451 The time value of money is accounted for only in 
the open transaction-contingent payment modifications of the annual accounting 
principle. 452 
tax benefit rule and the deduction component of the claim of right doctrine. Bittker & Kanner, 
supra note 231, at 281-82; Note, supra note 224, at 995. The claim of right doctrine is a judicial 
and legislative departure from the annual accounting principle enacted in order to harmonize a 
transaction's tax consequences when it is finally closed with its tax treatment in an earlier year. 
See generally Dubroff, Claim of Right Doctrine, 40 TAx L. REv. 729 (1985). 
Some commentators properly perceive such transactional equivalence as being the policy core 
of the Crane doctrine, the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine, and the tax benefit doctrine. Del 
Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 476-78; see also Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and 
the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277, 282-84 (1978); Bittker & Thompson, Income From the 
Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 
1159, 1165-66 (1978). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 131-39. The deep structure policy 
produces a clearer reflection of income than the absence of a year 2 correlative adjustment, given 
that year I cannot be reopened judicially or administratively. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 
380 n.ll; Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 476-78; White, supra note 391, at 495-96, 504-
05. 
446. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 276; Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 105-06 (citing 
Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 8 (1952)). The authors agree that Arrowsmith reflects 
the characterization component of the year 2 correlative adjustment and underlies the characterization 
component of alternative open transaction-deferred basis reporting. 
447. See Bittker, supra note 445, at 282-84; Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 276; Rosenberg, 
supra note 234, at 105-06. 
448. See supra text accompanying note 427. 
449. See Bittker, supra note 445, at 282-84; see also infra text accompanying notes 516-17; 
Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 475-76. 
450. See Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 476-78; cf. White, supra note 391, at 495 
n.60. 
45 I. See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 380-81 n.l2 (tax benefit year 2 inclusion); 
Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 284 (1953) (claim of right year 2 deduction). These and 
other potential inequities, caused by the absence of a pure transactional approach, have lead various 
commentators to advocate reopening year I or in year 2 using year I rates and brackets and 
imposing interest from year I on the taxpayer or the government, depending on whether the year 
2 correlative adjustment is an addition to or a deduction from income. See Note, supra note 224, 
at 1014-15 nn.96 & 97. The strongest argument to the contrary is that when the statute of limitations 
has run on year I, a correlative adjustment would be required when the adjusting event occurs. 
Thus, reopening year I as long as the statute of limitations has not run would lead to a proliferation 
of the rules. See infra note 467. 
452. See supra text accompanying note 202. 
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1. Case Law Matrix for Transactional Correlative Adjustment 
a. Tax Benefit and Claim of Right Doctrines 
[Winter 
The majority in Hillsboro National Bank acknowledged that the balancing 
entry portion of the above modelm undergirds the inclusionary component of 
the tax benefit doctrine which is now codified partially in section Ill, ~5~ and 
the deduction component of the "claim of right" doctrine which is now codified 
partially in section 1341.455 As discussed above, the tax benefit rule requires the 
inclusion in year 2 income of amounts deducted in year 1 to the extent that 
the year I deduction results in a tax benefit. The tax benefit rule applies when 
year 2 events are "fundamentally inconsistent"~5b with the year I deduction. 
The purpose of the rule is to effect transactional equivalency. The exclusionary 
aspect of the doctrine which provides for no year 2 inclusion to the extent that 
the year 1 deduction does not give rise to a tax benefit also is codified partially 
in section 111.457 
The claim of right doctrine requires a taxpayer to report as income in year 
1 amounts received in that year under a "claim of right." The taxpayer later 
may end up repaying the amounts reported in year 1.~sH If the taxpayer must 
make a repayment in year 2 due to a fundamentally inconsistent event, articulated 
in this context as repayment under "compulsion,"459 the doctrine grants the 
taxpayer a deduction in year 2 rather than reopening year 1..w• Section 1341 
453. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 412-15. 
454. For a brief description of I.R.C. § Ill (West Supp. 1986), see supra note 403. 
455. I.R.C. § 1341 (West Supp. 1986) is discussed infra in note 461. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank's 
acknowledgment of a rough transactional equivalency approach to the claim of right doctrine in 
the context of a year 2 deduction is discussed supra in note 445. 
456. See supra note 429. 
457. See I.R.C. §Ill (West Supp. 1986). 
458. See North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932). See generally Dubroff, supra 
note 445, at 733 (the three classic elements of the year I inclusion component of the doctrine are: 
"(I) receipt by a taxpayer of money or other property, (2) control by the taxpayer over the utilization 
or disposition of money or property, and (3) assertion of some claim of right or entitlement by 
the taxpayer to receipt"). Note that the third element may no longer be necessary. /d. 
459. Under the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment model, the year 2 repayment of 
the amount included in income in year I, pursuant to the claim of right doctrine, is deductible in 
order to back out the item included in income in year I, based on the assumption that the taxpayer 
would not repay the item. Cf. Dubroff, supra note 445, at 749 n. 104 ("A reverse application of 
the [tax benefit] doctrine could permit deduction of repayments of items previously included in 
income."). The "compulsion" requirement boils down to a perceived obligation, contractual or 
legal, to repay the amount existing in year I at the time of the receipt of the item. See id. at 753· 
55. Thus, payment pursuant to an obligation that first arose in year 2 would not come under the 
deduction component of the claim of right doctrine. Such analysis explains the following correctly 
decided, but poorly reasoned cases. Pahl v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 286 (1976); Blanton v. Com-
missioner, 46 T.C. 527 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 379 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1967). 
460. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has barred reopening year I with respect to 
items repaid in year 2 because such reopening was violative of the annual accounting principle; any 
deduction of amounts received under a claim of right in year I would be allowed in the year of 
repayment (year 2). See Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1953); United States v. 
Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). See generally Dubroff, supra, note 445, at 730-31. Skelly Oil explained 
that the refusal to reopen year I and instead allowance of a deduction in year 2 was "dictated by 
Congress' adoption of an annual accounting system as an integral part of the tax code." Skelly 
Oil, 394 U.S. at 681. The Court in Skelly aUuded to the issue of whether a year 2 deduction for 
a repayment of an item reported previously under the claim of right doctrine arose under a specific 
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affects partially transactional reporting, by giving a covered taxpayer a year 2 
deduction for his year 2 "involuntary" repayment of an item on which he did 
not have an unrestricted claim. This deduction is calculated at a level that is 
equal to the greater of his year I or year 2 marginal bracket and rate.~hl No 
interest is credited to the taxpayer from year I. ~62 
b. Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil and Year 2 Character 
The character of the year 2 adjustment under both doctrines must match 
the character of the year I event in order to back out or reverse the year I 
transaction. This principle underlies the results of United States v. Skelly Oil 
Co.•hJ and Arrowsmith v. Commissioner.4M Simplifying the Arrowsmith facts, 
the former T shareholders received a liquidating distribution in year I from T 
in which their amount realized was, say, $1000 and their basis was $600. This 
basis included all noncontingent T liabilities assumed, or taken by the share-
holders. Thus, the T shareholders reported a $400 capital gain in year I. In 
year 2, the former T shareholders as transferees of the liquidated T were forced 
to pay T's creditors $100 with respect to a theretofor contingent T liability. 
Consequently, a year 2 correlative adjustment of a $100 capital loss was ne-
cessitated to back out the $100 year I capital gain that had been computed on 
the erroneous assumption that the T shareholders' basis in their stock was only 
$600.•M The events of year 2 make it apparent that the basis actually was $700. 
Thus, T shareholders' transactional gain was $300, not the $400 capital gain 
reported. Therefore, the year 2 $100 capital loss achieves rough transactional 
parity. 
Code provision, but the Court did not decide whether the provision was § 162 or § 165. /d. at 
683-84. The authors believe that the year 2 deduction is an extra-Code deduction that is allowed 
in order to cancel out the item reported as income in year I. 
461. l.R.C. § 1341 provides that the year 2 tax is the lesser of the tax computed with a 
deduction for the year 2 repayment or the tax for the current year computed without the deduction 
minus the tax savings that would have resulted if the income under the claim of right had not 
been included in the prior year. l.R.C. § 134l(a) (West Supp. 1986). One commentator criticizes 
the availability of using the tax rates for either the prior or current year: 
Nor is there any sound policy reason for providing a windfall to the chance taxpayer 
who finds that a deduction in the restoration year wiU result in greater tax savings. 
Rather to achieve conceptual consistency and assure fairness among taxpayers, the 
transaction should be viewed as a whole and the taxpayer required to adjust his prior 
year's tax liability, thereby receiving as a refund or credit only that amount which he 
actually overpaid. 
Note, supra note 224, at 1014. This commentator advocates that year I should be reopened while 
the model suggests a transactional correlative adjustment in year 2. In Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, Justice 
O'Connor supported a year 2 adjustment. 460 U.S. at 377. In dissent, Justice Blackmun advocated 
reopening year I in certain circumstances. /d. at 425 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting). See infra note 426. 
See generally Dubroff, supra note 445, at 730-31 (discussion of alternatives). 
462. See Note, supra note 224, at 1013. 
463. 394 u.s. 678 (1969). 
464. 344 u.s. 6 (1952). 
465. The illustration in the text ignores time value of money considerations. See infra text 
accompanying notes 542-52. Some commentators properly perceive Arrowsmith as supporting the 
"same character as year I" aspect of year 2 transactional equivalence correlative adjustments to 
the annual accounting principle. See Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 106-07; Schenk, supra note 271, 
at 338. Both Rosenberg and Schenk cite Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 276, who, using the 
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In Arrowsmith, the taxpayer argued that the year 2 payment was an ordinary 
expense because each tax year stands on its own and there was no sale or 
exchange in year 2. In response to this argument, the Court reasoned that the 
annual accounting principle is not breached by considering all year 1 and year 
2 transaction events in order to classify properly the nature of the year 2 payment 
for tax purposes. 466 The Court stated that the annual accounting principle only 
precludes reopening and readjusting the year 1 return. 467 From this statement 
some commentators have concluded that Arrowsmith merely stands for the 
principle that if year 1 and year 2 transactions are "integrally related," the 
year 2 transaction takes its character from the year 1 transaction even when 
this characterization results in the year 2 transaction not backing out the year 
1 transaction. 46H Other commentators, more perceptively, have articulated that 
the deep structure policy of clearer reflection of income consists of the following 
"relation back" terminology of Arrowsmith's progeny, albeit without any citations, properly and 
succinctly reasoned as follows: 
When the inclusionary branch of the tax benefit rule is applicable, it is necessary 
to determine whether the taxable recovery constitutes ordinary income or capital gain. 
In making this determination the courts often impress the character of the original 
transaction on the recovery, rather than viewing it as an isolated transaction. When 
employed, this relation-back doctrine taxes the recovery as ordinary income if the 
earlier loss or expense was deducted from ordinary income; conversely, the recovery 
can, and usually does, constitute a capital gain if the earlier deduction was a capital 
loss. 
Bittker & Kanner supra note 231, at 276. See generally Lee & Murphy, Capital Expenditures: A 
Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. RtcH. L. REv. 473, 507-09 (1981); cf. Rabinovitz, supra 
note 229, at 100-01 (discusses cases supporting "event-counter event" reading). On occasion, Congress 
has seen the relationship between Arrowsmith and the year 2 transactional adjustments. See generally 
Note, supra note 224, at 1021. Traditionally the Arrowsmith doctrine has been limited to year 2 
transactional correlative adjustments to closed year I transactions. See Lee & Murphy, supra at 
538. However, the better view is that the Arrowsmith year 1-year 2 characterization equally applies 
to year 2 payments under the open transaction doctrine. Schenk, supra note 271, at 325-29; cf. 
Rabinovitz, supra note 271, at 101. Indeed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Arrowsmith, 
relied upon Corter and Westover, which are seminal open transaction constant character decisions, 
as analogous authority for the proposition that year I may be looked at to determine the character 
of a year 2 transaction. Commissioner v. Arrowsmith, 193 F.2d 734, 735 n.4 (2d Cir.), ofj'd, 344 
U.S. 6 (1952). Other views of Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil are disscussed infra at note 468. 
466. 344 U.S. at 8. The annual accounting principle and sale or exchange requirement are 
discussed supra in text accompanying notes 224-28 & 270. 
467. 344 U.S. at 9. Some would not raise the annual accounting principle to such an absolute 
bar to reopening year I on the basis of subsequent events in year 2. See Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 
460 U.S. at 422, 425 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 224, at 1015 (apply year I rate 
and bracket plus interest in year 2, even if year I is now closed by the statute of limitations). For 
a good policy discussion in favor of year 2 transactional correlative adjustments over reopening 
year I or treating year 2 as unrelated, see Dubroff, supra note 445, at 730-31. Justice O'Connor 
pointed out that if the statute of limitations has run on year I before the inconsistent event occurs, 
a correlative adjustment still will be needed when the event occurs in year 5. Hence, reopening 
year I merely proliferates the annual accounting rules. See Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 378-
79 n.IO. From a revenue point of view, Congress probably would prefer a year 2 adjustment, at 
least in the contingent income area, because parity of treatment as to T and P would mandate 
that P be entitled to a year I basis adjustment, possibly depreciable and, hence, possibly more 
valuable than the year I income, if any, that is recognized by T retroactively. 
468. See Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 104. 
Properly construed, therefore, Arrowsmith stands for no broader proposition than 
that a gain or loss, if closely enough related to a sale or exchange in an earlier year, 
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factors: (1) the necessity of a consistent character correlative adjustment in year 
2 to back out a closed year 1 transaction; or alternatively (2) maintaining year 
1 character when a transaction that was held open in year 1 has been closed 
in year 2.469 These commentators also have asserted that Arrowsmith merely 
reflects the character component of both the year 2 correlative adjustment and 
the year 2 closing of the transaction that was held open from year 1.470 
In Skelly Oil the Supreme Court more clearly articulated the policy underlying 
Arrowsmith.4' 1 Skelly Oil involved a year 2 deduction for amounts included in 
income under a claim of right in year 1. The year 1 income generated percentage 
depletion deductions equal to 27 .50Jo of the included income. 472 The Court reduced 
the year 2 deduction for the repayment of the amount included in income in 
year 1 by the percentage depletion deduction allowed in year 1 in order to 
prevent an inequitable result. 473 The Court concluded that: "[a]ny other approach 
would allow respondent [the taxpayer] a total of $1.27 1/2 in deductions for 
every $1 refunded to its customers. " 474 The Court was of the opinion that the 
avoidance of an inequitable result was supported by the rationale underlying 
Arrowsmith. The Court stated that: 
The rationale for the Arrowsmith rule is easy to see; if money 
was taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer would 
be accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally 
deductible from receipts taxable at the higher rate applicable to or-
dinary income. m 
may be treated as arising out of a sale or exchange, notwithstanding the absence of 
a sale or exchange in the year in which that gain or loss must be accounted for. 
/d. With this assumption, Rabinovitz reasoned that if a taxpayer reported a net § 1231 gain in 
year I (under a claim of right), the year 2 repayment would be treated as a year 2 § 1231 loss 
netted in year 2 against any year 2 § 1231 gains. Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 103-04; accord 
Schenk, supra note 271, at 367-68. Rabinovitz acknowledges that such an approach could result in 
year I capital gain-year 2 ordinary deduction. Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 104. Under the year 
2 transactional correlative adjustment model this rule is incorrect. Either the year I § 1231 transaction 
should be recomputed on the basis of year 2 event and the necessary year 2 correlative adjustment 
should be made to approximate this result, cf. Bresler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 182 (1975), or, 
year 2 simply should back out all or a portion of the year I § 1231 transaction, cf. Rev. Rul. 67· 
331, 1967-2 C.B. 290. However, in no event should a year 2 fictional sale or exchange of a § 1231 
asset be netted with actual year 2 § 1231 transactions. 
469. See supra notes 446 & 465. 
470. /d. 
471. Unlike Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 129, and Schenk, supra note 271, at 338-41, the 
authors believe that Skelly Oil and Arrowsmith flow from the same principle-that transactional 
equivalence in year 2 (through correlative adjustments to "closed" year I reporting or through year 
2 open transaction-deferred reporting) requires the same character in year 2. to avoid distortion of 
income. Skelly Oil is an example of the transactional equivalence of the correlative adjustment and 
Arrowsmith an example of the character of the adjustment. It may be that the issue actually is 
one of semantics: how we define the doctrine. 
472. Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. at 679. 
473. !d. at 684. 
474. /d. 
475. /d. at 685. The Skelly Oil majority viewed the case before it no differently. 
In essence, oil and gas producers are taxed on only 72 1/2% of their "gross income 
from the property" whenever they claim percentage depletion. The remainder of their 
oil and gas receipts is in reality tax exempt. We cannot believe that Congress intended 
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The avoidance of inequitable results, often articulated as avoidance of 
"double deductions, " 476 is at the heart of the year 2 transactional correlative 
adjustments-balancing entry counterweights to the annual accounting principle. 
Unfortunately, the judicial and scholarly focus on "characterizing" year 2 trans-
actions by year 1 events has lead both astray to the extent that the year 2 
payment conceptually involves an interest factor. That element should have 
resulted in an interest deduction to the payor and interest income to the payee, 
as discussed more fully below. 477 
c. Exclusions From Income of Loan Proceeds or Inclusion of Purchase 
Money Debt in Basis: Crane, Tufts, and Kirby Lumber 
The pattern of exclusion in year 1 with inclusion in year 2, as a transactional 
correlative adjustment, lies at the heart of Crane v. Commissioner.m This notion 
was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Tufts419 at the 
same time that the court distinguished the tax benefit and cancellation of 
indebtedness rules. 480 Moreover, the policy also constitutes the deep structure 
to give taxpayers a deduction for refunding money that was not taxed when received. 
/d. Rabinovitz argues that Arrowsmith does not stand for the quoted rationale, which he refers to 
as a "double deduction" theory. Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 87, 94 n.43; accord Schenk, supra 
note 271, at 339-40. Rabinowitz raises the technical point that because prior to 1969 a net long 
term capital loss could offset ordinary income dollar-for-dollar up to $1000 with the excess carried 
forward indefinitely, an Arrowsmith-type repayment could result in the capital loss offsetting ordinary 
income. Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 87-88. First, Rabinovitz argues that if a sale of a capital 
asset in year I produces no gain, an ordinary deduction in year 2 for repayment under § 1341 
would not produce a double deduction. !d. at 94-95. Thus, he sees Arrowsmith as creating a year 
2 sale or exchange rather than applying Skelly Oifs tax benefit rule. Second, Rabinovitz argues 
that Arrowsmith should apply to income amounts received in year 2 to retain the same character, 
but no double deduction is present. /d. at 95. While literally no "double deduction" is present in 
such circumstances, avoidance of distortion of income mandates year 2 transactional adjustments 
10 the annual accounting priciple. Double deduction is an inartful term denoting clearer reflection 
of income, and should not be taken literally. See infra note 525. Thus, Skelly Oil read Arrowsmith 
correctly. Both of these decisions, as well as decisions like Crane and Hillsboro Nat 'I Bank, reflect 
this policy. See infra text accompanying note 495. 
476. See, e.g., Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 215 (3d Cir.) (quoting Crane v. 
Commissioner, 331 U.S. I, 15-16 (1947), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. 
at 684; Bishop v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1105, 1111 (M.D. Ga. 1971). 
477. See infra text accompanying notes 542-52. 
478. Crane, 331 U.S. at 15-16. The Court, after pointing out that Mrs. Crane had taken 
depreciation deductions calculated upon a basis that included the nonrecourse liability in her "cost," 
concluded: 
The crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits her to exclude allowable 
deductions from consideration in computing gain. We have already showed that, if it 
does, the taxpayer can enjoy a double deduction, in effect, on the same loss of assets. 
The Sixteenth Amendment does not require that result any more than does the Act 
itself. 
/d. (footnote omitted). 
Arrowsmith also considered prior years to classify year 2 for tax purposes, Arrowsmith, 344 
U.S. at 8-9. Skelly Oil interpreted the Code in order to preclude double deductions and read 
Arrowsmith as resting on this premise as well. Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. 684-85. 
479. 461 u.s. 300, 309-14 (1983). 
480. The Tufts majority reasoned that the rationale for treating recourse and nonrecourse debt 
alike in "amount realized" is that they are treated alike with respect to basis. Thus, it reasoned 
that inclusion of nonrecourse debt in "amount realized" is necessary to avoid untaxed income in 
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basis for the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine promulgated in United States 
v. Kirby Lumber Co. 481 Unfortunately the legal fictions chosen to explain the 
year 2 income adjustment in traditional "income" realization terms, in Crane 
and Kirby, initially obscured understanding of the deep structure policy, similar 
to the recovery fiction in the tax benefit doctrine.482 This misconception led to 
bizarre results that ultimately triggered obfuscatory piecemeal statutory stabs at 
corrections. 483 
i. The Crane Decision 
In Crane, the taxpayer, by bequest, acquired an apartment building subject 
to a mortgage of $255,000 and accrued interest. The building was appraised for 
estate tax purposes at a value that was equal to the debt and accrued interest. 
After leasing the property for seven years and taking $25,000 in depreciation 
deductions based upon this $255,000 value, the taxpayer sold the property subject 
to the mortgage, to a third party for $3,000 cash, and paid $500 in sale expenses. 484 
The taxpayer argued that "property" under the predecessor to section 1001(b) 
meant the "equity of redemption," that is, the net value that was sold.485 The 
Court ruled that "property" had the same meaning for acquisition, depreciation, 
year I and an unwarranted basis increase because the assumption on which the year I exclusion 
and basis increase were premised was that the mortgagor would repay the loan. Tufts, 461 U.S. 
at 309-10. Tufts saw an affinity between the Crane doctrine and the tax benefit rule, id. at 310 
n.8, and the cancellation of indebtedness rule. ld. at 311 n.ll. However, the Court distinguished 
both rules on the basis of their mechanical differences. See infra text accompanying notes 494 & 
509. 
481. 284 U.S. I (1931 ). The corporate taxpayer issued bonds at par and in the same year 
repurchased them in the open market at below par. The Court distinguished its prior decision in 
Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926), which had held that no income was recognized 
upon repayment of a foreign loan with devalued marks because the borrowed money had been 
invested in an enterprise that failed, on the grounds that in Kirby "there was no shrinkage of assets 
and the taxpayer made a clear gain." Kirby, 284 U.S. at 3. The Court further reasoned that "(a)s 
a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation of 
bonds now extinct." /d. For a criticism of these rationales, see infra notes 512 & 514. 
482. See supra note 438. 
483. See infra note 507. 
484. Crane, 331 U.S. at 3. While the taxpayer claimed and was allowed $25,500 in depreciation 
deductions, id. at n.2, the allowable depreciation was $28,045.10. Accordingly the Commissioner 
reduced Mrs. Crane's basis by this larger allowable depreciation. /d. at 4; see United States v. 
Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927) (basis reduced by greater of allowed or allowable depreciation). Moreover, 
the taxpayer obtained no tax benefit from the bulk of the allowed deductions. Cain, From Crane 
to Tufts: In Search of A Rationale for the Taxation of Nonrecourse Mortgagors, II HoFSTRA L. 
Rev. I, 14 (1982) (citing the Record). Under the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment model 
no adjustment would be needed for the excess of "allowable" depreciation over "allowed," because 
such excess was not accounted for in the taxpayer's income. Furthermore, to the extent of no tax 
benefit the prior deduction or exclusion should be a universal feature of the doctrine. See supra 
note 432. Crane also was decided incorrectly with respect to the amount. See Cain, supra at 28-
29. 
485. Crane, 331 U.S. at 3-4, 6. The Court stated that: 
Petitioner reported a taxable gain of $1,250.00. Her theory was that the "property" 
which she had acquired in 1932 and sold in 1938 was only the equity, or the excess 
in the value of the apartment building and lot over the amount of the mortgage. This 
equity was of zero value when she acquired it. No depreciation would be taken on a 
zero value. Neither she nor her vendee ever assumed the mortgage, so, when she sold 
the equity, the amount she realized on the sale was the net cash received, or $2,500.00 
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and sale, and thus "amount realized" from "sale . . . of property" meant 
property value on disposition valued free from liens. 4x6 
In the case of a sale when the purchaser assumed the taxpayer's personal 
liability the pre-Crane case law held that the taxpayer did not have to receive 
money or other property to be taxed. The Crane court stated that "the taxpayer 
was the 'beneficiary' of the payment in 'as real and substantial [a sense] as if 
the money had been paid it and then paid over by it to its creditors." ' 4x7 In 
the case of nonrecourse liability, the Crane Court reasoned that in reality: 
[A]n owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at 
which the property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of 
the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If he 
transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and 
substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal 
debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another yx 
This focus on "economic benefit" analysis constitutes a striking example 
of the Court's erroneous couching of the analysis in terms of year 2 accessions 
This sum less the zero basis constituted her gain, of which she reponed half as taxable 
on the assumption that the entire property was a "capital asset." 
/d. at 34 (footnotes omitted). 
486. !d. at 12. The Crane court first looked at the § IOOI(b) definition of gain from the 
disposition of property. This definition characterized gain as the amount realized over the adjusted 
basis of the property and then defined "property" for purpose of basis (and depreciation) as the 
taxpayer's legal rights in the property undiminished by the (nonrecourse) liability on the grounds 
of: (I) ordinary sense of the word; (2) past administrative interpretation; and (3) difficulty of an 
annual redetermination of basis for depreciation purposes as principal payments are made. /d. at 
6-10. Once "property" was "valued" on the date of acquisition as the property free of liens, "the 
property to be priced on a subsequent sale must be the same thing." /d. at 12. Thus, the essence 
of Crane was "consistency." See Cain, supra note 484, at 20, 22. However, the seeds of controversy 
were planted with the factoring of the consistency requirement in the term "amount realized." See 
infra text accompanying notes 496-98. This controversy could have been avoided by a more explicit 
year I assumption (loan payment), year 2 counterevent (loan not paid) analysis. 
487. 331 U.S. at 13 (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 
( 1983 )). Hendler, however, held that assumption and payment of recourse indebtedness resulted in 
the taxpayer being the beneficiary of the discharge of indebtedness through such a pay-over rationale. 
United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938). However, even in the context of recourse 
indebtedness, economic benefit from the assumption of, and perforce transfers merely subject to, 
recourse indebtedness is a fiction, especially when the taxpayer remains liable secondarily. Cain, 
supra note 484, at 25-26. Therefore, transfer of property with recourse indebtedness that is not 
immediately paid off should have been decided under the model rather than under an economic 
benefit analysis. Cf. Note, Jackson Reanalyzed: Preventing Tax-Free Escape Upon Transfer of a 
Partnership Interest, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 317, 340, 348 (1985). 
488. 331 U.S. at 14. This "economic benefit" approach undoubtedly was influenced by 
"accessions 10 wealth" biases and was seriously flawed conceptually. Bittker, supra note 445, at 
281-82, stated that: 
The Court, of course, was- correct in asserting that the owner of mortgaged property 
must keep up the payments if he wants to retain the property and that for this period 
of time, he must treat the debt as a personal obligation whether he is personally liable 
or not. It does not follow, however, that the benefit to him from transferring the 
property subject to the mortgage is the same in both cases. If you crave gourmet 
meals, you must pay for them so long as your addiction continues; but once you 
break the habit, you need pay only for those you bought on credit in the past, not 
for those that you will skip in the future. So it is with mortgages. Nonrecourse 
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to wealth.4x9 However, the Court also fashioned an "equitable" result argument 
that was consistent with a year 2 transactional correlative adjustment analysis. 
The Court stated that: 
She [the taxpayer] was entitled to depreciation deductions for a 
period of nearly seven years, and she actually took them in almost 
the allowable amount. The crux of this case, really, is whether the 
law permits her to exclude allowable deductions from consideration 
in computing gain. We have already showed that, if it does, the 
taxpayer can enjoy a double deduction, in effect, on the same loss 
of assets}'~<' 
In Tufts the Supreme Court reviewed Crane and abandoned its economic 
benefit requirement and, hence, the controversial footnote 37 .49 ' The Tufts' Court 
relied upon Crane's equitable basis. The equitable basis in Tufts was couched 
in terms of a nonrecourse loan being treated as true debt. 492 The Court concluded 
that: 
Because no difference between recourse and nonrecourse obli-
gations is recognized in calculating basis, Crane teaches that the 
Commissioner may ignore the nonrecourse nature of the obligation 
obligations can be disregarded as soon as the property is sold, given away, or abandoned; 
personal liability persists even after the property has been disposed of, whether the 
new owner assumes of takes subject to the debt. 
/d. The Supreme Court abandoned the economic benefit rationale in Tufts, 461 U.S. at 311 n.ll. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was influenced strongly by the above quoted passage to find 
Crane without support misinterpreting Crane's prohibition of double deductions policy. Tufts v. 
Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1060 n.4 (5th Cir.l981); see Cain, supra note 484, at 28. See generally 
infra note 525. 
489. One commentator argues that the Crane Court, by precluding double deductions, meant 
only to endorse the absolute nature of the "allowed or allowable" depreciation rules (i.e., basis 
must be reduced year by year by allowable depreciation to prevent timing distortion that results 
from the taxpayer picking the year to sell the property and taking a loss based on an unreduced 
basis). Cain, supra note 484, at 31. More likely, the Crane Court meant to embrace the policy of 
avoidance of distortion of income through a year 2 transactional correlative adjustment. See supra 
note 475. The Tufts majority carefully skirted the validity of the double deduction theory by resolving 
the question on another ground. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.IO. In our view this is semantics. Cf. 
supra note 471. The double deduction rationale, however, is but an inartful articulation of the 
policy of avoiding distortion of income otherwise arising from the annual year 2 transactional 
accounting priciple through correlative adjustment. See infra note 525. 
/d. 
490. 331 U.S. at 15-16 (footnote omitted). 
491. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310-12 n.ll. 
492. /d. at 313. 
In the specific circumstances of Crane, the economic benefit theory did support 
the Commissioner's treatment of the nonrecourse mortgage as a personal obligation. 
The footnote in Crane acknowledged the limitations of that theory when applied to 
a different set of facts. Crane also stands for the broader proposition, however, that 
a nonrecourse loan should be treated a a true loan. We therefore hold that a taxpayer 
must account for the proceeds of obligations he has received tax-free and included in 
basis. Nothing in either § IOOI(b) or in the Court's prior decisions requires the 
Commissioner to permit a taxpayer to treat a sale of encumbered property asym-
metrically, by including the proceeds of the nonrecourse obligation in basis but not 
accounting for the proceeds upon transfer of the encumbered property. 
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in determining the amount realized upon disposition of the encumbered 
property. He thus may include in the amount realized the amount 
of the nonrecourse mortgage assumed by the purchaser. The rationale 
for this treatment is that the original inclusion of the amount of the 
mortgage in basis rested on the assumption that the mortgagor incurred 
an obligation to repay. Moreover, this treatment balances the fact 
that the mortgagor originally received the proceeds of the nonrecourse 
loan tax-free on the same assumption. Unless the outstanding amount 
of the mortgage is deemed to be realized, the mortgagor effectively 
will have received untaxed income at the time the loan was extended 
and will have received an unwarranted increase in the basis of his 
property. The Commissioner's interpretation of § lOOl(b) in this 
fashion cannot be said to be unreasonable. 4~3 
While Tufts acknowledged some affinity of this rationale with the tax benefit 
doctrine, Justice Blackmun claimed that his analysis differed. "Our analysis 
applies even in the situation in which no deductions are taken. It focuses on 
the obligation to repay and its subsequent extinguishment, not on the taking 
and recovery of deductions. " 4~4 In reality the year 2 transactional correlative 
493. /d. at 309-10 {footnote omitted). This passage encapsulates the conceptual confusion in 
the Tufts opinion. It espouses a "true debt" approach {nonrecourse debt is to be treated the same 
as recourse debt), that supports on one level the "two-step" analysis, and in some significant 
instances, conflicts with a year 2 transactional correlative adjustment. /d. Yet the opinion's stated 
rationale for adopting a true debt approach to "amount realized," namely a year 2 balancing of 
a year I assumption that the taxpayer would repay the loan, is equivalent to the year 2 transactional 
correlative adjustment component of the model. See supra text accompanying note 445. The Tuft's 
year 2 balancing rationale is derived from Bittker, supra note 445, at 282, 284. The inclusion of 
the year 2 transactional adjustment in the "amount realized" produces character results inconsistent 
with the "two-step" analysis. Coven, Limiting Losses Attributable to Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense 
of the Traditional System Against the At-Risk Concept, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 41, 76 {1986); see also 
Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 114-18. The transactional adjustment also frequently is inconsistent 
wiih the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment. See infra note 497. The Tufts opinion implicitly 
rests on an assumption that the courts in this context should bow to the will, or better interpretation, 
of the Commissioner as effectuating rough justice. See infra note 496. 
494. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.8. Ironically, Justice Blackmun recognized the year 2 transactional 
correlative adjustment basis of the benefit rule in Hillsboro Nat 'I Bank: 
It came into being, apparently, because of two concerns: {I) a natural reaction against 
an undeserved and otherwise unrecoverable {by the Government) tax benefit, and {2) 
a perceived need, because income taxes are payable at regular intervals, to promote 
the integrity of the annual tax return. Under this approach, if a deduction is claimed, 
with some justification, in an earlier tax year, it is to be allowed in that year, even 
though developments in a later year show that the deduction in the earlier year was 
undeserved in whole or in part. This impropriety is then counterbalanced {concededly 
in an imprecise manner, see ante, at 378 n.10, 380-81 n.l2) by the inclusion of a 
reparative item in gross income in the later year. 
460 U.S. at 423 {Biackmun, J., dissenting). When, however, year I was barred by the statute of 
limitations in year 2, Justice Blackmun would reopen year I. See supra note 467. Perhaps the fact 
that he dissented in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank motivated this semantic distinction. More likely, the 
Court's recent experience in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank with the flavoring of a policy oriented transactional 
adjustment analysis over the traditional legal fiction approach {recovery theory) led to Tuft's retention 
of Crane's traditional legal fiction of "amount realized," albeit rationalized with a transactional 
adjustment analysis. See Comment, Some Reflections on Commissioner v. Tufts: Mrs. Crane Shops 
at Kirby Lumber, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 929, 930-31 n.l5, 971-72 {1983). 
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adjustment that backs out a year 1 assumption shown in year 2 to be erroneous 
underlies both doctrines. 4Y5 However, the fiction chosen in Crane and reaffirmed 
in Tufts-that the "amount realized" includes the amount of any liability whether 
recourse or nonrecourse, 4 % presumably in order to achieve parity of nonrecourse 
debt with recourse debt,m-ultimately lead to inequitable results that remain 
only partially redressed by Congress.m In Crane the character of the amount 
495. See supra note 445. 
496. In Crane, the Court regarded the issue as definitional: (I) the meaning or "construction" 
of the term "property" for purposes of basis at acquisition (and hence, basis for depreciation 
purposes), Crane, 331 U.S. at 6-7, 9; and (2) "the 'amount realized' from 'the sale . . . of 
property."' /d. at 12. "If the 'property' to be valued on the date of acquisition is the property 
free of liens, the 'property' to be priced on a subsequent sale must be the same thing." /d. The 
Court's reliance upon an "administrative construction" was secondary. /d. at 7. Commentators 
correctly point out that the Crane construction of "amount realized" was quite strained. Rosenberg, 
supra note 234, at 92-95. 
In Tufts, the Court shifted from its own construction of the term to heavy reliance upon the 
Commissioner's interpretation. 461 U.S. at 310. The Court acknowledged that the Commissioner 
could have chosen other approaches: (I) non-inclusion of nonrecourse debt in basis and, hence, 
also in amount realized, id. at 308 n.5; and (2) bifurcation of the transaction upon disposition 
with the excess of nonrecourse debt over fair market value of property securing the debt being 
characterized as cancellation of indebtedness. /d. 310-1 I n.l I. In short, different adjustments could 
have been made in year 2 or in year I; the choice was that of the tax administrator. 
497. The Tufts' majority stated that Crane rested on approval of the "Commissioner's decision 
to treat a nonrecourse mortgage in. this context as a true loan." Tufts, 461 U.S. at· 307; see also 
id. at 308 n.5, 309, 313. See generally Bittker, supra note 445, at 282. Tufts' treatment of nonrecourse 
debt as true debt logically would produce parity between recourse and nonrecourse debt. Whether 
this is the case when property is transferred in satisfaction of recourse debt in excess of the fair 
market value of such property remains unclear. On the one hand, the Service's general litigation 
position, accepted by most (but not all) reported decisions, has been that such transfer of property 
with a value less than the recourse debt constitutes a sale or exchange of the property, with the 
full amount of the recourse indebtedness being included in the amount realized. See, e.g., Peninsula 
Properties Co. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 84, 91-92 (1942); accord Zappo v. Commissioner 81 
T.C. 77 (1983) (fair market value of property transferred to satisfy debt not discussed). On the 
other hand, various regulations, Treas. Reg.§ I.IOOI-2(c) ex. (8) (1980), Treas. Reg.§ 1.1017-(b)(S) 
(1956), as well as the most extensively reasoned, recent decision, Danenberg v. Commissioner, 70 
T.C. 370 (1979) have adopted a "bifurcation" analysis under which a transfer of property in 
satisfaction of debt is divided into two parts: (I) a sale or exchange up to the fair market value 
of the property transferred; and (2) the excess of the debt over the fair market value of such 
property is treated as cancellation of indebtedness income, subject to the various exceptions to, and 
deferral of such income under such doctrine. In short, Tufts' treatment of nonrecourse debt, in 
the context of a transfer of property as giving rise to sale or exchange income and not partially 
to cancellation of indebtedness income, does not conflict with the majority judicial approach with 
respect to satisfaction of recourse indebtedness by the debtor's transfer of property with a fair 
market value less than the amount of debt satisfied. The Tufts treatment conflicts with the minority 
approach. Commentators before and after Tufts have advocated a two-step approach to disposition 
of property in satisfaction of both recourse and nonrecourse debt. The two-step approach requires 
sale or exchange treatment up to the fair market value of the transferred property and cancellation 
of indebtedness treatment for liability discharged in excess of the fair market value of such transferred 
property. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 484, at 5-7 (suggesting many alternative rationales to achieve 
such a bifurcated result). The majority in Tufts, however, rejected expressly a two-step analysis. 
461 U.S. at 310-11 n.ll. While in many, if not most, instances the two-step analysis would produce 
results consistent with the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment approach of this Article, in 
some significant areas (principally post acquisition indebtedness) it would not. See infra note 508. 
498. Treatment of the taxpayer's gain, upon the disposition of encumbered property, as capital 
gain (under § 1231), to the extent that such gain arose from prior depreciation or ACRS deductions 
that reduced his basis below the amount of the encumbrance, generates distortion of income. 
Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 131-133; see also Evans v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 502, 513-14 (9th 
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realized, ordinary income, backed out the earlier ordinary depreciation deductions 
because the depreciable apartment building did not constitute a capital asset 
under the then applicable statute. •<J<J Ironically, the actual taxpayer in Crane had 
enjoyed only scant tax benefits from the depreciation deductions. ~(M) With the 
advent of section 123 JS01 disposition of such assets could yield a capital gain, 
including a Crane-created gain. Congress expressly intended for the ordinary 
income treatment of the recapture rules of sections 1245 and 1250 to overturn 
this result-"a partial codification of the tax benefit rule. "~02 Unfortunately, 
due to the mechanics of this route and the political compromises with respect 
to real estate improvements, the effort has proved to be only partially successful. ~0-' 
Moreover, the Treasury and other commentators often have speculated that a 
"gain" deferred in year I is a gain forgotten in year 2. ~o• Because both the 
Commissioner and Congress have acted, in the context of the past judicial error, 
including the year 2 correlative adjustment in amount realized, courts are now 
Cir. 1959) (traces early Treasury oppositiOn, to the combination of ordinary income depreciation 
deductions and capital gains treatment upon disposition). Long aware of such distortion, Congress 
enacted § 1245 in 1962 to "recapture" depreciation previously taken as to business personalty by 
recharacterizing, as ordinary income, gain otherwise taxable as capital gain. Comment, supra note 
494, at fJ'/9 n. 234. A proposal to apply the same rule to business realty was not enacted at that 
time. /d. Instead, in 1964 § 1250 was enacted to recapture only the excess of accelerated depreciation 
over straight line depreciation. The stated theory behind § 1250 was that gain on the sale of business 
real estate may result from gradual inflation in the economy as well as depreciation taken despite 
the lack of exhaustion of wear and tear of the property. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 
132 (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 (Part 2) C.B. 635-43; Horvitz, Sections 1250 and 1245: The Puddle 
and The Lake, 20 TAX L. REv. 285, 286 (1965). One suspects that the true basis for less stringent 
treatment of recapture of depreciation with respect to real estate improvements is to be found in 
the real estate lobby rather than in conceptual sources. The trend since 1964 has been to increase 
gradually the stringency of real estate depreciation recapture to the point that if accelerated deductions 
are taken under ACRS for non-residential real estate, total recapture as under § 1245 is provided. 
See I.R.C. §§ 1245 (a)(l), (a)(5) (West Supp. 1986). Statutory depreciation recapture has been character-
ized as a "tax benefit" concept. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 386 n.20; O'Hare, Statutory 
Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principal of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of 
Corporation and Shareholders, 27 TAx L. REv. 215, 216 (1972); Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 110. 
Thus, recapture of depreciation on business real estate often will not recharacterize sufficiently the 
§ 1231 gain to the full extent of prior depreciation deductions. Indeed, the facts of Tufts illustrate 
clearly that the gain arose from depreciation deductions, but due to the inadequacy of § 1250 recap-
ture, the gain was treated overwhelmingly as capital gain. Commentators have suggested fictions and 
other approaches that virtually would result in total recapture as to debt financed real estate. The 
comments conflict with respect to whether this is contrary to Congress' intent. Compare Rosenberg, 
supra note 234, at 109-112 with Comment, supra note 494, at 975. 
499. Capital assets initially included business land and depreciable trade or business property 
and remained unchanged throughout the years that the taxpayer in Crane took depreciation deductions 
(1932-1938). Crane, 331 U.S. at 3; see Rabinovitz & Shashy, Properties of Property: Indigestion 
from Corn Products, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 964, 967 (1975). However, in 1938 Congress removed 
depreciable trade or business property from the definition, but nondepreciable realty remained within 
the capital asset definition. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447 (1938) amending § 117(a)(l) 
of the initial Revenue Act of 1938. See generally Rabinovitz & Shashy, supra at 967. 
500. See Cain, supra note 484, at 14-15. The issue of the extent to which rules such as the 
"no tax benefit" aspect of the tax benefit doctrine should apply to all year 2 transactional correlative 
adjustment rules is interesting, but beyond the scope of this Article. 
501. The predecessor of § 1231 was enacted in 1942. I.R.C. § 117(j) (1942). See generally 
Rabinovitz & Shashy, supra note 499, at 968-69. 
502. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 386 n.20. 
503. See supra note 498. 
504. Cain, supra note 484, at 5 n.26; see supra note 307. 
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"obliged to bow to the will of Congress" 505 or the Commissioner506 at least 
when one or the other directly has addressed the problem. However, Crane and 
Tufts work a rougher approximation of transactional equity than the tax benefit 
and claim of right manifestations of the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment 
model. This result is due to an analytical defect with respect to the character 
of income through the "amount realized" fiction. While commentators have 
offered fictions to reconcile either the Crane or cancellation of indebtedness 
doctrine, 507 these fictions generally have overlooked the fact that the cancellation 
of indebtedness doctrine in its case-law and statutory forms also constitutes a 
flawed manifestation of the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment model. ~ux 
505. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 380 n.10. The majority's opmaon, in response to 
Justice Blackmun's view that year I should be reopened to account for inconsistent events in year 
2 as long as the statute of limitations has not run, reasoned that even if the judicial origins of 
the tax benefit rule supported that approach the Court still would be obliged to follow the partial 
codification of the tax benefit rule in § Ill, which contemplates a year 2 correlative adjustment 
when the taxpayer did receive a tax benefit to a deduction in year I. /d. At least Justice O'Connor 
apparently does not view this principle as limited to the tax benefit rule because her concurring 
opinion in Tufts primarily turns on the fact that the Commissioner historically had included the 
year 2 correlative adjustment in amount realized. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 320 (O'Connor, J ., concurring); 
see supra note 496. In short, generally once Congress (or perhaps the administrator) has acted in 
reliance upon an erroneous judicial approach, by building other provisions premised on such 
conceptual approach or partially codifying the doctrine itself, subsequent courts will not correct 
past errors. /d. In the case of the Crane fiction, the subsequent enactment of §§ 1245 and 1250 
clearly were premised upon inclusion of debts on depreciable property in the amount realized. Hence, 
a direct reversal of Crane's inclusion in amount realized would render the political compromises, 
particularly in § 1250, a nullity. 
506. The Court in Tufts was careful to indicate that other conceptual approaches to the 
transactional correlative adjustment other than inclusion in amount realized were permissible, but 
the Commissioner had chosen the "amount realized" route and hence, courts should follow it as 
a reasonable interpretation. See supra note 505. 
507. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 484, at 6, 34-35, 44-45, 50-51, 59-60; Rosenberg, supra note 
234, at 107-29. 
508. The judicial and codified forms (§§ 108 and 1017) of the cancellation of indebtedness 
doctrine vary in three substantial ways from the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment model. 
First, the judicial adjustment-of-purchase price exception now embodied in §§ 108 and 1017's reduction 
of tax attributes alternative to year 2 recognition of cancelled debt. Second, the judicial and statutory 
exception for debtors insolvent in year 2 when the debt is cancelled. Third and most significantly, 
the year 2 characterization of cancellation of indebtedness income as ordinary income in all cir-
cumstances. The first two exceptions have been criticized widely by commentators as conceptually 
deficient. See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 445, at 1162, 1166; Comment, supra note 494, at 
936-38. However, we believe the characterization issue is the most significant. Commentators believe 
generally that income from discharge of indebtedness is always ordinary. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra 
note 234, at 114, 126. Indeed, Congress in its 1980 reworking of §§ 108 and 1017 stated that "the 
rules of the bill are intended to carry out the Congressional intent of deferring, but eventually 
collecting within a reasonable period, tax on ordinary income realized from debt discharge." S. 
REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980-2 C.B. 625. Such deferral generates 
an increase in ordinary income through the reduction of ordinary deductions in future years, but 
such deferral is limited to transactions in which encumbered property is not transferred by the 
taxpayer. Thus, a distinction should be drawn between situations when a debt is discharged and 
the taxpayer retains encumbered property, and when the discharge accompanies a transfer of the 
property from the taxpayer. Furthermore, a distinction should be drawn for the model between 
purchase money indebtedness and debt placed on property after acquisition. The first type of debt 
is included in basis, the later is not. Under conventional doctrine both are included in the amount 
realized (at least when the debt is nonrecourse) when the taxpayer disposes of the property. 
Cunningham, Payment of Debt with Property-The Two-Step Analysis After Commissioner v. Tufts, 
38 TAx LAW 575, 583 n.53 (1985). However, when the liability was included in the basis and 
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ii. Kirby Lumber 
The Tufts Court also distinguished the cancellation of indebtedness doc-
trine.509 In United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. ,510 the progenitor of that doctrine, 
the corporate taxpayer purchased some of its bonds on the open market at less 
than their issue price. The Kirby Court distinguished its prior decision in Bowers 
v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.s' 1 which held that a taxpayer realized no income from 
the repayment of foreign debt with marks that had fallen in value because the 
locus proceeds had been invested in an enterprise that failed so that "the 
transaction as a whole was a loss." 512 The Court stated that "there was no 
depreciation taken, distortion of income arises by characterizing the gain as capital gain, as discussed 
above. See supra note 498. On the other hand, when the taxpayer places an encumbrance on 
property after he has acquired it, in effect, he is mortgaging current appreciation. Based on the 
assumption that the taxpayer will repay the loan, it is not included in income and the taxpayer is 
not treated as having sold the property. When the taxpayer does not repay the loan in year 2, the 
appreciation from year I is realized. Consequently, in such circumstances the gain attributable to 
the subsequent indebtedness should be capital gain. For example, assume that the taxpayer's basis 
in a capital asset is $60 (financed with the purchase money mortgage of $60). The current fair 
market value of the capital asset is $100 and the taxpayer increases his indebtedness from $60 to 
$100 and pockets the $40 in loan proceeds. The taxpayer's basis remains $60. Subsequently in year 
2, the fair market value of property declines to $60. At this point, assume that the taxpayer transfers 
the property to the lender in satisfaction of the entire $100 indebtedness (either because the 
indebtedness is nonrecourse or because the lender does not find it worth while to pursue the debtor 
for the balance of the debt). The taxpayer's basis remains $60. Under traditional analysis, the 
transfer of the property in satisfaction of nonrecourse indebtedness and probably in satisfaction of 
recourse indebtedness, results in an amount realized of $100 from which the $60 basis is subtracted 
resulting in a capital gain of $40. This result is in fact the correct result in this situation. Under 
the two-step analysis advocated by many commentators, see supra note 497, the sale or exchange 
portion would be limited to the fair market value of the property ($60) resulting in no sale or 
exchange gain and consequently, there would be cancellation of indebtedness of $40 ordinary income. 
Because the taxpayer actually has sold the $40 in appreciation in the property in year I (which we 
only know in year 2) the proper character of the $40 gain in year 2 is capital gain. However, the 
$40 should not be viewed as a part of the amount realized. Rather, the correlative adjustment in 
year 2 should be backing out the assumption that there was no sale of the asset in year I. Because 
we now know that there was a sale, there should be a $40 capital gain in year 2. While this result 
compons with the traditional sale or exchange analysis, the traditional sale or exchange analysis 
produces an incorrect result when the debt is acquisition indebtedness and subsequently, depreciation 
is taken. See supra note 498. 
509. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 311 n.ll. "The Commissioner also has chosen not to characterize 
the transaction as cancellation of indebtedness. We are not presented with and do not decide the 
contours of the cancellation-of-indebtedness doctrine." /d. The Court acknowledged that under one 
view the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine rested on the same initial premise as the Tufts' analysis 
(i.e., an obligation to repay), but the Coun saw the freeing-of-assets rationale (with its purported 
inapplicability to nonrecourse indebtedness), the insolvency exception, and the automatic ordinary 
income result of the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine as differing from its analysis. /d. Com-
mentary has pointed out that the Tufts decision misread some of these exceptions or doctrines. 
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 494, at 957-58, 959 n.l56. The commentary has suggested various 
harmonizing modifications to either the Crone doctrine or the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine. 
A premise of this Article is that the same underlying rationale supports both doctrines, but that 
the couns have misapplied both doctrines. 
510. 284 U.S. I (1931). Bittker points out that the taxpayer in Kirby Lumber did not issue 
the subsequently repurchased bonds for cash, but rather in exchange for its own preferred stock 
with dividend arrearages. Bittker, Income for the Cancellation of Indebtedness: A Historical Footnote 
to the Kirby Lumber Co. Case, 4 J. CoRP. TAx'N 124 (1977). 
511. 271 u.s. 170 (1926). 
512. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3. In fact, the Court's decision in Kerbaugh-Empire on the 
surface rested on two different theories: (I) a subsequently overturned definition of "income" as 
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shrinkage on the assets and the taxpayer made a clear gain."s 13 The Court also 
reasoned, cryptically, that as a result of the bond purchase at a discount, the 
taxpayer "made available . . . assets previously offset by the obligation of 
bonds now extinct .... [The taxpayer thus] realized within the year an accession 
to income .... "S 14 The "transaction as a whole" and "freed assets" rationales 
have been criticized soundly as conceptually ill-founded and leading "to a 
confusing patchwork of rules and exceptions .... "sis The Kirby Court should 
have relied explicitly upon a year 1 exclusion-year 2 transactional correlative 
adjustment analysis. In the words of a leading commentator "borrowed funds 
are excluded from gross income when received because of the assumption that 
they will be repaid in full and that a tax adjustment is required when this 
assumption proves erroneous. "S16 The adjustment under the year 2 transactional 
limited to "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained 
through sale or conversion of capital," 271 U.S. at 174; and (2) that the in effect cancelled debt 
was equalled or exceeded by a five year string of business losses financed by the money borrowed, 
that was more than the cancelled debt, so that "[t)he result of the whole transaction was a loss." 
/d. at 17S. Both of these arguments were directed at a traditional accession to wealth definition 
of income, that, as shown supra at note 438, is erroneous. Note that during the tax years in which 
the losses were incurred, there was no net operating loss carry over provisions in the Code. See 
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 3S9 (1931). Consequently, one could argue that the 
cancelled debt had not given rise to a tax benefit. Much later, courts held that the tax benefit 
exception overrode the cancellation of indebtedness rule. See Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 139-
44. Commentators have argued that Kerbaugh-Empire is limited under current law, if it is still valid 
at all. See id. at 122, 129; Bittker & Thompson, supra note 44S, at 1163; Eustice, Cancellation of 
Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. REv. 
22S, 243 (19S9). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the Tax Court and 
held that "when the accession to wealth resulting from the cancellation of indebtedness is otherwise 
income, Kerbaugh-Empire does not prevent the taxation of gain." Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
790 F.2d 1409, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986). 
The transaction-as-a whole analysis commonly is thought to serve as the conceptual basis for 
the judicial adjustment-of-purchase price approach. See supra note S08; Eustice, supra at 243-4S; 
Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 122. The rationale provides that by adjusting basis (or under the 
current statutory framework basis or other tax attributes) the income recognized is postponed, see 
supra note S08, and if postponed long enough, it will be possible to determine whether the transaction 
as a whole resulted in gain or loss. In effect this is an open transaction alternative in year 2, rather 
than in year I, pursuant to a year 2 correlative adjustment framework. 
Sl3. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3. 
Sl4. /d. The error in viewing year 2 transactional correlative adjustments in terms of traditional 
accessions to wealth in year 2, rather than as income in year I that is recognized in year 2 is 
discussed supra at note 438. This passage is the source of the freeing-of-assets theory that the Court 
in Tufts used to distinguished the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine from the Crane doctrine. 
Tufts, 461 U.S. at 311 n.ll. Indeed, the Tax Court has held the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine 
inapplicable to a discharge of nonrecourse liability on the grounds that no assets are freed. See 
Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. IS, 32-33 (1979) (The taxpayer argued for application 
of cancellation of indebtedness in order to use insolvency exception or to defer recognition through 
adjustments to basis under § 1017. Instead the Tax Court applied Crane doctrine.). 
The freeing-of-assets theory also supports the judicial rule that an insolvent debtor realizes 
income only to the extent his assets exceed his liabilities after the cancellation. Lakeland Grocery 
Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289-292 (1937). See generally Comment, supra note 494, at 964 
n.l83. Commentators have pointed out that the underlying basis of this doctrine probably is that 
you shouldn't kick someone when he is down. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 44S, at 1160; 
Eustice, supra note S 12, at 246. 
SIS. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 44S, at 1162, 1166; see also Comment, supra note 494, 
at 936-38. 
Sl6. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 44S, at 116S; see also Comment, supra note 494, at 
944. 
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correlative adjustment model in most cases should have been ordinary income 
recognition in year 2 similar to Kirby Lumber. This is true because the "sale 
or exchange" and "capital asset" requirements for capital gain or loss treatment 
were not met in year 1 viewed with the hindsight of year 2 events. Cancellation 
of postacquisition indebtedness, in connection with transfer of the encumbered 
asset however, should yield capital gains treatment under the model.m Here 
too, Congress intervened after chaotic case-law development to require recognition 
of ordinary income only when a deferred adjustment was not possible. 518 
In summary Crane, Tufts, and Kirby Lumber ultimately rest on a year 2 
correlative adjustment to back out the tax consequences of an erroneous year 
1 assumption. However, courts must yield in the first instance to the "reasonable" 
administrative interpretation of "amount realized" as implementing the correlative 
adjustment, albeit with character imperfections-an interpretation relied upon 
by Congress in the depreciation recapture provisions, refined, as it were, in the 
crucible of political compromises. The courts also must yield in the second 
instance to the congressional preference for deferral of the year 2 correlative 
adjustment. 
2. Conclusion: Understanding the Correlative Adjustment Model 
A fundamental to a correct understanding of the transactional correlative 
adjustment model is that when the correlative adjustment in year 2 is an income 
adjustment, the traditional definition of income as accession to wealth actually 
does not occur in year 2.519 The accession to wealth occurred in year 1, but is 
taken into account in year 2 in order to achieve a "rough transactional parity 
in tax" with a similar transaction with all events occurring in year 1.520 Thus, 
a theme running throughout the mature case-law manifestations, but not the 
legislative codifications of the model is that value is determined in year 1 not 
year 2.m The deep structure in this situation provides a clearer reflection of 
income than the annual accounting principle normally would yield. 522 Equally 
fundamental to the deep structure is the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that 
the case-law doctrines of assignment of income, open transaction or recovery 
of basis reporting,523 and even the annual accounting principle,524 merely are 
517. See supra note 508. 
518. /d. 
519. See White, supra note 391, at 504. 
520. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 383. Year 2 correlative adjustments are not a precise 
way of dealing with year 1-year 2 problems due to rate changes. /d. at 378 n.IO. See generally 
supra note 451. "While annual accounting precludes reopening the earlier year, it does not prevent 
a less precise correction-far superior to none-in the current year, analagous to the practice of 
financial accountants." 460 U.S. at 380 n.ll. 
521. See supra note 412. 
522. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 380 n.ll ("This concern with more accurate measurement 
of income underlines the tax benefit rule and always has."); see Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 
411, at 477-78 {underlying principle of tax benefit, claim of right, Kirby Lumber and Crane-Tufts 
doctrines is "to prevent distortion of a taxpayer's true economic picture-to prevent a false reflection 
of a taxpayer's true economic gain"). All these rules rest upon the assumption that tax results 
which truly reflect ecomonic gain always further, and never conflict with, congressional, administrative, 
or judicial tax policies. /d. at 478. 
523. See supra text accompanying note 241. 
524. See supra text accompanying note 226. 
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administrative rules, designed in the first two instances to reflect income more 
fairly. 
The courts, however, initially did not fashion these doctrines based upon 
a conceptualization of the model. Rather, the courts were guided, in the context 
of year 2 income adjustments, by a desire to prevent the effect of a double 
deduction or unwarranted tax benefit. 525 Unfortunately, the early decisions adopted 
legal fictions couched in terms of accessions to income in year 2 in order to 
justify the year 2 transactional adjustments. These fictions usually worked well 
enough in their initial context, but with mechanical rather than functional 
application by their progeny, came to yield unsound results. 
Subsequently, Congress stepped in repeatedly with piecemeal legislation that 
was increasingly technical, sometimes inconsistent, and that often contained 
provisions that obscured the pattern of the model. Moreover, once Congress 
acted, courts were forced to bow to its will, even when the legislature codified 
past judicial error. In light of the above discussed problems, what is left for 
the courts and the drafters of regulations? When Congress has not spoken 
directly, courts, or on occasion the drafters of regulations, may and should 
525. The double deduction rationale of Crane initially was interpreted by the courts as a term 
of art to prevent unwarranted tax benefits. See Millar v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 
1978). In Millar, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the failure to include a nonrecourse 
debt in amount realized would result in "the type of double deductions of which the Supreme 
Court so clearly disapproved in Crane." /d. at 215; see also Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656, 
662 (1977) (Sterrett, J., concurring) ("Petitioners have received a tax benefit of economic substance 
attributable to the use of their Crane basis. When the property is disposed of the petitioners must 
account for these deductions."). Similarly, the Tax Court in Tufts required inclusion of a nonrecourse 
debt in the amount realized, even though the debt exceeded the fair market value of the securing 
property. Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 765-66 (1978). Following Crane and Millar, the 
court stated that "since the total liability has been taken into consideration in determining other 
tax consequences of the transaction [i.e., basis and depreciation], the total liability must be included 
in the amount realized when the property is transferred." /d. at 766. The views expressed by the 
courts implicitly equate "double deduction" with its underlying foundation- "clear reflection of 
income." See Cain, supra note 484, at 39-40; Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 473-78. 
This broad interpretation of "double deduction" hit a significant snag when the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals heard Tufts on appeal. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981). 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals clearly misunderstood the transaction in question. The taxpayer 
excluded a nonrecourse debt from gross income in year I and constructed an apartment complex. 
/d. at 1059. By including the loan in the basis of the building, the taxpayer was entitled to greater 
depreciation deductions. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court finding no 
"double deduction" because the depreciation deductions attributable to the debt would be "recap-
tured" by a corresponding decrease in the basis of the property. /d. at 1061. If the taxpayer 
decreased his basis and included the debt in amount realized, he would be "taxed twice on the 
same component of gain." ld. Nevertheless, a "double deduction" (or more properly a "double 
exclusion") did in fact exist because the taxpayer excluded the loan proceeds from income and also 
excluded the relief from indebtedness from amount realized. See generally Del Cotto & Joyce, supra 
note 411, at 476. The court's failure to account for the initial exclusion of the loan proceeds may 
be attributable to its literal reading of "double deduction" in Crane. The court merely looked for 
a "double deduction" with respect to depreciation deductions and could not find one. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, but did not utilize the "double 
deduction" rationale. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.IO. Nevertheless, the Court reached the right result 
with respect to the amount of the gain. However, accounting for prior receipt of loan proceeds 
and depreciation deductions, by including them in amount realized or reducing basis, respectively, 
will lead to an improper characterization of the gain. See supra notes 493, 457 & 469. For additional 
discussion of the "double deduction" rationale, see Cain, supra note 484, at 39-40; Del Cotto & 
Joyce, supra note 411, 473; Comment, supra note 494, at 930-35. 
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respond to year I and year 2 issues keeping the transactional correlative ad-
justment model in mind. Contingent income is such an area. 
B. Correlative Adjustment Model for T Level 
Treatment of Contingent Income 
Conventional doctrine holds that a liquidating T which distributes a con-
tingent claim in year I under section 336, does not realize income taxable in 
year I under the recapture income exceptions to section 336 through 338 if 
either of the following are true: (I) the distribution accompanies a sale to P 
of the rest of T's asset in a transaction to which section 337 applies; or (2) 
the distribution is pursuant to a sale of a controlling interest of T stock to P 
in connection with P's section 338 election.526 Conventional wisdom also holds 
that in a section 337 transaction in which T is not in existence in year 2, when 
the distributed claim matures or first can be valued, neither T nor its former 
shareholders as transferees are chargeable with a T level tax. 527 This state of 
events encouraged some judges and the Service to attempt "rough justice" by 
closing the transaction outside at the T shareholder level on the date of distribution 
in order to produce both ordinary income and partial capital gain at the 
shareholder level to compensate for T's escaped inside income tax. 528 Unfor-
tunately, two wrongs do not make a right. The reverse transmutation of what 
should constitute capital gain under the model to partial ordinary income usually 
will not offset the sum of the inside T level ordinary income tax avoided and 
an outside T shareholder capital gains tax on the net gain. Thus, T shareholders 
would fare better than if they had never incorporated. On the other hand, if 
T remained in existence until year 2, it would be liable for taxes in year 2 
under the assignment of income doctrine because the income that T earned 
earlier now could be "accrued. " 529 This situation presents serious implications 
for discontinuity with section 338. 
Notwithstanding the conventional misidentification of clear reflection of 
income with accrual tax accounting principles, the actual rationale for not taxing 
T in year I is administrative convenience530 because the claim is difficult to 
value in year I. However, Burnet v. Logan531 indicates that such administrative 
rules on occasion must yield to necessity. An example of such a situation is a 
contingent claim that must be valued in year I for estate tax purposes. 532 Thus, 
T could be taxed in year I, but if subsequent events in year 2 show the assumed 
value put on the transaction in year I to be incorrect, a correlative adjustment 
will be necessary in year 2 when T is no longer in existence. In light of these 
possibilities, it would be advisable to defer reporting the transaction until year 
2 because fewer year 2 adjustments would be necessitated and more transactional 
accuracy would result.m 
526. See supra text accompanying notes 335-39, 348 & 385. 
527. See supra text accompanying note 338. 
528. See supra text accompanying notes 265-66. 
529. See supra text accompanying notes 333, 339 & 349. 
530. See supra text accompanying note 328. 
531. 283 U.S. 404 (1931); see supra note 237. 
532. See authorities cited supra at note 241. 
533. Justice O'Connor makes a strong argument for a year 2 correlative adjustment in all 
cases. See supra note 467; see also supra note 461. 
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The prior law broke down at this point because T no longer was in existence 
in year 2 when the income was initially deemed to be "earned." The answer 
to this conventional doctrine rationale is that the income was not earned in 
year 2. Rather, it was actually earned in year 1, ~_~.~ but could not be measured 
in year 1. Any year 2 T level income from a contingent claim is not a traditional 
accession to wealth in year 2, but rather, a rough approximation of transactional 
accounting that is far better than no approximation at all.m Thus, in order to 
avoid a distortion of income with respect to contingent items in the context of 
a cost-basis corporate acquisitions, the courts should effect an equitable solution 
of correlative adjustment following the premises of the model. 
This Article recommends a judicial or regulatory adoption of a transactional 
correlative adjustment in year 2 to a surrogate for the then liquidated T, that 
is, the former T shareholders as transferees of a hypothetical year 2 T level 
inside tax. This correlative adjustment, in conjunction with modification of the 
time value of money regulations applicable to contingent income, effects a 
transactional approximation to collection in year 1 by T. Such a year 2 additional 
tax is preferable to both avoidance of the T level taxation with no other 
adjustments and the rough justice of taxing the former T shareholders in year 
2 on their outside gain, in part, on an ordinary basis under closed transaction 
reporting. This approach also is preferable to section 341 for that matter. A 
year 2 adjustment is chosen because the annual accounting principle remains in 
effect, with respect to the courts and the Treasury, to the extent that year 1 
transactions cannot be reopened to make an adjustment for year 2 events. 536 It 
is true, on a tabula rasa that reopening year 1 and making an adjustment of 
open years would effect transactional justice better than the correlative adjustment 
in year 2. Yet this approach, as noted by Justice O'Connor in Hillsboro, 537 does 
not solve the problem when the subsequent event is not in year 2 but in year 
5 after the statute of limitations has run on year 1. In that case, a correlative 
adjustment in year 5 would be necessary-a proliferation of rules. Therefore, 
consistency between year 5 and year 2 requires correlative adjustments in both 
years, absent congressional intercession. 
The suggested T level model provides that the former T shareholders should 
be taxed in year 2 as transferees for the constructive year 2 income of T in 
addition to their outside gain on the distribution. A determination of rates for 
the year 2 hypothetical T level tax should start at T's top bracket in year I. 
It is true that such an "exact" tax benefit approach did not fare well the last 
time around, 538 but there is support for such an approach in the temporary 
regulations. 539 While the former T shareholders are taxed twice under this ap-
proach-once on the outside net value of the distributed claim in year 2 or 
year 1, and twice as the transferee for the hypothetical T level tax in year 2-
that is exactly what is supposed to happen with respect to claims, contingent 
or otherwise, earned by T in the ordinary course of its business. Sections 337 
534. See supra text accompanying note 519. 
535. See supra text accompanying note 520. 
536. See supra text accompanying notes 224-28. 
537. See supra note 467. 
538. See supra text accompanying notes 230-31 & 451. 
539. See infra text accompanying notes 503-07. 
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and 338 never were meant to shield such inside income. However, the outside 
former T shareholder level gain should be reduced by the surrogate hypothetical 
inside T level tax liability. 
C. Correlative Adjustment: Open Transaction Model for Shareholder 
Level Treatment of Contingent Income 
The open transaction-recovery of basis approach was the more common 
response to a contingent income item at the T shareholder level. The major 
defect in this case-law approach was its failure to account for the time value 
of money element. 54" The cases should have imputed an interest factor into the 
contingent amounts in order to reflect income clearly. The proposed and tem-
porary time value of money rules adequately handle this problem. 541 However, 
when these rules are not applicable, the courts should apply an interest factor 
as discussed below. 
Year 2 income adjustments to a transaction closed in year I, for example, 
should retain the same character as the payment in year I in order to back out 
the deduction or exclusion in year 1. 542 However, the year I closed value of an 
excluded contingent claim should be a discounted value in year 2. This is necessary 
to reflect the fact that the contingent payments were to be received in the future. 
This discount is the equivalent of interest, 543 and hence, when the year 2 payments 
are received, courts conceptually should treat an appropriate portion of the 
payments as interest. Only the balance should retain the year I character. 544 The 
year 2 discount payments are not backing out the year I transaction, but stand 
on their own in year 2 as the equivalent of interest. Hence, these discount 
payments should be ordinary income to the former T shareholders. 
The year I closed transaction-year 2 correlative adjustment approach was 
rejected by the conventional doctrine because of a flawed understanding of the 
Arrowsmith doctrine. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Campagna v. 
United States, 545 refused to apply Arrowsmith to year 2 payments that were 
fixed in amount in year I, but contingent with respect to collectability, and that 
exceeded the amount at which the payments were closed when distributed in a 
complete liquidation in year I. The court reasoned that Arrowsmith and its 
progeny "involve[ d) situations where the tax treatment of a subsequent adjustment 
of an earlier sale or liquidation is determined by considering the nature of the 
earlier transaction. " 546 In the case of payments in excess of the closed amounts, 
"the payments actually made in the disputed tax years were at all times un-
conditionally required to be made .. ,"547 so that no adjustment was being made. 
Under the model, to the extent that payments in year 2 exceed the year I closed 
540. See supra text accompanying notes 426, 452 & 477. 
541. See supra text accompanying notes 202-08 & 214-15. 
542. See supra text accompanying notes 445-50. 
543. United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965); 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra 
note 104, at 108. 
544. See Note, supra note 224, at 1014-15 nn.96-97. 
545. 290 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1961). 
546. /d. at 685; see supra note 276. 
547. Campagna, 290 F.2d at 685. The Campagna approach has been criticized severely. Note, 
supra note 238, at 78-79; see also supra note 276. 
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amount plus an interest factor, the earlier transaction in fact is being "adjusted." 
Namely, the earlier year 1 closing assumed that the taxpayer would receive only 
the closed amount plus interest. Payments in excess of this base prove that the 
earlier assumption was wrong. Hence, a correlative adjustment for additional 
income must be made in year 2. In order to backout the earlier exclusion from 
income, the character of that correlative adjustment must be the same as the 
earlier excluded income would have been, capital gains in most instances. 5•K 
When the proposed and temporary time value of money5•~ or accounting 
rental and service rules55" would be applicable transactionally to a year 2 payment 
of a T level contingent claim distributed in connection with P's acquisition of 
T's assets or stock, courts could pursue either of the following strategies: (1) 
fashion under the model an appropriate interest charge (presumably equal to 
the applicable test rate), in which case regulations and the Code would not 
impute interest; or (2) not judicially impute interest, in which case the regulations 
would impute such interest. Simplicity militates that the latter approach be 
followed. 551 When, however, the legislative rules are not properly applicable, as 
in the case of a liquidating distribution of a T owned contingent claim arising 
other than from T's sale or exchange of property, providing services, or renting 
property, the courts should follow the model to appropriately impute an interest 
factor for the year 2 payments under such a claim at both the former T 
shareholder and ultimate obligor levels. 552 
D. Conclusion 
For forty years the Service, courts, and commentators have sought a rationale 
that supports the T and T shareholder model's result, particularly at the T 
level. 553 The suggested year 2 transactional correlative adjustments analysis scarcely 
extends the "open-closed with correlative adjustment, character remains the same" 
clearer reflection of income transactional model that is fully supported, even 
mandated in our view, by existing Supreme Court precedents. 55• The suggested 
surrogate T level tax is a year 2 correlative adjustment that more clearly reflects 
income that was not reported properly in year 1 through exclusion from T's 
tax base in its final tax year (year 1). 555 The same "general principle" of clear 
reflection of income underlies the tax benefit and the other transactional ex-
ceptions to the annual accounting principle. 556 When the drafters of the section 
338 regulations (discussed below) incorporate by reference "general principles 
548. See supra text accompanying notes 442-43. 
549. See authorities cited supra note 541. 
550. See supra note 221. See generally Whitesman, Section 467: Tax Planning for Deferred-
Payment Leases, 5 VA. TAX. REV. 345 (1985). 
551. See supra note 467. 
552. See supra notes 543-45. 
553. See supra text accompanying notes 243 & 314; Farer, supra note 242, at 531-532 ("the 
distributee would ... be liable both for the corporate income tax and for a capital gains tax."); 
Note, supra note 238, at 62 (tax former T shareholders as transferee for year 2 hypothetical T 
liability). 
554. See supra text accompanying notes 437-552. 
555. See Cunningham, supra note 508, at 581 n.39; White, supra note 391, at 504. 
556. See supra text accompanying notes 441-52. 
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of law," 557 they should consider these deep structure principles as well as con-
ventional doctrine. The drafters of the regulations could continue to rely on a 
year 2 "continuation" of Old pss in which the burden is then borne by either 
the Neo-T or the former T shareholders as transferees. 559 Instead of a fiction 
that generates discontinuities with section 337 if Neo-T is the surrogate, the 
drafters should embrace explicitly the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment 
model in the section 337 and 338 regulations. 
V. SECTIONS 337 AND 338 AND CONTINGENT INCOME ITEMS: 
INTO THE ~ELSTROM 
A. Introduction 
Contingent income items can arise in three contexts in connection with a 
P cost basis acquisition of T's assets or stock. First, P may purchase T's assets 
or stock for consideration consisting, in part, of a contingent amount such as 
a percentage of postacquisition T production or profits. 51\(' This transaction is 
known as an "earnout. " 561 Second, T's assets may include a contingent claim 
that P purchases pursuant to T's complete liquidation to which section 337562 
applies or is deemed purchased by Neo-T in a section 338 transaction. 563 Third, 
T's assets may include a contingent claim that T distributes in a complete 
liquidation governed by section 336 pursuant to a section 337 bulk sale of its 
assets, 564 or in connection with P's purchase of control of T and election of 
section 338, resulting in a deemed section 336 distribution. 565 
The 1982 Conference Report and the 1982 "Blue Book" Staff General 
Explanation, addressed contingent T level income in the earnout context. 566 
557. See infra text accompanying note 574. 
558. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3TU> ex. (4)(v); see also Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-
3T(h)(l)(i), 1.338(b)-3T (h)(2)(i)-(ii)(A) (1986); supra text accompanying note 343. 
559. See supra note 334. Use of Neo-T as a surrogate or transferee for Old T, rather than 
the former T shareholders as surrogates leads to discontinuities between §§ 338 and 337 transactions. 
See infra text accompanying notes 640-43. 
560. Only the contingent payout by a P corporation for the old T stock transaction is addressed 
by the legislative history. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338 (1986); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 566 & 603. Commentators also focused solely on the contingent purchasing corporation payout 
in year 2. See, e.g., Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.05[3), at 12-39 to -47; Ginsburg, supra 
note 35, at 287. 
561. Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.05[3), at 12-39 to -47. 
562. The typical operation of § 337 is described supra in text accompanying notes 14-25. 
563. The paradigm operation of § 338 is set forth supra in text accompanying notes 35-38. 
564. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24. This combination bootstrap acquisition (dis-
tribution to T shareholders of assets not desired by the purchasing corporation) and § 337 sale of 
the balance of T's assets was the breeding place for the classic avoidance of corporate level taxation 
abuse. See infra text accompanying note 652. 
565. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
566. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, supra note 37, at 537. The Report stated that: 
[l)n some cases, recapture items may be includible in income for a period during which 
the target corporation is included in a consolidated return of the acquiring corporation. 
Where, for example, there is an adjustment for the purchase price for its stock based 
on post-acquisition date earnings of the target corporation, there may be additional 
amounts of recapture income. Such additional income is to be separately accounted 
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Contrary to the general tenor of the 1982 legislative history of section 338/~7 
the Conference Report and 1982 Joint Committee Staff treated Neo-T as ac-
counting separately for any contingent T level recapture income in year 2. 5M At 
least the format of the 1982 version of the deemed Old T bulk sale was perhaps 
reconcilable with this approach because the deemed sales price equalled P's basis 
in its T stock properly adjusted for Old T's liabilities and other relevant items. 
In addition, P's basis would include its contingent payments in year 2. 5~'~ The 
current version of section 338(a), which will have retroactive effect, measures 
Old T's deemed sale price by the fair market value of its assets as of the 
acquisition date. 570 Nevertheless, the proposed571 and temporary section 338 reg-
ulations generally provide that the price at which Old T is deemed to have sold 
its assets in such a contingent payment context must be redetermined to take 
into account "adjustment events," occurring after the acquisition date, such as 
year 2 contingent P payments. 572 These Regulations provide that Neo-T must 
separately take this adjustment into account in year 2 as an item of Old T as 
if recognized by Old T in its year 1. Old T's year 1 is deemed to end on the 
acquisition date. This adjustment cannot be offset by Neo-T's year 2 income, 
loss, credit, or other item, but it can be offset by any Old T unexpired NOL 
carry forward as of the end of year 1.573 
The temporary section 338 regulations purport to incorporate "general law 
principles" in fashioning these rules. These regulations provide that: 
Pursuant to general principles of tax law, the price at which old 
target is deemed to have sold its assets shall be adjusted to take into 
account adjustment events occurring after the acquisition date. In 
making such an adjustment, recognition of income (or loss) ... with 
respect to the deemed sale of assets is not precluded because the 
target is treated as a new corporation after the acquisition date. To 
the extent general tax law principles require seller to account for 
for and may not be absorbed by losses or deductions of other members of the acquiring 
corporation's affiliated group. 
/d. The 1982 Bluebook more succinctly provides the same. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133-
35. 
567. See supra notes 109 & 566. 
568. See supra note 566. 
569. I.R.C. § 338(a)(l) (1982) (as amended in 1984); see 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 
995-96. 
570. See supra note 98. Under conventional authority, a sale at the T level for fair market 
value would result in a closed transaction, and any year 2 payments received in excess of such 
closed value would be characterized as ordinary income due to the absence of a sale or exchange 
in year 2. These payments probably would not be sheltered by § 337. See supra text accompanying 
notes 267-70. 
571. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-IT to -3T were adopted as proposed regulations. 51 Fed. 
Reg. 3634-35 (1986). 
572. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(h)(l)(i) (1986). The term "adjustment events" is defined 
as increases (or decreases) in the consideration paid for recently or nonrecently purchased Old T 
stock, reductions in T's liabilities included in the adjusted basis as of the beginning of the day 
after the acquisition date, and Old T liabilities that have become fixed and determinable. Temp. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-IT(b)(2)(ii) (1986). 
573. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-3T(h)(2)(i), (ii) (1986). 
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adjustment events, target . . . shall make such an accounting, which 
may result in reporting income, loss, or other amount. 57~ 
The underlying thrust of these regulations is that Old T continues in year 
2, or even year 5 or 25, and it recognizes the contingent item in year 2, 5, or 
25575 under an exact tax benefit approach. This is accomplished by recomputing 
a hypothetical increase in Old T's year 1 tax, subject to a deemed section 337 
shield including the year 2 contingent item that Neo-T must report in year 2. 571' 
Thus, the temporary regulations effect a melange of consolidated return and 
separate return year principles. 577 The general tax benefit rule and reopening of 
year 1 as articulated seem to violate the annual accounting principle. More 
significantly, the proposed temporary section 338 regulation's approach of deemed 
continuation of Old T in year 2, with Neo-T as surrogate, results in a lack of 
parity between sections 337 and 338 in some instances. m 1 f this approach is 
extended to contingent items held by Old T on the acquisition date, it could 
result in the year 2 contingent payment being attributed to the wrong taxpayer. 57" 
The suggested model would eliminate these section 337-338 discontinuities. The 
model is more consistent with existing judicial and administrative exceptions to 
the annual accounting principle and results in less distortion of income than 
the conventional doctrine or the proposed and temporary section 338-3T reg-
ulations. Hence, the final regulations should adopt explicitly the model with 
respect to both section 337 and 338 regulations. 
B. Contingent Payments in the Legislative History of Section 338 
Before continuing, a quick review of the mechanics of section 338(a) will 
prove helpful. Section 338(a) separates the deemed bulk section 337 sale by Old 
T to P into two transactions. The first transaction is a sale of Old T's assets 
at fair market value in a single transaction to which section 337 applies. This 
sale is deemed to take place on the date P acquires control of T. 5xo The second 
is a purchase by Neo-T of all of such assets, beginning the day after the 
574. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(h)(l )(i) (1986). 
575. T.D. 8072, 1986-11 I.R.B. 7. 
Although included in new target's return, such income, loss, or other amount is 
separately accounted for as an item of income, loss, or other amount of old target. 
Therefore, such income, loss, or other amount may not be offset by income, loss, 
etc. of new target .... Also, ... net operating losses and net capital losses of old 
target may be carried forward to offset income items described above. 
/d. at 10. Examples illustrating subsequent adjustments to adjusted gross-up basis more clearly 
articulate that the year 2 income is recognized by Old T and Neo-T merely reports this year 2 Old 
T income. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(j) ex. (4)(v) (1986). 
576. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-3T(h)(2)(i), 1.338(b)-3T(j) ex. (4)(v) (1986). 
577. The separate return principle has the support of legislative history. See supra note 566. 
For a discussion of the separate return approach, see Dunn, The New Consolidated Return Regulations 
May Preempt the Field in Determining the Allowance of Operating Losses, 23 TAX L. REv. 185 
(1968). 
578. See infra text accompanying notes 640-43. 
579. See infra text accompanying notes 651-62. 
580. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97. 
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acqwsitlon date. ~x 1 Congress stated that generally Neo-T is treated as a new 
corporation with a clean slate of tax attributes. ~x2 As discussed above, the purpose 
of this bifurcation was to put Old T's recapture income from the deemed section 
337 bulk sale into a separate return for the short tax year of Old T. This 
income is not includable in either Old T's or P's consolidated group. ~x., In the 
original 1982 version, section 338(a)(l) used P's adjusted cost basis as the deemed 
sales price of the deemed section 337 bulk sale. ~x• Today the fair market value 
is used to determine the deemed sales price. m Neo-T's basis in its assets equals 
P's purchase price increased by "recently purchased stock" and adjusted for 
liabilities and other re.levant items. ~xn Of course, the whole point of this statutory 
exercise is the taxation of Old T only on its "recapture income," albeit in a 
separate return. <x7 
I. The 1982 Version of the Section 388 Deemed Bulk Section 337 Sale 
Under the original version of bifurcated sale, a contingent purchase price 
by P posed problems because Old T's sales price could not be determined until 
P's total cost was determined in the year 2. The House and Senate Tax Conferees 
were aware of this problem of contingent income in 1982. The conferees pointed 
out in the Conference Report accompanying the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982 that: 
[R]ecapture items may be includible in income for a period during 
which a target corporation is included in a consolidated return of the 
acquiring corporation. Where, for example, there is an adjustment to 
the purchase price for its stock based on post-acquisition date earnings 
of the target corporation, there may be additional amounts of recapture 
income. Such additional income is to be separately accounted for and 
may not be absorbed by losses or deductions of other members of 
the acquiring corporation's affiliated group.~xx 
The unarticulated premises of the above conclusion in the legislative history~x" 
is that part of P's contingent purchase price may be allocated in year 2 to T's 
recapture items, thereby increasing their fair market value in that year and 
581. See supra text accompanying note 100. 
582. See supra text accompanying notes 109 & 567. 
583. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
584. See supra note 569. 
585. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
586. See supra text accompanying note 101. 
587. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
588. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, supra note 37, at 632; accord 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 
35, at 135. 
589. The implication of the legislative history cited supra in note 558, is that the Neo-T will 
report the additional recapture income triggered by the year 2 contingent payment in year 2. This 
impliction conflicts internally with the discussion adjacent to recapture items in the Conference 
Report in which T is treated as a new corporation; indeed, the report states that the "target 
corporation is treated as a 'new' corporation after the acquisition date for all purposes relating to 
its tax liability either as the selling or purchasing corporation." H.R. CoN F. REP. No. 760, supra 
note 37, at 537. 
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particularly in the case of statutory depreciation recapture, thereby increasing 
the "recapture income. " 5<J<1 In addition, such redetermined recapture income is 
allocated to Neo-T in year 2 and not in year I. 5y 1 
2. 1984 Version 
The House Bill (H. R. 4170), 592 which evolved into the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 1984, contained amendments to section 338m which provided that the 
deemed sale price by Old T was to be "fair market value" just as the final 
1984 provision mandates. The House provision for the determination of Nea-
T's basis in its constructively purchased assets would have treated the assets of 
Old T as being purchased by Neo-T at an amount equal to their "adjusted fair 
market value. " 5Y4 The House bill mandated that the regulations provide "proper 
adjustment" for contingent P payment and other items with respect to both 
Old T's deemed sales price and Neo-T's basis. 5y5 Note that the commentators 
on the original section 338(c)(l) suggested treatment of contingent P payments 
as another "relevant item" under the original section 338 basis and deemed 
sales provision. 596 The House Committee Report adopted that suggestion: the 
fair market value of the assets under the House version properly would have 
been adjusted in order to determine the price at which the assets were deemed 
sold and purchased for contingent payments and other relevant items. "The 
consideration to be paid by the acquiring corporation may depend, for example, 
on the amount of the acquired corporation's liabilities which are not fixed on 
the acquisition date or on the post-acquisition date earnings of the acquired 
corporation.'' m 
590. In statutory depreciation recapture, the fair market value of the disposed of property is 
a ceiling on the statutory recapture. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1245(a)(l) (West Supp. 1986). Only by 
increasing the fair market value can depreciation recapture be increased. 
591. Neo-T only can be included in the consolidated return of the acquiring corporation in 
the tax year ending after Old-T's acquisition date. See I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504(d) (West Supp. 1986). 
592. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 612(d)(5)(a) (1984). 
593. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L. 98-369, § 
712(k)(l) (1984). 
594. See supra note 592. 
595. H.R. 4170, supra note 592, at § 612(k)(5)(8), would have amended § 338(b) by adding 
a new paragraph 5 that authorized regulations providing proper adjustments to the deemed purchase 
price for Neo-T and deemed sales price for Old T "for contingent payments and other relevant 
items." The accompanying Committee Report provided as follows: 
The fair market value and the adjusted fair market value of the assets are to be 
properly adjusted under regulations, in determining the price at which the assets are 
deemed sold and purchased, for contingent payments and other relevant items. The 
consideration to be paid by the acquiring corporation may depend, for example, on 
the amount of the acquired corporation's liabilities which are not fixed on the acquisition 
date or on the post-acquisition date earnings of the acquired corporation. In some 
cases, the aggregate bases in the stock of the acquired corporation held by the acquiring 
corporation on the acquisition date may exceed the fair market value of the assets on 
such date. Proper adjustment to the basis of assets may be made to reflect such excess. 
H.R. REP. No. 432 (Part 2), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1622 (1984). 
596. Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.05[3], at 12-41 to -42; Ginsburg, supra note 35, 
at 286-87. 
597. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 107, at 1622. 
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The Conference compromise also bifurcated the treatment of the Old T and 
Neo-T transaction, by treating Old T's sales price as fair market value. 59" 
However, reference to contingent payment adjustments (to the deemed sale and 
deemed purchase) was deleted from the final 1984 Act. Moreover, the Conference 
Committee Report was silent with respect to contingent payments. 5w However, 
in describing the new deemed sale at fair market value by Old T the "Bluebook" 
General Explanation of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, states that ''there 
was no intention to change the treatment under prior law of contingent payments 
and liabilities.' '"""1 
C. Proposed Temporary Section 338 Regulations 
The proposed temporary section 338-3T regulations purport to incorporate 
such prior law in the form of "general tax law principles. """ll However, they 
apply such general principles in year 2 in the context of a P contingent payment 
for Old T stock in a manner that is unprecedented both judicially and admin-
istratively.@ These regulations contain a year !-year 2 construct, which provides 
that Old T must recognize in year 2 gain or loss arising from a year 2 change 
in Old T's deemed sales price that is reported by Neo-T in year 2.1\()J However, 
Neo-T's year 2 tax on income or loss resulting from such change is determined 
as if such gain or loss had been recognized "[t]o the extent general tax law 
principles require seller to account for adjustment events"""14 in Old T's taxable 
year ending on its acquisition date (year 1).""15 The acquisition date is deemed 
to be the date that P acquired 80% control of T's stock. Neo-T must account 
separately, in year 2, for such year 2 income as an item of Old T,""16 subject 
598. See H.R. 4170, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. § 712(k)(l) (1984). 
599. See H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1220-21 (1984). 
600. 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 996. 
601. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(h)(i) (1986). 
602. A major thesis of this Article is that the courts in dealing with contingent items that 
have effects in two tax years have but two options: (I) hold the transaction open in year I, with 
the year 2 reporting taking the same character as the transaction would have had in year I, but 
at the taxpayer's year 2 rates and brackets; or (2) close the transaction in year I on the best 
assumption possible and, if such assumption proves untrue in year 2, back-out the earlier reported 
transaction with an item of opposite effect (deduction for income, income for deduction). The back-
out transaction should be of the same character and should be taxed at the year 2 rates and 
brackets. It appears that, absent express statutory authority, the regulations have but the same two 
choices. Indeed, Professor Lee over a decade ago stated, in an opinion letter based upon: (I) the 
open transaction doctrine; (2) the tax benefit rule; (3) the claim of right doctrine; and (4) the 
Arrowsmith doctrine, that Treasury regulations reopening year I on the basis of an assumption 
proving untrue in year 2 or even year 20 were invalid. See Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(c)(2) (as amended 
by T.D. 6841 (1965)). Thus, if the proposed and temporary § 338 allocation regulations literally 
reopened year I, they clearly would be invalid. Reopening year I to determine the tax, but not 
imposing interest on any deficiency or refund until year 2, probably is invalid as well. Cf. supra 
note 451. Congress, however, can use year I brackets, rates, and income to determine the shape 
of a year 2 correlative adjustment. See supra notes 455 & 461 (discussing § 1341 ). 
603. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)·3T(h)(2)(i) (1986). 
604. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(h)(l)(i) (1986). The term "adjustment events" is defined 
supra at note 572. 
605. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(h)(2)(i) (1986). Acquisition date is defined supra in text 
accompanying note 98. 
606. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)·3T(h)(2)(ii)(A) (1984). 
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to Old T's tax attributes unexpired as of the end of such year.'"'7 The temporary 
regulations'"'8 specifically defer the treatment of any year 2 (or 5 or 25) original 
issue discount, arising out of the year 2 payment, to the regulations under 
sections 1274, l275(d), and 483.'"1'} These regulations would impute interest into 
the year 2 contingent payment, based on the years lapsed since year l, 610 thereby 
reducing the principal payment portion of the contingent payment. The principal 
payment portion is the only portion that the temporary section 338 contingent 
income regulations apply to specifically. 611 
The proposed and temporary section 338 regulations allocate P contingent 
payments in year 2 to Neo-T's assets in that year under a "residual method" 
of allocation formula. 612 This allocation formula limits generally such year 2 
allocation to year l fair market value which is defined as the fair market value 
on the day following the acquisition date. 613 Thus, all year 2 contingent payments 
607. /d. Ginsburg suggested that in the case of contingent income in year 2, Old-T's year 
unexpired NOL should be available to offset such income. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 287. 
608. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3TU) (1986). 
609. These regulations are discussed supra in text accompanying notes 202-23. 
610. The mechanics of imputed interest, including the applicable interest rates are set forth 
supra in text accompanying notes 202-08. 
611. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3TU) (1984). 
612. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-2T(b), (c) (1986). 
In some cases a taxpayer who has purchased a going business at a premium (that 
is, the price that it has determined exceeds the apparent aggregate fair market values 
of the tangible and intangible assets, including goodwill and going concern value) might 
take the position that it is entitled to allocate an amount in excess of fair market 
value to the basis of individual assets. Relying on one interpretation of the judicial 
and administrative authorities, the taxpayer would separately value each of the acquired 
assets and allocate the premium among all the assets (other than cash and cash 
equivalents) in proportion to their relative fair market values in a so-called "second-
tier allocation." 
Proposed and temporary regulations recently issued by the Treasury Department 
under section 338 mandate a residual method of allocation (and prohibit a second-
tier allocation) in determining the basis of assets acquired in a qualified stock purchase 
for which a section 338 election is made or is deemed to have been made, i.e., a 
stock purchase which is treated as a purchase of assets for tax purposes. The deemed 
purchase price of the assets if first reduced by cash and items similar to cash, and 
is then allocated sequentially to two defined classes of identifiable tangible and intangible 
assets; any excess is allocated to assets in the nature of goodwill and going concern 
value. After the reduction for cash items, no amount may be allocated to any asset 
in the next two classes in excess of its fair market value. 
S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1986) (footnotes omitted). Second·tier allocation and 
residual allocation are discussed in Krieger, Tax Accounting: New Section 338 Regs Provide for 
Use of Residual Method in Goodwill Allocation, 13 J. CoRP. TAx'N 159, 162-63 (1986). 
Due to the difficulty in valuing the goodwill and going concern value, the drafters of the 
temporary regulations decided to value and assign basis to other assets first with the residual excess, 
if any, being assigned to goodwill and going concern value. Preamble, supra note 202. Of course, 
the fact that goodwill generally is nonamortizable undoubtedly was a major reason for designing 
the residual method contained in the § 133 regulations. SeeS. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
251 (1986). 
613. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T(c)(l) ( 1986); Temp. Treas. § 1.338(b)-3T(d)(l) (1986). 
1987] Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions 237 
would be allocated to goodwill,614 unless P's base price for control of T was 
less than the fair market value on the deemed purchase date. 61 ~ 
I. Validity of the Regulation's Year /-Year 2 Construct 
The temporary and proposed regulations treat Old T as continuing until 
year 2, as may be seen in Example (4) of Temporary Regulation616 section l-
338(b)-3TU). In Example (4), P purchased control of Old T on January 1, 1987 
and timely elected section 338.617 In 1990 (Year 4) P makes a contingent payment 
(an earnout)m for the stock of Old T. This payment is allocated in part to 
section 1245 property because P's base price was less than fair market value.61 ~ 
As a result, additional income is recognized under section 1245 
by old T for 1990 on the deemed sale of old T's assets. This income 
must be reported on the consolidated return of new T [Neo-T] for 
1990, but it is separately accounted for and may not be absorbed by 
losses or deductions of P or of new T. 620 
The 1982 legislative history treats Neo-T or new T as a new corporation, 
either as the selling or purchasing corporation, and with respect to tax liability, 
Neo-T has a clean slate of tax attributes. 621 This treatment raised the presumption 
that Old T was dead. While the 1984 House bill specifically would have addressed 
the problem of contingent payouts at the T level, 622 the 1984 Conference bill 
left prior general principles undisturbed. 623 Under such principles a liquidated T 
614. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(g) (1986), provides a special rule for allocating a basis 
increase (or decrease) resulting from adjustments directly relating to income produced by a particular 
contingent income asset (e.g., a patent, copyright, or secret process), under which fair market value 
is redetermined in year 2 and used as the ceiling for allocation rather than year I fair market value. 
See generally T.D. 8072, supra note 575, at 10. 





620. /d. § 1.338(b)-3T(j) ex. (4)(v). 
621. S. Rep. No. 494, supra note 37, at 193. This same legislative history also stated that 
recapture income includible in income for a subsequent tax year in which the target is included in 
a consolidated return of the acquiring corporation, is to be accounted for separately, presumably 
by Neo-T. /d. at 194; see supra note 588. These two references do not, however, dictate that Old 
T should be treated as continuing in year 2. The references are perfectly consistent with a conceptual 
model under which year 2 transactional correlative adjustments are made, rather than reopening 
year I with such correlative adjustments being reported separately by Neo-Ts. However, the in-
consistencies that this continuation of Old T approach produces with a § 337 transaction in which 
Old T is liquidated in year I are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 640-43. 
622. See supra text accompanying notes 107 & 595. 
623. The absence of any provision or reference in the conference bill and report is displayed 
supra in text accompanying notes 598-99. The 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 996, however, 
states that Congress did not intend to change prior general principles. Although the 1984 Bluebook, 
as is the case with all bluebooks, is not strictly legislative history, because it is written after the 
bill is enacted and is not passed upon by the House or Senate Committees, many courts give it 
significant weight because the writers of the bluebooks also write the committee reports. See, e.g., 
Bank of Clearwater v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 289, 294 (1985) ("(A]Ithough said Joint Committee 
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that is no longer in existence in year 2 when the contingent income matures, 
is not taxable in either year 2 or year 1.624 Assuming, arguendo, that Old T 
continues, the articulation of the temporary regulations result, through meas-
urement of Old T's year 2 income625 by recomputing its year 1 income and then 
including the hypothetical increase in year 1 tax in Old T's year 2 income, 
smacks of a legislative solution626 and contravenes existing general tax principles. 
The annual accounting principle bars reopening Old T's year 1.627 Technically, 
however, the temporary regulation's solution does not constitute reopening year 
1 if interest is not charged from year 1 by the Treasury on Neo-T's year 2 
addition to income. 628 Nevertheless, the recomputation of year 1 income and 
the subsequent addition to year 2 income as articulated is closer to a legislative 
solution than the existing judicial year 2 correlative adjustment exceptions to 
the annual accounting principle.629 
The model differs from the temporary regulations because the model assumes 
that Old T does not continue. This assumption is consistent with the legislative 
history. Therefore, in year 2 the correlative adjustment cannot be made to the 
same taxpayer's year 2 income. Accordingly, the model is not bound by the 
existing precedents' prohibition of no "exact" tax benefit. In addition, in 
calculating year 2 adjustments the model uses Old T's year 1 top bracket rate 
as the starting point for computing a hypothetical year 2 tax that is to be added 
to some taxpayer's year 2 income. 630 The final regulations should do the same. 
The premises of the model are consistent with the existing general case law 
principles,631 however, the proposed temporary and section 338-3T regulation's 
premises are not. Note that the temporary regulation's solution of determining 
the amount of the year 2 addition to tax by recomputing Old T's year 1 tax 
is a perfectly acceptable legislative solution.632 
2. Impact of Time Value of Money Principles 
The proposed time value of money regulations first separate the contingent 
P payments for the Old T stock from the noncontingent or fixed payments. 633 
explanation . . . does not rise to the level of authority given to legislative history, we do not 
percieve it as totally worthless or unenlightning. It is common knowledge that the congressional 
staff of the joint committee works very closely with members of Congress in drafting legislation 
and undoubtedly has 'eyeball knowledge' of the fundamental purpose of a given piece of legislation. 
Absent any definitive legislative history that is more revealing, . . . it is proper nevertheless, in 
the absense of any comparable contrary assertions, to give substantial weight to this explanation."); 
see also Federal Power Comm'n v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 411 U.S. 458, 472-73 (1973); 
Reed v. United States, 743 F.2d 162 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1984). The retention of general principles 
when the statute is silent would be the case in any event. 
624. See supra text accompanying notes 335-39, 348, 366, 383, 385 & 398. 
625. See supra text accompanying note 620. 
626. See supra note 602. 
627. See supra text accompanying notes 224-25. 
628. Cf. Note, supra note 224, at 1013-15 (discussing failure of Congress to provide for interest 
in the context of I.R.C. § 1341). 
629. See supra text accompanying notes 453-518. 
630. See supra text accompanying notes 444-51. 
631. See supra text accompanying notes 453-525. 
632. The committee staff could have benefitted from an earlier deep structure analysis that 
would have avoided the problem of regulations that override the annual accounting principle and 
that are based solely on an erroneous reading of general principles and on sparse legislative history. 
633. See supra text accompanying note 204. 
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If the year 2 contingent P payment does not provide adequate interest for the 
years elapsed since year 1, the proposed regulations bifurcate the year 2 payment 
into a principal payment equal to the discounted year 1 value of the total 
contingent P payment made in year 2 and the balance is considered interest. 634 
The proposed and temporary section 338 (contingent payment) regulations 
expressly state that the examples illustrating year 2 payment by P of theretofore 
contingent amounts are "exclusive of interest." These regulations make a cross 
reference to the regulations under sections 1274, 1275(d), and 483 for rules that 
characterize deferred contingent payments as principal or interest.63s Implicitly, 
therefore, the year 1-year 2 separate return construct of contingent payment 
allocation and income portion of the proposed and temporary regulations may 
apply only to the principal portion of the year 2 P contingent payment. The 
principal portion of the contingent payment is considered to be earned by Old 
T in year l/36 but the interest portion is not.637 Indeed, when the contingent 
payment claim is distributed to the former T shareholders on the acquisition 
date, the entire OlD is earned by the former T shareholders.638 A subsequent 
distribution could result in some OlD at the T level, but it should be a consolidated 
return item of Neo-T in year 2. 639 The final regulations should address this 
situation. 
3. Year 2 Section 338 Earnout Discontinuity with Actual 
Section 33 7 Transaction 
The proposed and temporary section 338-3T regulations (governing year 2 
contingent payments), illustrate a year 2 increase in Neo-T' s separate return 
recapture income that arises from a year I noncontingent P price that is less 
than the fair market value of Old T's assets plus a year 2 contingent P payment.640 
Thus, Neo-T would be taxed in year 2 only to the extent that the P contingent 
payments are allocable as of year 1 or year 2 to assets that generate recapture 
634. See supra text accompanying notes 206-08. 
635. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3TU> (1986). 
636. See supra text accompanying notes 519-20. 
637. Cf. Stewart's Trust v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 682, 692-94 (1975) (when income is 
attributable to services rendered after distribution of property, assignment of income does not apply). 
Similarly, when interest is earned after the assignment of the property, the assignment of income 
doctrine should not apply in year 2. 
638. This analysis would apply when Old T distributed, in connection with acquisition of its 
stock or assets, an existing contingent claim to its shareholders, to the extent the OlD accrued after 
the distribution. Any OlD that had accrued prior to the distribution would indeed be an item 
attributable to Old T and hence, subject to correlative adjustment in year 2. With respect to a 
purchasing corporation's contingent purchase price note, the payment normally would be distributed 
almost instantaneously from Old T to the fonner target shareholders, or more frequently the claim 
would go directly from P to the former T shareholders, with the result that OlD would not be 
attributable in any way to Old T or for that matter to Neo-T. 
639. Old T could seU its assets to P, in part or whole, for a contingent purchase price and 
hold such contingent claim for up to a year after the sale utilizing the full distribution period of 
§ 337. See supra text accompanying note 61. In such a case, OlD in the contingent claim "earned" 
from the date of sale to the date of distribution would be an Old T item resulting in a correlative 
adjustment in year 2 to the former T shareholders. 
640. For a description of the allocation procedures under the temporary § 338 regulations and 
a year 2 reallocation to property, other than goodwill or going concern value, when the base price 
is less than fair market value in year I, see supra note 10 I. 
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income or other exceptions to the section 337 General Utilities shield. 641 The 
section 337 shield would continue to apply in year 2 to contingent income 
allocable to a nonrecapture item. 
Yet in a T asset sale structured as a section 337 transaction T is liquidated 
usually in year 1. Under conventional doctrine, when T distributes a contingent 
payment obligation to its shareholders T is not taxed in year 1 for any additional 
recapture income that might arise in year 2 due to the contingent payments. 
This is true because the contingent payments cannot be valued in year 1.642 
Moreover, because T will not be in existence when the contingency is resolved 
under an earnout in year 2, conventional doctrine would not tax Old T in year 
2 for any recapture income created by the contingent payments. In contrast, in 
a section 338 contingent earnout transaction the proposed and temporary reg-
ulations as shown above would tax Neo-T in year 2 as to P's contingent purchase 
price payments made to the former T shareholders in year 2 to the extent they 
create additional recapture income. Thus, contrary to the intent of Congress, 
new discontinuities would be created under the proposed and temporary regu-
lation's approach.643 
The model would tax the Old T shareholders as a surrogate for Old T in 
year 2 in both a section 337 and section 338 transaction. The model addresses 
the fact that Old T no longer exists and imposition of the year 2 income and 
accompanying tax on an appropriate successor is necessary to avoid distortion 
of income. Thus, discontinuity is eliminated. In a legislative context, perhaps 
an explicit election with respect to whether Neo-T, P, or the former T shareholders 
would be responsible would be appropriate. 
4. Contingent Income Items Retained by Neo-T or Distributed to 
Former T Shareholders in "Bootstrap Acquisition, 
The proposed and temporary section 338 allocation regulations do not speak 
of allocation to assets, or recognition by Old T or New T, of year 2 payments 
of contingent income items held by Old T and owed by third parties. This lack 
of attention presumably is because the year 2 payments would not affect P's 
cost and, hence, the allocation formula. Bear in mind, however, that the proposed 
and temporary regulation's underlying assumption that Old T continues in year 
2 subject to general law principles644 logically would dictate an application of 
general principles to an Old T continuing in year 2 in regard to contingent 
income items that it distributed or continued to hold from year l. 
a. Sections 337 and Deemed Section 337 Sale by T of Contingent 
Income Items 
Under the majority conventional doctrine that equates assignment and clear 
reflection of income with accrual of income, if T sells a contingent item to P 
641. For "recapture income" exceptions to the shield of§§ 336-338, see supra text accompanying 
notes 16-22, 60 & 99. 
642. See authorities cited supra in notes 335-39, 348, 366-67, 383, 385, 398 & 425-36. 
643. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
644. See supra text accompanying notes 574-75. 
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pursuant to a complete liquidation to which section 337 applies, T would not 
be taxed in year 1 at the time of the sale. Similarly, because Old T would not 
be in existence at the time that the contingent item matured in year 2, the 
contingent item would not be taxed in year 2.645 However, the more functional 
approach taken in Storz v. CommissionerM6 would tax T at the time of the sale 
of the contingent claim on its fair market value. If P later collected a greater 
amount from the purchased claim than P's allocated basis, the entire excess 
would be ordinary income because it did not arise from a sale or exchange.M7 
In contrast under section 338, Old T similarly would be taxed on the sale 
of the contingent claim in year 1. However, consistent with the proposed and 
temporary regulation's year 2 continuation of Old T approach, if later amounts 
were collected, Neo-T would be treated as having received the additional amounts 
as a surrogate of Old T, the year 1 seller, rather than as Neo-T the purchaser. 
Under the conventional doctrine, additional payments received by a seller in 
year 2 relate back for character to the original transaction in year 164M except 
for the appropriate discount factor. 649 In year 2, Neo-T would be taxed only 
on the amount of the claim that gives rise to "recapture income" in year 2. 
In many instances this would be the entire principal amount if the contingent 
claim were for services rendered by Old T. However, a contingent claim could 
carry a capital character. An example of such a contingent claim is a claim for 
damages to goodwill or additional sales price of a capital asset. Under the model 
and the section 338 year 2 continuation of a seller (Old T) approach, such 
additional amount, excluding any interest discount, would be shielded by the 
deemed section 337 shield.650 In short, the temporary section 338 regulation's 
year 2 continuation of Old T with respect to contingent income could produce 
another, albeit narrow, discontinuity with a comparable section 337 transaction. 
Such a discontinuity would arise when Old T is no longer in existence in year 
2 and thus escapes tax on any year 2 contingent payments. 
b. Distribution by T of Contingent Income Item 
When Old T distributes the contingent claim to its shareholders in connection 
with a section 337 or 338 transaction-a classic bootstrap acquisiton-651 the 
greatest discontinuities and potential for abuse arise. In a section 337 transaction 
such abuse constitutes the classic misfortune of avoidance of T level income. 651 
A liquidating T is not taxed under conventional doctrine at the liquidation in 
645. See Storz v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 84, 92-94 (1977), rev'd, 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 
1978). See generally supra text accompanying notes 335-39, 348, 366-67, 383, 385, 398 & 425-36. 
646. 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978). 
647. See supra text accompanying notes 362-65. 
648. See supra text accompanying notes 237-56. 
649. See supra text accompanying notes 542-44. 
650. In most instances the discount would not be taxable at the Old T or Neo-T level, but 
rather, at the former T shareholder level. See supra note 639. 
651. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 31, 38 & 40. 
652. See, e.g., Note, supra note 238, at 78 (precociously advocating that open transaction-
deferred basis reporting should continue at the former T shareholder level, while the Old T level 
problem of escaped income due to its nonexistence in year 2 "should be resolved by the attribution 
of the income from the distributed contingent rights to the corporation with the shareholder being 
held derivatively liable as a corporation's distributee"); see also Farer, supra note 242, at 531-32. 
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year 1 because the claim cannot be valued.653 Moreover, because a liquidated 
T is not in existence when the claim matures in year 2, the liquidated T is not 
taxed under conventional doctrine. 654 Similarly, the shareholders of a liquidated 
T are not taxed directly for this year 2 T level tax, notwithstanding the fact 
that an outside closing of the transaction at the T shareholder level may have 
occurred. 655 
Issues arise with respect to whether these "general principles" would apply 
at the T level in a section 337 transaction when the former T shareholders in 
effect "close" the sale to P transaction outside by not electing out from the 
section 453 installment reporting transaction. The T shareholders are not likely 
to elect out despite the receipt of a contingent claim permitting basis recovery 
because of factors that outweigh the ability to use basis recovery outside for 
the distributed contingent claim. 656 The failure to elect out apparently did not 
make a difference under conventional doctrine and should not make a difference 
under section 337. If the bootstrap acquisition is structured so that the value 
of the T stock redeemed could be used as a valuation for the contingent claim 
(for example, a non pro rata redemption), a different result might obtain.657 If, 
however, the former T shareholders receive the contingent claim pro rata, and 
in particular, if they do not turn in any T stock, this curb on the T level abuse 
would not be available.m 
In contrast, under section 338, following the logic of the proposed and 
temporary section 338-3T regulations, if Old T distributes a contingent claim 
to the Old T shareholders, in connection with the sale of control of its stock 
followed by a section 338 election by P, Neo-T could be taxed in a separate 
return as a continuation of Old T with respect to the principal portion of the 
distributed contingent claim when it matures in year 2.659 In year I section 336 
653. See supra text accompanying notes 304-18. While these authorities deal with open and 
closed transactions primarily at the shareholder level, the same principle should apply at the corporate 
level. 
654. See authorities cited supra in notes 335-39, 348, 366-67, 383, 385, 398 & 424-36. 
655. See supra text accompanying note 258. 
656. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
657. In a non pro rata distribution of a contingent claim in exchange for stock of some 
shareholders, but not others, the value of the surrendered stock can be determined by reference to 
the value of the stock that is not surrendered. See B. BITTKER & J. EusTICE, supra note 23, , 
11.03, at 11-12 n.21. Once the value of the surrendered stock is determined, the value of the 
contingent claim received for the stock can be determined in year I under the barter-equation 
analysis. Cf. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-l(d)(2)(ii) (1986). 
658. Rev. Rul. 56-513, 1956-2 C.B. 191, 192, provides that in a pro rata distribution (in the 
context of a partial liquidation under § 346(a) of prior law) the number of shares deemed to be 
surrendered is calculated by solving the following ratio: 
x cash distributed 
total shares 
outstanding 
fair market value 
of net assets 
where x equals the number of deemed shares surrendered. See also Rev. Rul. 74-544, 1974-2 C.B. 
I 08 (same calculation). 
If a contingent item with an unascertainable fair market value is distributed, one could not 
use this ruling to determine the number of shares deemed to be surrendered. As such, one could 
not back into the value of the contingent item as suggested supra in text accompanying note 657. 
659. Following the assumption of the regulations that Old T continues in year 2, see supra 
text accompanying notes 616-20, under conventional doctrine Old T would be taxed in year 2 with 
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is deemed to apply to the distribution, rather than section 311.660 In this instance 
under conventional doctrine Old T would not be taxed under section 336 (or 
section 311 for that matter) because the contingent claim cannot be valued at 
the time of the distribution in year 1.661 However, because under the rationale 
of the proposed and temporary section 338-3T regulations, Old T continues to 
live on in year 2 with Neo-T as its surrogate, presumably Neo-T will be taxed 
in year 2 when the distributed contingent claim matures pursuant to a separate 
return approach.662 Unless P has discounted its purchase price for the Neo-T 
liability with respect to the contingent income, the former T shareholders would 
enjoy a windfall. The former T shareholders enjoy capital gains treatment outside 
without any inside T level toll charge because the toll charge is borne this time 
by Neo-T. In short, not only does discontinuity between sections 337 and 338 
occur in the context of a distribution of a contingent claim, but the direction 
of the proposed and temporary regulations probably is incorrect in this context 
when applied to the party that bears the ultimate tax liability. 
5. Adoption of the Model 
Under the model, the T level tax that is applied to contingent income items 
maturing in year 2 (in transactions other than a sale of the item) would be 
taxed in year 2 to the former T shareholders who receive the contingent payments 
as transferees for a hypothetical Old T corporate level tax. Such an assessment 
is necessary in order to prevent distortion of Old T's income. The rates for 
this year 2 hypothetical T level corporate tax should begin at T's top marginal 
bracket in year I. True symmetry with existing year 2 transactional correlative 
adjustment judicial precedents would require use of the former T shareholders 
actual year 2 income. However, recognizing the equitable origin of the year 2 
transactional correlative adjustment in this virgin area, courts might feel less 
restrained in the absence of an actual Old T, to fashion a more equitable year 
2 correlative adjustment using Old T's marginal year I rates. 663 This transferee 
"inside" tax would be in addition to the "outside" former T shareholder level 
tax, 664 but the "inside" tax probably should be subtracted from the outside 
respect to the principal portion of the distributed claim, even though the claim already has been 
distributed to the former T shareholders. See supra text accompanying notes 333, 334, 341 & 349. 
The special treatment of the OlD or discount portion of the contingent payment is discussed supra 
in note 639. 
660. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
661. See authorities cited supra in notes 335-39, 348, 366-67, 398 & 425-36. 
662. See supra note 659. 
663. The predecessor to the Federal Circuit, in its development of the tax benefit doctrine, 
recognized that such rule was equitable in origin. In shaping the tax benefit recovery of the deduction, 
the Court of Claims initially applied the year I rates and brackets in year 2. Perry v. United States, 
160 F. Supp. 270, 272 (Ct. Cl. 1958). However, a decade later the Court of Claims reversed itself, 
still acknowledging that the year 2 adjustment was equitable, but refusing to follow the ultimate 
logic of such premise (i.e., year I brackets and rates), on the theory that "any change in the 
existing law rests within the wisdom and discretion of the Congress." Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. 
v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 403 n.5 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Because the Court of Claims in Perry used 
only year I brackets and rates without an interest charge, its approach produced precisely the same 
effect as the proposed and temporary § 338-3T regulations. If such an approach is not within the 
power of the courts, surely it is not within the power of the tax administrators, absent specific statutory 
authority. 
664. See supra note 539. 
244 The Journal of Corporation Law [Winter 
payment. In addition, if a year 1 transaction is "closed" and subsequently 
amounts in excess of the closed value plus an appropriate interest charge are 
received in year 2, these amounts should retain the same character as the original 
transaction. 665 Year 2 income items arise from a correlative adjustment and, 
hence, partake of the same character as the year 1 transaction. 666 To the extent 
that the distributed contingent payment would have been shielded in year 1 by 
section 337 or deemed shielded by section 337 in a section 338 transaction if 
its value were determinable, the income and the correlative adjustment in year 
2 should be shielded analogously to the exclusion under the (no) tax benefit 
doctrine. In a sale of a contingent item in year 1, Old T would be taxed in 
that year and no year 2 correlative adjustment would be necessary. 
a. Contingent P Purchase Price: Earnout 
In the context of a P contingent "earnout" component of P's purchase 
price, the former T shareholders in a section 337 asset sale would be taxed in 
year 2 as transferees of a hypothetical Old T corporate level tax when the P 
contingent payments were received. This treatment applies notwithstanding the 
fact that Old T is no longer in existence. The tax is imposed in addition to 
the former T shareholders' outside tax on the liquidation of T that was reported 
either on the installment method or basis recovery method. However, the section 
337 shield should apply in year 2 to the extent that it would have applied in 
year 1, and in many instances the contingent payment will not generate additional 
hypothetical Old T level recapture income. 
Following the model, in a section 338 transaction the former T shareholders 
would be liable as transferees for any year 2 hypothetical T corporate level tax 
on recapture income arising from contingent P earnout payments. Theoretically, 
the same economic effect would be obtainable by the proposed and temporary 
regulation's approach of imposing tax liability on Neo-T in a separate year 2 
return as a continuation of Old T, provided that P had discounted or reduced 
the earnout formula in anticipation of such tax liability. However, the possibility 
that P and the former T shareholders will fail to consider this potential Neo-
T tax liability, 667 and the loss of simplicity that results from one set of rules 
665. See Note, supra note 238, at 92-93. 
666. See supra text accompanying notes 542-48. 
667: There appears to be no hard data on the extent that taxpayers actually use § 338, much 
less the extent that a purchasing corporation discounts its purchase price for the Old T recapture 
tax in year I to be borne by Neo-T. Anecdotal discussions with leading tax practitioners at tax 
conferences over the past several years, as well as with local practitioners at such conferences, 
support the assumption that most acquisitions of public targets take the form of purchases of stock 
by a purchasing corporation or an affiliate, perhaps cast in the form of a cash option merger 
without a § 338 election, because the purchasing corporation's purchase price will not justify 
economically the § 338 election's immediate tax costs. In other words, to the purchasing corporation, 
the § 338 election consists of a comparison between immediate costs of the recapture income tax 
accompanied by a gradual recovery of stepped-up basis by Neo-T over a period of years, with no 
immediate tax costs accompanied, however, by a carry-over basis (and lower depreciation deductions) 
in the acquired assets. Conversely, in the context of a small non publicly traded T, most purchasers 
that have the negotiating advantage acquire assets rather than stock (i.e., a § 337 transaction). 
There are, however, many transactions in which § 338 imposes particular advantages. See supra 
note 106. 
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for a section 337 earnouts (former T shareholders as surrogates) and another 
for section 338 earnouts (Neo-T as surrogate), militates toward utilizing the year 
2 hypothetical T level tax model in section 337 and 338 earnout transactions. 
The existence of one set of rules for section 338 P contingent payment earnouts 
and another for section 338 bootstrap acquisiton distribution of a T held 
contingent claim, when the former T shareholders constitute the proper surrogate, 
also militates towards utilizing the model. 
b. Sale or Deemed Sale by T of a Contingent Item 
When T sells a contingent item to P, or in the case of a section 338 
transaction, Neo-T retains the contingent item, T's year 1 sale or deemed sale 
would trigger assignment of income to Old T under the conventional doctrine66s 
and the model,66~ to the extent of fair market or ascertainable value in year I. 
The year 2 transaction should not require any adjustments at the former T 
shareholder level because the T shareholders do not receive any additional 
payments. Logically, however, if the model were joined with the proposed and 
temporary section 338 regulation's concept of Neo-T as a year 2 continuation 
of seller (Old T), any additional payments received by Neo-T above the year 
1 fair market value purchase price should be viewed as a correlative adjustment 
in year 2 to the year I transaction.670 Thus, the character of the year 2 payments 
on the claim would follow the character of the claim and, thus, in some cases 
would be shielded in whole or in part by a year 2 correlative adjustment deemed 
section 337 shield. This shield would create discontinuity with section 337 when 
P holds the contingent claim at its year 1 purchase price and excess year 2 
payments receive ordinary status either because of the conventional doctrine's 
lack of a sale or exchange or because of the deep structure's similarity to 
discount. 671 
Parity between section 337 and section 338 transactions would be obtained 
by the final regulations excluding contingent claims held by Old T that are 
collected by Neo-T in year 2 from the Neo-T continuation of the seller in a 
separate return concept. The final regulations should be modified in this manner 
in order to obtain parity with section 337. Accordingly, Neo-T, as a member 
of P's affiliated group, would treat the year 2 excess payments as any other 
purchaser of a (contingent) discounted claim would-as ordinary income. A 
preferable approach simply is to abandon use of Neo-T as the surrogate for 
Old T in all contingent income transactions and instead use the former T 
shareholders as the proper surrogates.672 
668. See supra text accompanying notes 362-65. 
669. In the authors' opinion, assignment of income should apply to the T in year I when it 
sells a contingent item in that year, even if the sale is pursuant to § 337. 
670. See supra text accompanying notes 542-48. 
671. See supra text accompanying notes 269 (sale or exchange requirement) & 543 (similarity 
to discount). 
672. Of course, when the contingent claim has been sold rather than distributed to the former 
T shareholders, they should not be taxed in year 2 on the excess over the purchase price. Nor 
should Neo-T bear any tax as to the discount factor in year 2 because Neo-T did not earn it. 
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c. Distribution by T of a Contingent Item 
When T distributes a contingent claim to some or all of its shareholders 
in connection with a section 337 or 338 transaction, the model is needed to 
reflect income clearly. Under the model, in the case of a section 337 transaction, 
the former T shareholders would bear the hypothetical T level tax within year 
2 with the same character and shield as if T had received the payment in year 
1. Thus, the "transmutation" of income abuse673 finally would be halted. The 
section 337 shield is more likely not to be available with respect to the year 2 
payment of the contingent claim than in an earnout transaction. Contingent 
claims held by Old T often originate in the ordinary course ofT's business and 
hence, should not be shielded by section 337. 
Following the logic of the proposed and temporary section 338 regulations, 
Neo-T would be taxable in year 2 in a section 338 transaction in which both 
of the following are true: (I) Old T distributes a contingent claim to its 
shareholders in connection with the section 338 election pursuant to P's purchase 
of control of T; and (2) Neo-T is in existence when the claim matures in year 
2 and is able to serve as a surrogate for Old T's hypothetical year I addition 
to tax that is attributable to recomputed year I income. This treatment produces 
an absurd result because the full benefit of the contingent claim lays with the 
former T shareholders. Moreover, P almost certainly would not, or could not, 
discount accurately its purchase price for this potential year 2 Neo-T tax. In 
this context at least, the former T shareholder surrogate model, rather than the 
proposed and temporary regulation's year 2 continuation of Old T approach, 
should apply in a section 338 transaction. Otherwise, not only would discontinuity 
result, but Neo-T's income would be distorted severely, and the former T 
shareholders would enjoy an unwarranted windfall. 
d. Conclusion 
The temporary regulations purport to apply general principles of law in the 
area of contingent item distribution. The model year 2 correlative adjustments 
is derived from the policies underlying such general principles. The general 
principles undercut conventional authority on contingent income in liquidations 
and, hence, cost basis corporate acquisitions. The year 2 former T shareholder 
surrogate for Old T hypothetical year 2 tax, derived from the year 2 transactional 
correlative adjustment model, is consistent with deep structure general principles. 
Accordingly, the final regulations could and should use the former T shareholder 
surrogate model explicitly for both section 337 and section 338. Otherwise, 
section 337-338 discontinuity, as well as distortion of income, will result. 
VI. LEGISLATIVE PRoPoSALs: "THE SoNG REMAINS THE SAME" 
The Tax Reform Act of I986 repeals the T level shield of current sections 
3II and 336-338, with a two year transitional rule for long term capital assets 
of closely held small businesses.674 Such amendments, however, do not eliminate 
673. See supra text accompanying notes 257-66. 
674. Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 631(a) and (b) repeal the corporate level General Utils. shield with 
respect to new §§ 336 and 338. Section 631(d) also repeals old § 337 in its entirety. These amendments 
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the contingent income problem. First, with respect to the closely held small 
businesses, the statutory framework will remain the same until 1989, except for 
the long term capital gain limitation.675 While, with few exceptions,676 contingent 
claims generally would not qualify as long term capital gain income, the denial 
of the shield to property other than such capital assets does not produce a 
different result because the assignment of income doctrine ordinarily would apply 
to such assets but for their contingency and the fact that they cannot be valued 
readily. This treatment continues to pose a problem for taxation in year I. 
Therefore, the same year 2 correlative adjustment problem would arise and 
hence, the same question of who is taxed, if anyone, on the inside T level 
income in year 2 would be present. 
In the case of a nonclosely held or large T, the same year 2 problem arises. 
While in such circumstances T would recognize all gain or loss in year 1 under 
the 1986 Code, 677 contingent items would still have to be accounted for in year 
2. In such a sale of assets transaction, 678 the same problems remain because, 
as before, T is liquidated in year 2. Additionally, in the section 338 transaction, 
Neo-T or a carryover basis successor still is in existence in year 2. The 1986 
Code requires, under new section 1060, both the buyer and the seller679 to allocate 
the purchase price of any cost basis assets constituting a trade or business. 6xo 
This allocation must be made in the manner prescribed in section 338(b)(5). 6x1 
The Senate Finance Committee Report, in which this provision originated, 6x2 
states that the "method adopted by the bill is identical to that provided in the 
regulations under section 338 for allocating purchase price to assets following 
a stock purchase . . . . Thus, both parties must use the residual method as 
described in the [2T] regulations under section 338. " 683 The proposed and tem-
porary section 338 regulations684 governing year 2 adjustments, 685 including year 
2 Old T level recapture income from year 2 contingent payments, 686 are contained, 
however, in subsection 3T. 687 Thus, it is not clear whether new section 1060 is 
generally apply to distributions, sales pursuant to a complete liquidation, and deemed asset sales made 
after December 31, 1986. /d. § 633(c). A 2-year transitional rule applies to long-term capital gains 
of closely held "small" corporations. /d. § 633(d). 
675. Cf. Lee, supra note 54, at 1376-77. 
676. For example, proceeds from an involuntary conversion of a capital asset, held for longer 
than 6 months, are entitled to capital gains treatment. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(3)(ii) (West Supp. 1986). 
677. See supra note 674. 
678. Old § 337 is repealed. See supra note 674. 
679. New § 1060's purchase price allocation rule applies to the transferee's basis in applicable 
assets and the transferor's gain or loss. I.R.C. § 1060(a) (West Supp. 1986), enacted by Pub. L. 
No. 99-514, § 641(a); seeS. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 251-55 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 841, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-208 (1986). 
680. New § 1060 applies to any transfer of assets, constituting a trade or business, with respect 
to which the transferee's basis is determined wholly by reference to its purchase price paid for such 
assets. I.R.C. § 1060(c) (West Supp. 1986). 
681. I.R.C. § 1060(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 338(b)(5) authorizes regulations governing 
allocation of § 338 basis among the target corporation's assets. /d. 
682. See H.R. REP. No. 841, supra note 679, at 11-208. 
683. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 679, at 254; see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T 
(1986). 
684. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T (1986). 
685. For applicable adjustment events, see supra note 572. 
686. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-3T(h), U> (1986). 
687. See supra text accompanying notes 601-11. 
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intended to incorporate the contingent income provisions contained in the tem-
porary and proposed regulations. To achieve parity between section 338 and sec-
tion 337 in acquisitions involving contingent items, Congress should have addressed 
explicitly the problem of year 2 contingent income at the old seller level. The 
adoption of the model proposed in this Article would be the best approach. 688 
VII. CoNCLUSION: BAD DocTRINE AND Goon DocTRINE-HAs CoNGREss 
DoNE BETTER? 
The Supreme Court properly launched the principal case-Jaw doctrines that 
should have resolved the T level and former T shareholder level aspects of 
contingent claims arising in connection with sale of T's assets or stock. The 
genesis of the assignment of income and open transaction doctrines, as well as 
the Arrowsmith doctrine was functional-more clear and accurate reflection of 
income.689 Recently, the Supreme Court also has articulated a functional basis 
for the tax benefit doctrine-a correlative or balancing year 2 adjustment to 
achieve an approximation of transactional reporting.690 Good doctrine must be 
based functionally. Unfortunately, the lower courts' devolutionary mainstream 
implementation of these doctrines with respect to contingent items, particularly 
at the T level, historically focused on definitional accounting accrual rules rather 
than on clear reflection of income. Definitional approaches tend to breed bad 
doctrine. At present, the bad doctrine is rectifiable if the recent Supreme Court 
direction in Hillsboro and Tufts is followed faithfully. 
On three occasions Congress has addressed the contingent income liquidation/ 
sale of business problem. The first attempt was in the collapsible corporation 
provisions that applied a surrogate penalty (conversion of long-term capital gain 
to ordinary income) to the former T shareholders rather than taxing T inside 
on its contingent income. 691 This statutory endeavor has been described aptly as 
a "misfortune. " 692 Congress' second foray, the Installment Sales Revision Act, 
provided an adequate basis for resolution of contingent payments at the former 
T shareholder level in legislative regulations. 693 Unfortunately, political consid-
erations resulted in the absurd retention of the case-Jaw basis recovery option. 694 
Last, the "legislative history" of section 338 dealt with contingent income 
at the T level, but only in the context of a P contingent purchase price in a 
section 338 transaction. Moreover, the final resolution by the congressional staff 
and tax administrators was to apply "general principles" to Neo-T as a con-
tinuation of Old T, contrary to the general tenor of section 338's treatment of 
Neo-T as a new corporation with a clean slate of attributes. The common failure 
in Congress' and the tax administrators' attentions thus far has been a failure 
of deep structure analysis centering on clear reflection of income-a common 
688. Otherwise, we predict that the § 1060 regulations probably will incorporate some form 
of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)·3T (1986), thus compounding the problem of the 3T regulation's 
misapplication of general law principles. See supra text accompanying notes 616-32. 
689. See supra text accompanying notes 238, 255, 324-28 & 464-76. 
690. See supra text accompanying notes 453-55 & 492-508. 
691. See supra text accompanying note 262. 
692. See supra note 266. 
693. See supra text accompanying notes 131-45. 
694. See supra text accompanying notes 320-21. 
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failure of tax reform. m Either Congress in amendments to new section 1060, or 
the drafters of the final regulations covering year 2 recognition of income under 
section 338 (and perhaps section 1060), can close this old abuse ofT level distor-
tion of income. If Congress fails to address the problem, the courts could fill 
the gap, but in an area that is restricted increasingly by technical statutes and 
regulations, that option becomes circumscribed more tightly leaving only the choice 
outlined in Dobson v. Commissioner. 696 
695. See supra note 2. 
696. 320 U.S. 489 (1943), reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 231 (1944). The Supreme Court, in effect, 
deferred to the expertise of the Tax Court with respect to the tax benefit doctrine. One may expect 
similar judicial deference to the expertise of the drafters of the regulations. See supra text accom· 
panying note 506. Incidentally, the Dobson doctrine of special deference by courts reviewing the 
Tax Court was rejected by Congress in the predecessor to I.R.C. § 7482(d) (West Supp. 1986). See 
generally Rice, Low, Fact, and Taxes: Review of Tax Court Decisions Under Section //41 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, 50 CowM. L. REv. 439 (1951). 
